

Western Perspectives on War, Peace, Media and Elections in Bosnia - Herzegovina

A Case Study of American Foreign News Reporting

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"A secure nation requires a free press, even one that is cantankerous, obstinate and ubiquitous".

(Judge Murray I. Gurfein ,

The Pentagon Papers case – the U.S. vs. The New York Times)

Prelude

To my landlady in Sarajevo

Dobro jutro, Baba
Your intense dark eyes
Smiling
Waving your arms
Begging me to stay

Moja Baba
You who served me coffee
Cleaned and ironed my clothes
Who looked after me
When I needed a mother

Cuj Baba
How I wish I could speak to you
Hear you talk about your life
Tell me your experiences
You talk to me all the time
I try to understand

Dobar dan, Baba
You say you saw in the paper
That all the foreigners would stay longer
Even though the elections are over...
And you ask me why I have to go...

Draga Baba
The foreigners are still here....
Dovidenja, Baba.

Tvoja Britt

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Summary

The main objective of the thesis is to analyze the media debate evolving around the run-up to the first elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Dayton Peace Agreement which ended a three and a half year long war in November 1995. These elections took place on September 14, 1996 and were considered the “most complicated elections in history” by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and all other international bodies involved with organising the elections. To make the three former enemies cooperate and form a well functioning, governing body together, proved to be a long and painful process that is not at all completed more than ten years after.

The United States played a decisive role in bringing about the Dayton Peace Agreement. High international profile and a lot of political prestige were connected to the fact that it was the U.S. and not the EU or other European negotiators who managed to bring peace to Bosnia. For the U.S. a lot of prestige was therefore also put into the accomplishment of the peace accords the way they were formulated, word by word, almost as a bible.

The primary data for analysis in the thesis is mainly material from the American newspaper *The International Herald Tribune* during the months May through September 1996. It is considered a liberal, independent newspaper, and the material showed that it performed an independent coverage of the elections and its preparations in Bosnia in 1996.

The media debate during the run-up to the elections evolved around whether the conditions for holding the elections were met or not. The agreement on elections of the Dayton Peace Agreement are set down in Annex III, and Article I makes a list of the conditions that had to be met for these elections to be free and fair. The list of conditions included: a political neutral environment, the right to vote in secret without fear or intimidation, freedom of expression and of the press, freedom of association, freedom of movement. In the period analysed, both reports and experience on the ground documented over and over again that conditions were not met.

Based on a discourse analytical approach, the main focus of the analysis is: In what way does the newspaper coverage of the run-up to the elections reflect the question:

- *Were the conditions met for holding the elections on September 14, 1996?*
- *How did the expressed position to this question reflect whether the press showed support for or had an independent/critical stand towards the policies of the U.S. administration?*

All articles in the period June – September (the material from May was not complete) were defined within three codes, based on whether they had a positive, neutral or negative position to holding the elections on the prescribed date according to the Dayton Peace Accords. The analysis shows that the majority of the articles (73% of a total of 80 articles) did not favour holding the elections under the circumstances. This reflects that the U.S. press, and in particular the International Herald Tribune, had an independent, critical and at times oppositional position towards the politics of the U.S. government at the time. This is contrary to an assumption that the U.S. press mainly tends to support the policies of U.S. governments in its foreign news reporting. The overall perspective of the analysed material is a U.S. perspective, although the subject matter should be the situation in Bosnia. The analysis also shows that the dominating and hegemonic position of the U.S. as a leading power of the world is not challenged as a presupposition for the news coverage.

The method chosen for analysing the material is Discourse Analysis, inspired by the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) developed by Norman Fairclough. Stuart Hall's article about "Encoding/decoding" (Hall 1992) is another inspiration for the analysis, as well as Van Dijk's way of analysing news discourse. (Van Dijk 1988). Concepts like the Western 'Self' and the Balkan 'Other' as developed by Hansen (Hansen 2006) are other inspirations. Within the dominating election discourse, certain other basic discourses are defined, for instance a 'Balkanization discourse' relating to all that is defined in the West as negative about the Balkans: violent, tribal, ethnically divided, characterized by nationalism and conflict etc.

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Introduction

The scope of analysis for this thesis is the press coverage of the preparations for the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996. These were the first elections after the Dayton Peace Agreement had put an end to the three and a half year long war in the middle of Europe.

The agreement on elections of The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) . Annex III, Article 1 of the Agreement, (see Annex 1) makes a list of the conditions that had to be met for the elections to be free and fair. This list of conditions included a politically neutral environment, the right to vote in secret without fear or intimidation, freedom of expression and of the press, freedom of association, freedom of movement.

The press reporting during the run-up to the elections (May-September 1996) which is the period of this study, evolved around the question whether conditions to hold elections were met or not. Concerning the planned elections in Bosnia, the expectation would be that U.S. media would report favourably about the planned implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords through holding elections at the prescribed time. One of the main questions for the analysis is how the press reflected the important question:

- *Were conditions met for holding the elections on September 14, 1996?*
- *How does the expressed position to this question reflect whether the press shows support for or is critical/shows independence to the policies of the U.S. administration at the time?*

The issue was not whether elections should be held at all, but whether they should be held at the exact time – September 14 was the ultimate time limit if the elections should be held within the deadline set by the Dayton Peace Agreement. For the United States, keeping the time seemed to be a decisive issue for several reasons. The United States had put a lot of prestige into bringing about the DPA. The U.S. had managed to negotiate the peace for Bosnia, after innumerable failures by the EU and other European negotiators. One reason was that the DPA was considered to be such an important document, that the fulfilment of the agreement was interpreted to be almost as important as fulfilling a law, or abiding to it as if it were a holy book, a bible so to speak. Secondly the U.S. had 60 000 troops in Bosnia

(within the NATO- led IFOR, later SFOR). The U.S. government had promised to bring these troops home by the end of the year, and the Elections were one of the important conditions to be fulfilled before the troops could be pulled out. Thirdly there were U.S. elections coming up – set for November. For President Bill Clinton so much prestige was connected to the Dayton Peace Agreement and the fulfilment of it, that “breaking” it by not holding elections within the time limit as promised, seemed impossible.

During my period of working in the Press Office of the OSCE (Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe), the organisations assigned by the Dayton Peace Agreement to organise the elections, I did my best to try to understand how the Americans were thinking. Since they were so powerful and dominating, both in our little mission and in world politics both then and now, this became the point of departure for this study.

During my six-month stay from April to October, I was astonished by the coverage of the preparations for the elections by the U.S. press, the main outlet of access being *The International Herald Tribune*. Copies from this paper were circulated to the OSCE staff on a daily basis, and these original copies from 1996 have become the basis for the analysis of this study.

The coverage seemed more negative and oppositional to the U.S Foreign policies and the Bosnia politics of the Clinton administration than I had expected. This negative reporting actually led to the fall of the OSCE Head of information, the Dutch diplomat Ms Joanna Van Vliet. From one day to another in late August 1996, just a few weeks before the elections, she was replaced by an American diplomat, presumably to tone down the negative reporting of the U.S. press related to the planned elections on Bosnia. That incident contributed to the main focus of this thesis:

- Is U.S foreign affairs reporting “following the flag” in the sense that any reporting on U.S foreign policy is affirmative and accepting of the premises and results of these policies, or can foreign affairs reporting in U.S. media also be independent, critical and even oppositional when the media sees it necessary?
- How does the press deal with U.S, foreign policy interests – is it really concerned about what is going on in the world, or are the politicians’ concern with domestic politics interfering foreign policy – and how is this reflected in the foreign policy reporting?

An important indication of the answer to this question is the fact that almost 73 % of the articles covering the elections preparations from my material expressed a negative position

to holding the elections at the time enforced by the U.S. government. This shows both independence and ability to keep up the ideals of a free and independent press even in foreign policy reporting.

For a closer understanding of how this type of reporting is conducted, I have chosen to do a discourse analysis of a selected number of articles from the material. These articles are selected because I find them representative of the type of reporting which dominated the U.S. coverage at the time. *The International Herald Tribune* as such appears to be a very objective, balanced newspaper, liberal and conservative at the same time. It is based on very traditional American press principles, and the way they are performed by their owners at the time, *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*.

I chose Discourse Analysis as the method for analysis because I wanted to see if it was possible to trace underlying, ideological meanings behind the press coverage. The majority of the articles that are analysed are news reports, with the particular properties characterizing such reports. For instance such reporting is supposed to be neutral and objective. Still I did not have any problems dividing them into the three codes that I chose for the analysis: *positive, neutral or negative*. These codes relate to the main position to holding the elections on September 14 1996 that can be interpreted from the articles.

Critical Discourse Analysis, the way it is presented by Norman Fairclough inspires the analysis. Critical Discourse Analysis applied on journalism is a way of trying to understand how journalistic texts are composed by different social factors, and how they contribute to sustain institutional norms and practices. Other inspirations are Van Dijk's analyses of news texts (Van Dijk 1988) and Stuart Hall's article "Encoding/decoding" (Hall 1992). Hansen's discourse analysis of texts about the Bosnian conflict has been another influence for the analysis (Hansen 2006).

The fairly detailed historical background in Chapters 1 and 2, with descriptions of the war and the long process of international attempts at peace negotiations, which mostly failed, is meant to give a thorough understanding and explanation of the U.S position and why the Dayton Peace Process became so important for the Clinton administration at the time. In discourse analytical terms it is meant to provide background and context for the analysis.

Chapter 3 is meant to contribute to a reflection over different aspects of the role of the press in modern societies, particularly in relation to politics and specifically related to foreign politics. An important observation is that U.S. foreign affairs reporting tends to cover U.S. foreign relations primarily, and that the reporting normally is predictable and in accordance with the priorities of the U.S. government, it is “following the flag.” This is one of the assertions I am trying to challenge with my study of the press coverage of the first elections in Bosnia after the Dayton Peace Agreement. The chapter also gives a presentation of the main objective for observation, *The International Herald Tribune*, its background and owners at the time of the study, *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*.

Chapter 4 discusses different aspects of Discourse Analysis with particular emphasis on the approaches of Van Dijk in analysing news and Norman Fairclough’s approach to Critical Discourse Analysis.

In Chapter 5 the main focuses of the analysis are outlined, including the definition of the codes *positive, neutral and negative* as a tool for understanding the main position of the analysed articles towards the administration’s insistence on holding the elections at a certain time. The ‘basic discourses’ in my analysis are also defined.

Chapter 6 presents a Critical Discourse Analysis of six selected articles from the *International Herald Tribune*’s coverage of the preparations for the elections in Bosnia in 1996.

Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina



(Source: University of Texas Map Libraries/CIA Political Map 2002)

Background

The war in Bosnia & Herzegovina which started in April 1992 and ended with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA, also known as the General Framework Agreement for Peace, GFAP) in Dayton, Ohio on 21 November 1995, is considered one of the worst wars in modern history only second to World War II. The fact that this was a war on the European continent and that it was fought between peoples who formerly had lived together as peaceful neighbours, created massive worries and seemingly endless attempts at peace negotiations on behalf of the International Community (IC).¹

It was a war characterized by arbitrary killings, forced expulsions and mass rape, with endless civilian suffering. It was a war fought on the European continent, geographically close to important EU-member states like Germany, Austria, Italy and Greece. Numerous attempts at negotiations and peace treaties kept failing during the three and half years of war – neither threats nor economic blockade had much effect on the warring partners.

What was particularly remarkable was that this became the TV-war of the nineties. It became the Vietnam war of the generation growing up at the time, dominating the daily news coverage of TV stations all over the world. The international media coverage portrayed the conflict as “deep rooted, tribal and impenetrable” (Thompson 1999:xi). The conflict was created, nurtured and encouraged by competing political forces. Mark Thompson (Thompson 1999) and others have documented that domestic media played a major role in manufacturing the conflict. The leaders of the conflict were very much aware of the role of media – control of public opinion was just as important as control of the battlefield. All sides deliberately worked to mobilize and manipulate public opinion. Thus the media did not just comment on the war – they became a vital part of the front line. But influence and control of

¹ The term IC includes UN, EU-member states, NATO-member states and neighbouring Eastern European states as Russia, and OSCE-member states, including USA and Canada. In cold numbers the net result at the time of the signing would amount to 200 000 persons killed and approximately 1 million refugees had left the country.

public opinion did not just apply to domestic media. To the combatants, foreign public opinion also played a crucial role. All sides in the conflict needed intervention of external powers to succeed, none of them were strong enough to win by their own force of arms. Winning the media war, controlling the perception of the conflict also in international media became a crucial objective to the warring parties (Thompson 1999:2).

Just like the conflicts themselves, the role of the media in the conflicts is rooted in the structure of Former Yugoslavia. Each of the Republics that formed the federation controlled the media. They were controlled by each republic's league of Communists, and thus became an easy prey to the tide of ethnic nationalism which started to sweep the country from the time Slobodan Milosevic became leader of the Serbian Communist party (1986) and President in 1987. One important step for Milosevic in order to achieve the degree of control of the masses that he wanted was to gain complete control of the mass media. According to Bennett, Serbian society was systematically purged, all opposition was crushed and the media were brought firmly under political control. "As early as 1987, four years before the shooting began; the Serbian media were already on a war-footing, spewing out a barrage of ethnic hatred" (Bennett 1995:10). This propaganda offensive was so intense that ordinary Serbs started to believe that they were permanently threatened and that they were surrounded by enemies, whose ultimate goal was to wipe them out. Bennett remarks that "the media always had played a critical role in Yugoslav society but had, hitherto, been employed to bring Yugoslavia's peoples together in the Titoist spirit of 'brotherhood and unity', and to smooth over national disputes" (Bennett 1995:10).

The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) did not contain provisions concerning media. But the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which was responsible for implementing the elections provided for in the DPA, shortly after starting to operate in Bosnia and Herzegovina installed a body responsible for Media Development. The main concern was to ensure that the media coverage of the first elections after the DPA would contribute to free and fair elections. The issue of "hate speech" and unfair press coverage was a constant topic for discussions with media representatives from all sides in the former conflict, although the media of Republika Srpska was overrepresented concerning "hate speech" in the cases treated by the so called Media Expert's Commission. Developing democratic media from a situation of conflict and mutual suspicion is not done over night.

My personal background for choosing the topic for this dissertation is that I spent six months in Sarajevo from 1 April to 1 October 1996, just as the preparations for the first elections after the DPA were under way. I was seconded to work as a Press Officer at the Press Office of the OSCE headquarters in Sarajevo. I dealt on a daily basis with journalists, very many of them were American.

It would have been interesting to study the Bosnian media coverage of the elections. Unfortunately, my knowledge of the Bosnian-Croatian-Serb language is not good enough for an in-depth study of media. Although we had access to translated material of the most relevant articles for the election coverage, I decided to leave that part to persons more knowledgeable of the language, translations do not necessarily do justice to the real content and do not give a good enough basis as primary material for a discourse analysis.

During my stay I was able to gather copies of a substantial amount of press material, both from local and international media, of which I have chosen to analyse the *International Herald Tribune*. My data consists basically of these press clippings. As a background for the total analysis is of course a lot of other material that I gathered during the period, including my personal observations from my position in the OSCE Press Office.

There were several factors that led me to the idea of studying the U.S. press coverage of the elections preparations. One of them was my own experience with my U.S. colleagues in the OSCE mission and how they handled their national media. The other major factor was the U.S. government's direct and heavy involvement with the elections preparations due to its prestigious brokering of the Dayton Peace Accords. The feeling of being "run by Washington" was not fictitious – it was materialized as an important part of reality when my immediate superior, the OSCE Head of Information (a Dutch diplomat) was told to leave from one day to the other, just a few weeks before the elections, and replaced by a team of U.S. diplomats sent directly from U.S. State Department. Their more or less overt mission was to try to turn the tide, try to convince the U.S. press to produce more positive reports about the elections.

As elections approached, we realised more and more that this was a futile business. For U.S. journalists, changing the spokesperson was not enough to change their mind about the elections. Most of them knew Bosnian issues very well from having reported from the country for several years during the war. As the analysis shows, they reported on an

independent basis, if the process leading to the elections did not seem to go well, this was what they reported, no matter what the U.S. government was trying to tell them. In other words, they were doing their job.

Chapter 1

Historical background

Western powers and the disintegration of Yugoslavia

For an introduction to the background and the dramatic events, which eventually led to the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords and the following elections, I think it is appropriate to present a timeline of main events before and during the war and the Western responses to these events.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 the World expected to take a deep breath of relief – the Cold War was over, the scenarios of the possibility of an atomic war and other wars between the two Superpowers and their allies dissolved. Nations on both sides of the former Iron Wall could re-orientate and start thinking about de-arming and détente. But the calm did not last long.

On 27 June 1991 hostilities broke out in Slovenia, and from then on and until the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement on 21 November 1995, the conflicts resulting in the break-up of Yugoslavia dominated the news headlines all over the world. The conflict dominated the international news to the degree that Balkan leaders have become “household names the world over” (Bennett 1995: 1). The term “ethnic cleansing” which originates from the Serbo-Croat *etničko ciscenje* has passed to English and many other languages to express the brutality of a conflict with the principal aim to erase all traces of alien culture. Bosnia-Herzegovina became synonymous with killing, cruelty and human suffering to a degree only comparable to the suffering during World War II.

Yugoslavia formally ceased to exist on 15 January 1992 when all the twelve member countries of the European Union officially recognised Slovenia and Croatia as independent states. On 6 April the EU recognised Bosnia – Herzegovina as an independent republic. The day after (7 April 1992) the U.S. recognised Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. At this stage hostilities, conflicts and fighting had been going on for a year.

The US recognition signified a major shift in U.S. policy towards the former Yugoslav republics. The then Secretary of State, James Baker, had visited Belgrade ten months earlier and made his country's position clear: 'the U.S. would not recognise Slovenia and Croatia under any circumstances' (Bennett 1995:2). The U.S. did not want to see Yugoslavia disintegrate; fearing the future stability of the Balkans was at stake. Hansen remarks that the American foreign policy agenda at the time (1991) was preoccupied with the break-up of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War. (Hansen 2006: 116-117)

The international community became directly involved in the Yugoslav conflict as soon as war broke out in Slovenia, when the European Union set itself as mediator. As war reached Croatia three months later, the United Nations joined the search for settlement. But diplomacy alone had no impact on the bloodshed, and fighting continued to escalate along with increasing reports on atrocities. International recognition of Slovenia and Croatia was unthinkable without the war. As cease-fires came and went without results, the pressure to recognise the two republics increased – they were both seen as victims of aggression. When the European Community member states finally recognised Slovenia and Croatia, they were realising the inevitable – Yugoslavia did not exist any more.²

In April 1992 Serb forces launched an offensive on Bosnia-Herzegovina to make sure the republic remained part of the rump –Yugoslav state, irrespective of the wishes of the republic's non-Serb majority and much of the Serb population. The offence laid waste much of the republic and massacred untold numbers of innocent and defenceless people simply because they had the "wrong" national origins. Survivors of the original Serb offensive were herded into concentration camps where their sufferings continued. During the months of April, May, June and July 1992 thousands of Bosnians were systematically raped, tortured and executed. According to Christopher Bennett (Bennett 1995:3) this level of killing might have continued much longer unless a handful of courageous journalists had exposed some of

² Much of the historical description of the war in the thesis is based on the thorough and comprehensive report prepared by the Dutch Institute of War Documentation called "Srebrenica – a 'safe' area - Reconstruction, background, consequences and analyses of the fall of a safe area," , Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (NIOD) Amsterdam 2002, www.niod.nl.)

the horror, which led to public outrage throughout the world. The International Community chose not to intervene to protect the victims, and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was not over until the signing of the Peace Agreement at the end of 1995.

UN peacekeepers began arriving in Croatia in March 1992 after the 17th cease-fire of the Croatian war had been held for two months. The so-called UNPROFOR forces (United Nations Protection Forces) came as a part of a peace agreement, which had been signed in Sarajevo on 2 January 1992 (the Cyrus Vance peace plan.)

According to Bennett the decision on part of the Western powers to recognise Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina was a major step towards apportioning war-guilt. This recognition implied that Serbia was actually to blame for the conflict, whereas Serbia itself claimed to be fighting to hold Yugoslavia together. Serbia has repeatedly been singled out for condemnation in the many reports on the war compiled by international organisations (Bennett 1995:9).

The Director of the Dutch Institute of War Documentation, professor J.C. Hans Blom, said when the Srebrenica Report ³ was launched, that the fact that conflict broke out in former Yugoslavia was mainly due to “...*nationalist leaders who seemed willing to achieve their objectives by brute force, and to the population’s sense of insecurity and fear, that led to the acceptance of violence as the only means of defence. Yugoslavia’s collapse was the result of a multi-faceted process where President Milosevic of Serbia played a decisive role by embracing nationalism in an attempt to sustain his position of power.*” The nationalism of leaders elsewhere in Yugoslavia was also influential, and particularly that of President Tudjman of Croatia. Blom stated : “*While Croatia entered into a state of war with the Yugoslav army and Serbian paramilitaries, Tudjman was still drawing up agreements with Milosevic about the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina where only a mini-Muslim state would be allowed to remain*”. He went on to clarify that the war in Bosnia did not break out because of the premature recognition of the European Union, as has often been claimed, rather that it was generated by the parties within the region itself. Mr Blom claimed that “...*the West could only exert a limited influence on the chain of events in former Yugoslavia, and this was certainly true for as long as there was no preparedness to intervene on a*

³ (http://www.srebrenica.nl/en/content_aanbiedingstoeppraak.htm)

massive scale.” The cease-fire agreements, viewed by the West as diplomatic successes, were simply consciously chosen breathing spaces for the warring factions that allowed them to prepare for the next phase of conflict. “The peace plans of the West frequently intensified hostilities. The West mainly attempted to limit the conflict and to provide humanitarian aid. But negotiations and humanitarian aid also limited the possibility for actual intervention: armed action could thwart peace talks and could result in a suspension of aid. The West became a hostage of its own approach and ended up in a scenario of ‘muddling through’. The UN’s attempts at impartiality meant that the peacekeeping troops were hated by all sides in the conflict”, according to Hans Blom.

War breaks out

In February 1992 Milosevic had told the US ambassador to Bosnia, Zimmermann, that in contrast to Croatia the Serbs in Bosnia only made up 35 (in fact 31) per cent of the population, but owned 64 per cent of the land. According to NIOD the real purpose of this remark was to get the American ambassador used to Serbian claims for two thirds of Bosnian territory. At the same time Milosevic constantly referred to the Bosnian leader *Alija Izetbegovic* as a dangerous Muslim fundamentalist. (http://312.222.3.6/Srebrenica/toc/p1_c05_s001_b01.html)

On this background the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 24 January dealt with the issue of referendum on the independence of Bosnia –Herzegovina. It was a requirement from The European Commission to hold a referendum before they could proceed with recognition of Bosnian independence. The Bosnian Serb leaders opposed a referendum, which would lead to independence, while Izetbegovic and his supporters were in favour. The Croats were divided between moderates who advocated a multi-ethnic Bosnia, and radicals who wished that a part of Bosnian territory should join Croatia. The Referendum was to take place on 29 February and 1 March. The Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic declared that the Bosnian Serbs would not participate in the referendum, with the result that only Muslims and Croats went to the polls.

On the second day of the referendum, the evening of 1 March, an incident in the old Muslim quarter of Sarajevo, Bascarsija, became an illustration of the tension which was building up between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs. During a wedding celebration, the Serb wedding guests were waving Serb flags. Suddenly shots were fired at the wedding

party. The father of the bridegroom was killed and an orthodox priest was wounded. This attack on the wedding guests proved to be the spark that lit the keg. Numerous commentators consider these shots fired at the wedding guests the overture to the war in Bosnia.⁴

Immediately after this incident supporters of the SDS set up roadblocks around the old quarter of Sarajevo. In a television speech from Belgrade Radovan Karadzic warned that the siege of Sarajevo would not be lifted until preparations for the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina were stopped. In Sarajevo peaceful demonstrators by unarmed groups in favour of an undivided Bosnia were shot at. On 3 March Izetbegovic declared the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Cutilheiro Plan

Prior to the referendum in Bosnia the EC had started discussions about Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the Portuguese chairmanship the Portuguese diplomat Jose Cutilheiro had taken over the leadership of the reactivated Yugoslavia Conference, now concentrating on Bosnia-Herzegovina. The principles for an agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina would have to satisfy two conditions: the inviolability of the external borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the acceptance of the existence of three separate ethnic groups, each with their own interests. Both Serbs and Croats favoured the basic proposal from Cutilheiro which involved the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into cantons based on a Swiss model. After a lot of meetings and discussions back and forth, the so-called Cutilheiro Plan was signed on 17 March 1992. Bosnia-Herzegovina should be divided in cantons where each of the three nations were given regions with a large degree of local authority, whereas foreign-, security- and monetary policy would remain the prerogative of the central government and the parliament of Bosnia. Each of the three ethnic entities would be assigned an equal number of delegates in the upper house of the parliament, decisions on important issues would be passed if 80 per cent of the delegates voted in favour. A special tribunal would be created to settle disputes

⁴ However, according to the Dutch Srebrenica report, which cites the French author Bougarel, a Muslim had admitted on the radio that he fired the shots. His name was Ramiz Delalic, with the nickname Celo, who was a well known criminal who had spent eight years in prison on a charge of rape. Delalic was a member of the so called 'Green Berets', a militant Bosnian militia. He went underground, and did not appear again until a few weeks later, when he, alongside several other Bosnian criminals led the defence of Sarajevo. For further reading: [http://213.222.3.6/srebrenica\(top/pl_c05_s002_b01.html](http://213.222.3.6/srebrenica(top/pl_c05_s002_b01.html)

between the central authority and the cantons. The tribunal would consist of one member of each of the cantons and four foreigners.

The plan left the difficult question of authority over the army and police unresolved. More discussion was also needed about the map on which the internal borders were drawn. According to the provisional map there would be two Muslim areas, four Croat areas and seven Serb areas. The Muslims would control 45 per cent, the Serbs 42.5 per cent and the Croats 12.5 per cent of the Bosnian territory. The difficulty of dividing up Bosnia-Herzegovina into ethnic areas was demonstrated by the fact that according to this map 50 per cent of the Bosnian Serbs would live outside the areas of their own ethnicity, while the corresponding figures for Bosnian Croats were 59 per cent and for the Bosnian Muslims 18 per cent.

Immediately after the plan was signed, Karadzic's comment was that it was 'a great event in the history of Bosnia', according to him this now 'saved the country from civil war.'http://213.222.3.6/srebrenica/toc/pl_c05_s003_b01.html)

But a week after the end of the talks, on 26 March, Izetbegovic withdrew his acceptance of the plan.

The day after the Bosnian Serb parliament declared the independence of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia – Herzegovina, Republika Srpska, which had previously been declared autonomous on 9 January. That same day the Bosnian government appealed to the UN to send peacekeeping troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina. This request was in vain, the UN said that because of budgetary problems the number of crisis areas where the UN could be active had to be limited.

In principle through the Cutilheiro Plan, the European Community had accepted a division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into separate ethnic communities, as long as these would be held together by a coordinating central authority. Karadzic realised that Izetbegovic and his government could not count on a lot of support neither from the UN nor the EC if the Bosnian Serbs were to press ahead with their aims. Shortly it became clear that he was ready to fulfil the threats of a bloodbath he had launched during the talks on the Cutilheiro plan.

Recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina

On 7 April 1992 the ministers of the EC declared that they would recognise Bosnia-Herzegovina, and from the same date the USA did the same. In total 72 states recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina on that date. But it took some time before Western governments actually established diplomatic contacts with the government of Sarajevo. The West and the UN neglected to enable or to organise the defence of the new state. Already from the beginning of the year the CIA had warned that in the event of recognition of Bosnia a major international effort would be needed to counter Serb aggression and to keep the state together. However, the new state was affected by the UN arms embargo, which had been imposed in September 1991 on all areas of the former Yugoslavia. The maintenance of this embargo prevented Bosnia from defending itself from external aggression, a right actually granted to each state under Article 51 of the UN Charter. But the West also abandoned Bosnia-Herzegovina morally by strengthening the nationalist leaders in Bosnia and Serbia by conducting negotiations exclusively with them. The West ignored the democratic forces that were striving for multi-ethnicity and had hoped for help from the West.
(http://213.222.3.6/srebrenica/toc/pl_c05_s004_b01.html)

Already in the last week of March fighting had started between JNA and Serb militias on the one side and Croat and Muslim militias on the other in several towns both in the north, in the centre around Mostar and in Neum in the south of Bosnia. On Sunday 5 April 1992 fighting broke out in the suburbs of Sarajevo. But still a lot of people in the Bosnian capital resisted the growing ethnic tensions. Between 60 000 and 100 000 demonstrators gathered in front of the Bosnian parliament to show their rejection of the nationalist parties. They demanded new elections, waved portraits of Tito and chanted slogans at the 'murderers'. But the demonstration was brutally disrupted by gunmen from the SDS party shooting at them from the top of their headquarters at the Holiday Inn hotel. Several demonstrators were killed. The night between the 5-6 April the JNA took Sarajevo airport.

On 7 April 1992, the day the European Community and the United States recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosnian Serb parliament decided definitively to implement the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was to be based in Pale, a ski resort just outside Sarajevo. The SDS withdrew its two members, Koljevic and Plavsic from the collective

presidium of Bosnia, and asked all other functionaries still active in Bosnian political bodies to follow their example.

Between March and June the Bosnian Serb forces, supported by the JNA and paramilitaries from Serbia, took control of a large part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The territorial goals of the Republika Srpska were Northern and Western Bosnia, Eastern Bosnia, Eastern Herzegovina and the valley of the Sava river known as the Posavina Corridor. According to the census of 1981 the population mix in the north –west of Bosnia was 63% Serb, 15% Muslim and 10% Croat. The Eastern part of Bosnia bordered on Serbia and would form a buffer zone for the Serbian motherland. Throughout the whole war there was continued fighting in the Posavina Corridor.

Apart from this area, the interests of the Bosnian Croats were located chiefly in west-Herzegovina (the area west of the river Neretva). Thus it was possible to divide the general spheres of interest in Herzegovina with the Serbs, except the town of Mostar. Mostar was on the river Neretva and became the object of really heavy fighting that broke out in April 1992 and all three ethnic groups were involved. The fighting in Mostar lasted for almost two years.

The Siege of Sarajevo

Sarajevo is situated in a valley, and the defence of the city was difficult. Serb troops surrounded the city and occupied most of the hills around. The firepower of the Serbs was superior to the Muslims. The first heavy bombardments took place on 21 April. Serb troops then started attacks on the suburbs Ilidza and Grbavica, but the defenders managed to keep this territory. On 2 May 1992 Bosnian Serb troops penetrated into the suburbs of Sarajevo, in the weeks that followed heavy house-to house fighting took place. In the early phase of the war the defence of Sarajevo relied on a group called the Green Berets with strong links to the government of Sarajevo and ABiH. Several of the leading figures of the Green Berets were former criminals, who committed repeated breaches of the Geneva Convention. These elements were not dealt with until the new government of Haris Siladjiz took office in 1993. (http://213.222.3.6/srebrenica/toc/pl_c05_s005_b01.html)

The JNA tried to penetrate further into the city in the following weeks. Due to lack of Serb infantry the offensive came to a stop right at the centre of the city. The forces around

Sarajevo confined themselves by weakening the population through a state of siege and artillery bombardment. But the government army did not manage to break through the surrounding Serb forces either. The result was a stalemate, which lasted for three and a half years, and led to miserable conditions for the population constantly attacked by mortar and artillery bombardments and the well-known sniper fire. During the siege a considerable proportion of the population continued to comprise both Croats and Serbs. Meanwhile the Bosnian Serbs pressed for a permanent solution for division of the city, either by a green line like in Nicosia, or with a wall like the one in Berlin.

According to Udovicki and Stitkovac the Serbian offensive in the first phase of the war had two objectives, besides reducing Sarajevo to ruins. One aim was to conquer the eighteen-mile wide strip along the Serbian-Bosnian border, which was marked by the Drina river. The second aim was to consolidate Banja Luka as the proclaimed capital of Republika Srpska (Udovicki and Stitkovac 1997: 184).

Ethnic cleansing

The attention of the West was mainly concentrated on the developments in and around the capital Sarajevo at the beginning of the war. But during the months of April through June, Serb paramilitary groups were very active in other parts of Bosnia, mainly in the north-west and east. These groups were reluctant to let journalists or international aid groups enter the areas, and as telephone and telex links were broken, at the beginning very limited information came out apart from accounts from Displaced Persons. According to the Srebrenica report the paramilitary groups were not independently operating warlords, they were systematically employed by the Serb leadership, operating within the existing power relationships, and the "...sign points towards Belgrade, in particular to President Milosevic." (http://213.222.3.6/srebrenica/toc/pl_c05_s006_b01.html)

As an example how ethnic cleansing was performed we can take a closer look at the siege of the town Zvornik in eastern Bosnia on the Drina river. Originally the town had 60% Muslims. The town was considered to occupy a strategic position both on the Belgrade-Sarajevo line and the Belgrade-Tuzla line. The paramilitary troops were led by the extreme nationalist leader Vojislav Seselj. Already in late March his units had arrived in Zvornik, and gave the Muslims ten days to hand in their weapons. On 7 April units of Seselj, with other paramilitary groups arrived in the neighbouring village Grabavci and killed Muslims

who had not handed in their weapons. The next day, the JNA, together with military units and supported by the Serb territorial defence force, attacked Zvornik. During the fighting it was not possible to make any clear distinctions between the groups. A Muslim unit managed to defend the town for several days, but due to lack of ammunition, they had to give in to the artillery bombardments, which mostly came from tanks on the Serbian side of the Drina.

After the fall of the town, the paramilitary groups were given a free hand while the JNA kept the town surrounded. Seselj's group were called the Chetniks, and other paramilitary groups were led by Marko Pavlovic, reportedly a member of the Serbian state security service. The members of the notorious Arkan's so called Tigers committed the worst crimes. Torture, rape and murder became the order of the day for more than a week. Houses belonging to Muslims were plundered and set on fire. Similar and worse stories are told from towns like Banja Luka, Prijedor, Bjeljina, Modrica and several more.

Mosques were a much sought after target. According to the Yugoslav Islamic Community no less than 430 mosques were destroyed. Several were shelled and bombed during the fighting, but many were destroyed as mere terrorist acts by extreme Serbs aimed at adding pressure on the Muslim community. Many of the destroyed mosques would date back to the 15th century. (Udovicki and Stitkovac 1997: 208).

Descriptions of eyewitness accounts and many of the atrocities appeared in Serbian newspapers and magazines, such as Borba and Vreme. Udovicki and Stitkovac write:

"The manifold instances of terror included public executions, torture, concentration camps and rape, all conducted as a sort of public blood sport." (Udovicki and Stitkovac 1997: 188-189).

The practices of ethnic cleansing during the war in Bosnia have often been compared to the German extinction of Jews during World War II. But Donia and Fine say that ethnic cleansing differs from the systematic, quiet extermination procedures used by the Germans against Jews, Gypsies and other.

"The Germans set out to kill people without creating public furore; the ethnic cleansers of Bosnia use killings and other atrocities to sow fear and panic and to induce flight." (Donia and Fine 1994: 247)

Eyewitness accounts

The highest representative of UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) in former Yugoslavia, José Maria de Mendiluce, happened to pass through Zvornic on his way from a meeting with Milosevic in Belgrade to Sarajevo, exactly at the peak of the paramilitary activities. The Serb and JNA forces were furious to find an outsider who could witness what was going on, and Mendiluce was detained. His description of the situation is referred in the book “The Death of Yugoslavia” by Laura Silber and Allan Little, later the basis for a BBC television series.

‘I realised I was at serious risk. I could see trucks full of dead bodies. I could see militiamen taking more corpses of children, women and old people from their houses and putting them on trucks. I saw at least four or five trucks full of corpses. When I arrived the cleansing had been done. There were no people, no-one on the streets. It was all finished. They were looting, cleaning up the city after the massacre. I was convinced they were going to kill me.’ (Silber and Little 1995: 246)

He was released, and crossed at a speed of 140 km an hour into Bosnian-held territory. In a narrow valley he found victims of the cleansing. Five thousand people were trying to find shelter.

‘When I arrived in the car I was surrounded by 1000 people. They were all over me, begging “Save us! Save us!” with such despair that I stayed there for an hour trying to calm them down. There were lots of dead people, wounded children on the floor looking terrified – absolutely terrified – and we could hear the sound of mortar fire approaching.’

Mendiluce’s impression that both Serbian paramilitaries and JNA units were taking part in the capture of Zvornik is confirmed by the accounts of Vojislav Seselj. He said that ‘The Zvornik operation was planned in Belgrade.’

‘The Bosnian Serb forces took part in it. But the special units and the best combat units came from this side [Serbia]. These were police units – the so-called Red Berets – special units of the Serbian Interior Ministry of Belgrade. The army engaged itself to a small degree – it gave artillery support where it was needed. The operation had

been prepared for a long time. It wasn't carried out in any kind of nervous fashion. Everything was well-organized and implemented.' (Silber and Little 1995: 247)

More U.S. involvement?

As the news about the atrocities of the Bosnian war reached the American public, the U.S. leadership started to change its policies towards the parties in the war. On 20 May the U.S. government withdrew its military attaché from Belgrade and ordered the Yugoslavian colleagues in the U.S. to leave the country, including closing the Yugoslavian consulates in New York and San Francisco. The Secretary of State, James Baker, spoke about a 'humanitarian nightmare' in Bosnia which the world could not ignore. The indecision of the EC was referred to as 'intolerable.' On 24 May, during an international conference in Lisbon on aid for countries of the former Soviet Union, Baker issued an urgent appeal to the rest of the world to call for a halt to the bloodshed in Bosnia. Baker and diplomats close to him gave the impression that the US government was prepared to provide logistical support and air cover for humanitarian convoys, on the condition that other countries should be prepared to bear the greater part of the burden of such an international operation. At a press conference Baker made implicit references to the extermination of Jews during World War II when he spoke about ethnic cleansing. At the same time he also directed implicit accusations to the EC, or 'those who were seeking reasons not to act'. Baker referred to figures like 2225 deaths in Bosnia the previous month, 7600 wounded and 2500 missing. (The Washington Post 25 May 1992).

It is too far fetched for this dissertation to go into all the details of the further development of the war. So far the description should give an introduction and a background to the further process of negotiations and attempts at peace negotiations on behalf of the International Community.

Since media played an important role in the war and is an important part of this thesis, I will give a more detailed description of an incident that is a good representation of the complications of the war in Bosnia, the so called *Bread Queue Massacre* in Sarajevo.

The Bread Queue Massacre

On 27 May in Sarajevo, almost as an answer to Baker's speech, a mortar attack took place on a crowd of people queuing for bread. Eighteen people were killed and 160 were wounded.

When this was broadcast on western television only fragments of the footage were shown, western viewers were spared the details of severed body parts.

But this bread queue massacre became a media issue. The Bosnian Serbs claimed that the attack was the work of Muslims, and actually Mc Kenzie, the Canadian Chief of Staff of UNPROFOR supported the view. This was the first major incident in the Bosnian war, which raised doubts as to whether the Bosnian Muslims had possibly fired on their own people. Under the conditions, doubts were easy to throw out, truth was almost impossible to ascertain.

The issue is extensively discussed in the Srebrenica report. According to military sources, Muslims repeatedly provoked fire from the Serb units, not only on military positions, but also on civilian targets, in order to mobilize international public opinion against the Serbs. Also considering Izetbegovic's strong focus on obtaining American intervention, it would make sense to stage "Serb aggression" which in reality was Bosnian troops firing on so-called "friendly targets".

The aim would be to keep up the international attention on Sarajevo, to provoke an international intervention. Each time a lot of Bosnians were killed by a mortar in Sarajevo, Western governments asked the UN soldiers to do "crater analysis" to find out which side had fired bombs or mortars.

It is interesting to observe the media coverage of the event. The American journalist Peter Maass covered the war in Bosnia for The Washington Post, and wrote:

"Crater analysis" is not an exact science, and the UN soldiers had a hard time pinning the blame; the incoming direction of the shell could be determined, but not the precise position from which it was fired. If Karadzic denied responsibility, and if the United Nations could not prove scientifically that the Serbs were responsible, then we should hold off on punishing them, right? Right. Thankfully we have not always been so circumspect, and did not demand, during World War II that Winston Churchill provide proof that the bombs exploding in London were German rather than British. (Maass 1996: 161)

Mark Thompson in the book "Forging War" mentions the Bread Queue massacre in his description of the Serb newspaper Politika's transformation from a prestigious, reliable

newspaper, to a strong mouthpiece for Serb nationalism as it developed in the Milosevic era. Thompson writes:

How to deny with any plausibility the overwhelming likelihood that the Serb side had perpetrated this atrocity? The answer took a day to locate, maybe because it was so obvious; the enemy's advantage had to be turned on its head. How could the Bosnian TV cameraman have filmed the effect of the mortar blasts unless the atrocity had been planned? Politika, on 28 May, led with top-level JNA and Bosnian Serb denials of Serb responsibility; no Bosnian government source or opinion was quoted.

Thompson goes on, quoting Politika which refers to the Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA:

"SRNA has concluded that the massacre was stage-managed by Muslim militia and paramilitary units ", the article continued. "Most of the victims were Serbs, moreover, but in order to maximize the propaganda, Serb corpses were swiftly swapped for Croats and Muslims wounded earlier elsewhere in the city."

And finally:

On 30 May Politika went further: "There is evidence that the Serb side was not responsible for the massacre. However, no evidence was presented. The paper demanded an international inquiry. (Thompson 1999: 75&76)

Mark Thompson's account of the coverage of Serbian Radio-Television (RTS) is particularly intriguing, since RTS became the most notorious mouthpiece for the Milosevic regime. Up to the Bread Queue massacre RTS had never mentioned that Serb forces were bombarding Sarajevo. That is, RTS did not deny that a siege was taking place; it was just that it was turned upside down. Mark Thompson quotes an article in the magazine Vreme: ⁵

⁵ *Journalists from Vreme and the Belgrade newspaper, Borba, along with media researchers and social scientists, had closely monitored the evening news of RTS from the beginning of the outbreak of the war in Bosnia. (Thompson 1999:88)*

“The Muslim authorities are holding Sarajevo under siege from within”, said reporter Dana Djokic, adding, “The Serb continue to defend their centuries-old hills around Sarajevo.” (Thompson 1999: 88-90)

According to Vreme magazine it was only until 31 May, a few hours before the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro, that RTS admitted that Serb forces were bombarding Sarajevo. But still, the presentation was wrapped as a defence for this type of action, since “nobody can stop Serbia helping its people in Bosnia”, and the bombardments were part of the Serbs “struggles for freedom and self-determination”. At the same time, the “hysterical, methodical campaign by foreign media to Satanize Serbia and Slobodan Milosevic” was denounced. (Thompson 1999:90)

The Bread Queue Massacre led to a trade embargo by the European Community against Serbia and Montenegro on 28 May. Two days later the UN Security Council passed the resolution 757 which imposed heavy sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro. Import and export, as well as transport to and from Serbia and Montenegro were forbidden. Financial transactions were forbidden, all scientific, cultural and sporting contacts were broken off and the level of diplomatic representation was drastically reduced.

War and Western Diplomacy

The Washington Agreement

Overt hostilities between Croats and the Bosnian government ended after cease-fire negotiations in Washington in February-March 1994. This led to the signing of a loose Bosnian-Croatian federation. The so-called Washington Agreement became the first successful Bosnian initiative of the Clinton administration. The new U.S. negotiator, Charles Redman, meant that a key to the success of any diplomatic efforts would be to end the Muslim-Croat conflict. This conflict complicated all peace negotiations in two important ways. Firstly, having three rather than two parties made it a lot more difficult to reach a settlement. Secondly, the Muslim-Croat conflict had left the Serbs with a decisive military advantage and little incentive to concede territory during negotiations. The Washington Agreement managed to isolate the Serbs at the negotiating table. (Daalder 2000: 27).

At the beginning of 1994 the role of the UN was becoming gradually more difficult; the UNPROFOR was given the mandate to defend themselves, but only if they were attacked.

The marketplace massacre

On 5 February 1994 a grenade thrown at the Markale Marketplace in Sarajevo killed 68 persons and wounded 200. Again the Serbs charged that the Muslims were responsible themselves, which has never been proven. However, the Marketplace –massacre created important international attention, and led to the UN Security Council ultimatum to the Serbs to withdraw their heavy weapons from Sarajevo and stop shelling the city. For 22 months the Serbs had been bombarding Sarajevo from the hills around the city, killing more than 10 000 civilians, among them 1500 children. For the first time during the war, on February 28, NATO shot down four Serbian planes which were defying the no-fly zone over Bosnia. (Mønnesland 1999:301, Udovicki and Stitkovac 1997:212)

Another important outcome of the Sarajevo ultimatum was the U.S. decision to become actively involved in the diplomatic negotiations over Bosnia. Up to then the United States had distanced itself from the European negotiation efforts on the basis that the territorial divisions of the European proposals legitimized ethnic cleansing. President Bill Clinton's administration was more willing to engage the Bosnian government in discussions on the arrangements the Muslims reasonably could get out of any negotiations. (Daalder 2000:26).

The Contact Group Peace Plan

In the summer of 1994, the newly formed Contact Group pressed for a peaceful solution. (The Contact Group consisted of representatives from the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany and Russia).⁶ The plan, which largely was based on the efforts of EU-UN-negotiators David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, would mean a division of Bosnia where

⁶ The Contact Group was formed in April 1994, mainly to ensure that Russia would be included in the negotiating process. But the arrangement also offered particular advantages for each of the members. For the Europeans, it was a way to ensure that the U.S. would not move too far ahead of the prevailing consensus. For the U.S., the Contact Group provided the possibility to avoid complex processes that would involve all EU members and the UN-system. At this stage the U.S. administration did not find the UN trustworthy any longer. For Russia, the group offered a way to confirm its strong international standing. (Daalder 2000:28).

49% of the territory would go to the Serbs, whereas 51 % was meant for the Muslims and the Croats. The plan was presented as an ultimatum, “accept it or beware of the consequences” was the slogan, under threats of bombardment of Bosnian Serb positions and annulment of the weapons’ embargo towards the Bosnian government (Nilsen 1996: 63). But by the deadline of the new peace plan on 19 July, the Bosnian Serbs refused to accept it.

At this stage Slobodan Milosevic wanted the sanctions against Serbia lifted, and sealed the borders along the Drina river and cut off the lifeline between Serbia and Republika Srpska. Nevertheless, in August and September 1994 the Serbs conducted a wave of ethnic cleansing in Bijeljina, Rogatica and Banja Luka, and cut off the supply routes to the UN declared “safe areas” such as Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde, with the aim to starve the local population.

Despite these advances, there were strong signs of fatigue among the Serb troops. This did not only apply to fuel and parts, but the morale of the infantry had dropped to an unprecedented low. Recruits to the army were more or less forced to fight. There are accounts of the military police in Republika Srpska catching people at home late at night, forcing them into vehicles parked in front of the house, and forcing them to sign a statement that they joined the army voluntarily. Those who refused to join the army were beaten, called deserters and sent to the trenches. (Udovicki and Stitkovac 1997:195).

On the other hand, the Bosnian army made important advances during the summer of 1994. Bosnian forces managed to recapture the strategically important area of Bihac from the renegade Bosnjak businessman and politician Fikret Abdic, forcing 30 000 of his supporters out of the area. The offensive spread from there to the Grabec plateau, and with the Croatian troops, the Bosnians recaptured the town of Kupres in central Bosnia forcing the Bosnian Serbs living in the areas to flee.

Srebrenica – a turning point

Realizing that further assaults from the Bosnian-Croatian Federation Army and that Republika Srpska was likely to suffer added losses, General Ratko Mladic mobilized his forces in July 1995 to secure what had been the war aim of the Serbian side from the beginning of the war – the continuous thirty-kilometre-wide band of territory along the western bank of the Drina river, including the “safe areas” of Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde.

The advance towards Srebrenica started on 6 July, on 11 July they stopped two kilometres from the centre. The Bosnian troops withdrew from the town, abandoning the civilians. The civilians had divided into two large groups, one tried to escape into the Dutch battalion base in Potocari. However the peacekeepers in Potocari made it clear they could not protect the civilians. Instead, they were evacuated from the base overseen by Bosnian Serb authorities. On 12 July General Mladic arrived in Potocari with a TV crew and promised the Dutch representatives that the civilians would be treated fairly. Still he ordered all males above sixteen years of age to be separated from their families and taken to Bratunac, and afterwards to Karakaj where they were massacred.

During the night between July 11-12 the other group of about 15 000, including 3500 Bosnian army troops, tried to escape toward Tuzla through the forest, across rivers and minefields, carrying children and their old and feeble ones. In Bulje they were ambushed, and hundreds were killed. The group splintered into two and one group, mainly soldiers, reached Tuzla safely. The other was taken over by a number of ambushes. Some surrendered, assured by the Bosnian Serbs that nothing would happen to them. All of them were liquidated on the spot. (Udovicki and Stitkovac 1997: 196)

According to the Srebrenica report, 7500 Bosnian Muslims went missing after the attack on Srebrenica, all of them most likely killed. At least six thousand of them were slaughtered in mass executions. The report comments on the so called “safe areas” that they were in no way safe. The designed areas were not demilitarized, the surrounding Serbian troops had not withdrawn to a safe distance, and the peacekeeping force that was stationed in these enclaves was too small either for protection or defence. According to the report, the Safe Areas had less to do with the reality of Bosnia & Herzegovina than with the need to achieve a compromise in the Security Council. It also had to do with the wish to diminish the tension that had arisen between the United States and Europe over how to deal with the conflict. (http://www.srebrenica.nl/en/content_aanbiedingstoeppraak.htm)

The Serb forces (VRS) led by General Mladic turned their artillery on Zepa and the town was captured on July 25. 12 000 Muslims had to flee or were deported. Gorazde would be next in line. By the end of July Croatian forces started an offensive on Serb areas in Western Bosnia, and by 6 August Krajina and Western Slavonia is conquered, and 120 000 Serbs leave the provinces. With a new grenade attack on the central market in Sarajevo,

killing 38 people and leaving 90 injured, the U.S. and the rest of the international community said stop. On August 30 1995, NATO started bombing Serbian artillery posts, anti-aircraft positions, ammunition depots and arms factories. This weakened the VRS to the degree that the plan to attack Gorazde was abandoned. During August, September and October the Bosnian and Croatian army made advances which again redrew the map and reduced the areas the Serbs had conquered, actually advancing only 12 kilometres away from Banja Luka. This created a new wave of refugees by the thousands, of Serb origin this time, riding whatever vehicle they could come across: trucks, overcrowded cars, horse-drawn-carts and tractors, trying to find refuge in Banja Luka and Omarska and further on to Serbia. Republika Srpska lost on the ground the territories it had refused to grant the Bosnian government around the negotiating table. Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic needed a peace plan to be able to keep what was left.

Chapter 2

Change in international policy

Bosnia becomes a key issue in American politics

From the beginning of the 1990s the wars that resulted from the break-up of Yugoslavia had occupied a central space in U.S. foreign policy. But American policy was characterized by a deep fear to get too deeply involved. Neither the Bush nor the Clinton administration wanted to get drawn into what was seen as a likely quagmire. But by 1995 it was no longer possible to ignore the conflict in Bosnia from an American perspective. The Srebrenica massacre and the endless TV images of the horrors in Sarajevo and elsewhere in Bosnia became a too heavy load on the Clinton administration and the policy of containment had to end. The question now was not whether, but how, the U.S. should get involved.

From the outset of the violence in early 1991, the major Western powers had appealed to European institutions and the United Nations to deal with the problems in the multi-ethnic state in the heart of South-Eastern Europe. Still thinking that the end of the Cold War meant detente and peace, the international institutions sought to prove their relevance in the new world order. But all efforts at cease-fires, peace negotiations or mutual agreements of any kind were failing when conducted on behalf of the international institutions like the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Community (EC) or the United Nations (UN). The European Community had been able to negotiate an agreement to end the violence in Slovenia, but was not able to do the same thing in Croatia. The United Nations secured a fragile peace in Croatia and deployed more than 10 000 UN troops to supervise this truce. But the UN was not able to act in a preventive manner in Bosnia, which erupted in untold violence. Several thousand UN peacekeepers were sent to Bosnia to try to mitigate the worst humanitarian consequences of the war. NATO had pledged to conduct air strikes to defend the peacekeepers as well as the six isolated “safe areas” inhabited by the strongly weakened Muslim population. But the conflict between the UN and NATO over when and to which extent to use force effectively

prevented NATO's possible deterrent effect and threatened the credibility of the military alliance.

Many factors led to the collective failure of the international institutions in dealing with the disintegration of Bosnia.

According to Daadler, the reasons for the policy change of the Clinton administration were to be found in the specific policy context the administration was facing. Four developments led to the decision of the summer of 1995: (Daadler 2000: 119)

- It was expected that UNPROFOR would collapse following the humiliation of the hostage crisis
- Bosnia meant a threat to the vitality, if not continued viability of NATO.
- The prospect of having to deploy U.S. troops both to rescue UN forces and to sustain the alliance's credibility
- There was a heavy pressure from the U.S. Congress to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia.
- Last, but not least: under girding all these reasons was the upcoming re-election campaign which would start just in a few months.

The first issue relates to the hostage-taking of U.N. blue-helmet troops in May by Bosnian Serbs. The Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) of 10 000 troops was meant to help out. According to the U.S. administration, as long as it was supposed to operate under UN rules of engagement, which under the dictates of the UN secretary general and the chief civilian and military representative in the Balkans, put the safety of UN personnel ahead of the mission they were supposed to perform, the U.S. believed that the RRF also was forced to fail in its destined task.

The second important factor contributing to the U.S. decision to engage in Bosnia was the need to defend NATO credibility. For more than three years the issue of what to do in Bosnia had divided the allies and put a strain on transatlantic relations. The issue had dominated every NATO meeting, but none had concluded on any consensus on how to proceed. NATO's failure to end a brutal war at its doorsteps had a profound impact both on

the alliance's viability and the credibility of the United States. Several European leaders, headed by Jacques Chirac, questioned both the U.S. leadership of the alliance and NATO's ability to safeguard European security.

With the collapse of UN's credibility in Bosnia and the future of NATO very much in doubt, during the summer of 1995 the Clinton administration faced the very unwelcome prospect of having to deploy 25 000 U.S. soldiers to fulfil the commitment of the allies to contribute to the withdrawal of the UNPROFOR if that was requested. But the idea of having to send American troops to Bosnia was not very welcome by officials in Washington. On the one hand U.S. officials were worried that the key assumption of U.S. policy – that troops should be deployed only to implement a peace agreement – could be changed as a result of a decision made by others rather than as a deliberate decision made by Washington. (Daalder 2000:164).

Some argued that if U.S. troops were to go to Bosnia, it should be conducted by an effort to convince UNPROFOR to stay, no matter the inefficiency and lack of credibility the UN force had at that stage. The argument that president Clinton found the most persuasive was that if U.S. troops should go in, they should do so on U.S. terms and at a time and for reasons that were chosen by the Administration in Washington.

Another factor that influenced the decision to become more fully engaged in Bosnia concerned the domestic context within which America's Bosnia policy was being framed. In the three first years of the war, the American debate on the policy towards Bosnia had oscillated between arguments for both engagement and disengagement. Some found Washington's inaction appalling, facing the policy of genocide performed by the Bosnian Serbs. Few argued for sending American ground troops, many favoured air strikes to support the Muslim forces and thought that the least that could be done would be to lift the arms embargo that deprived the Bosnian government of its right to self-defence. Again others underscored that this was a civil war among peoples who had fought each other for many years. Any interference from the outside would risk getting the United States into a quagmire like the one in Viet Nam. This group also argued that Bosnia basically was a European problem that had to be solved by Europeans.

These arguments had been going back and forth for many months and years; by July 1995 the group arguing in favour of doing something was increasing. With the horrifying

images emerging from Srebrenica, the U.S. Congress challenged the Clinton administration to change course by passing an overwhelming vote to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia. The administration had long opposed a unilateral lift. It feared the precedence this would set in the UN Security council, of fear that it would allow Russia and perhaps France to abandon the critically important sanctions regime against Iraq. The administration also believed that such a step would precipitate the withdrawal of allied forces and force a choice between assisting the allies' departure by deploying thousands of U.S. troops on the ground or having to abandon a solemn commitment to NATO.

These four factors – the UN's loss of credibility, the threat to NATO, the prospect of U.S. troop deployment, and the congressional vote on lifting the arms embargo – became evident during the summer of 1995 at the same time as the presidential campaign was about to start. It was likely that the opposite candidate would be the republican Senate majority leader Robert Dole, who for a long time had been a vociferous critic of the president's Bosnia policy. (Daalder 2000: 165, 166).

Daalder does not want to go as far as to suggest that the prospects of elections alone were what drove the administration to act, but it is clear that at this stage Bosnia represented a significant problem for the president. Clinton's political future seemed to be dependent on the events in the Balkans. President Clinton had a powerful incentive to reduce Bosnia's potential to disrupt his campaign. A prospect that was easier to talk about than to do something about. It seemed clear that the politically easiest way to get out of the problem was for America to wash its hands and blame the UN and the Europeans for the mess. But there was a well-founded fear that such an attitude would backfire, either because the war would intensify (with the television images of the horrors which accompanied it), or because the allies would insist that Washington fulfilled the commitment to assist in the UN's withdrawal. On the other hand a decision to take a leadership role in Bosnia also implied grave risks; success would mean spending a lot of money and deploying thousands of American troops.

Clinton decides to engage

But in August 1995 President Clinton decided to engage in Bosnia.

In the shaping of the new policy two main actors emerged: the UN ambassador Madeleine Albright and the national security advisor at the time, W. Anthony (Tony) Lake.

Madeleine Albright had at several occasions argued that America's inability to address the Bosnia issue was putting at risk the credibility of the entire foreign policy of the administration. In a meeting of the foreign policy team in June 1995 she said: "When U.S. leadership is questioned in one area, it affects our leadership in others. French President Chirac's recent statement that 'the position of leader of the Free World is vacant' has been chilling my heart for weeks. The strategy we have now makes the President look weak. We need to get ahead of the game." (Albright 2003: 186)

After the massacres of Srebrenica had become known at the White House, the Vice – President had made an impassioned plea that the U.S. should not "acquiesce in genocide". Madeleine Albright had argued the need to be firm with the allies. While she was thinking of earlier failures, she had insisted: "We need to tell them this is it". Accompanied by a nodding President Bill Clinton she had said: "We need to press the French and British to go our way." (Albright 2003:187)

According to Madeleine Albright, three main factors ended the Bosnian war:

The first was that the Bosnian Serbs were overreaching their capacity. For years they had been counting on the vacillation of the West, but they did not know when to say stop.

The second factor was the changing military situation. In early August 1995 Croatia had launched an offensive to reclaim territory seized by the Serbs. This offensive was successful, and sent a message to the Bosnian Serbs that they were not invincible, and that they even in a crisis could not always count on the support from Milosevic.

The third factor, according to Albright, was Bill Clinton's willingness to lead. (Albright 2003: 189)

In early August 1995 Madeleine Albright presented with Tony Lake a new so called "End Game" strategy for the U.S. Bosnian policy. She argued that U.S. troops would have to go to Bosnia sooner or later, and that it would make more sense to send them "on our terms and timetable".(Albright 2003:189). She underscored that Europe had failed to resolve the crisis and, in the process, had diminished both NATO and the U.N. The U.S. reluctance to

take charge had weakened its own claim to leadership. She argued that the Bosnian Serbs should be forced to agree on reasonable terms or face a rollback of their military gains. If a negotiated settlement seemed difficult to gain, the U.S. should urge withdrawal of the UN mission and train and equip the Bosnian military behind a shield of NATO air power.

At this decisive moment President Clinton spoke up in support for Madeleine Albright and Tony Lake, and said: “We should bust our ass to get a settlement within the next few months. We must commit to a unified Bosnia. And if we can’t get that at the bargaining table, we have to help the Bosnians on the battlefield.” (Albright 2003:190). The road to Dayton was being paved.

The Long and Winding Road

Richard Holbrooke was now on board as Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs. He was appointed chief negotiator and immediately started his well known shuttle diplomacy with his team of hand-picked U.S. diplomats and military advisors.

The first step of the mission was interrupted by the tragic death of three of the team-members in a car accident on the steep, narrow and dangerous road on Mount Igman on their way to Sarajevo, by Holbrooke designated “The Most Dangerous Road in Europe”. (Holbrooke 1999:7).

New meetings in the Balkans were not resumed until August 30 1995, while Bosnian Serb installations were being bombed by NATO airplanes in the operation named Deliberate Force.

The first meeting was with Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade, who announced that he was to represent the Bosnian Serbs in the negotiations, after extensive negotiations with the leaders in Pale. He referred to the so-called “Patriarch Paper” which stated that Slobodan Milosevic was to lead the negotiations on behalf of Republika Srpska and Yugoslavia. It was called the Patriarch Paper because the meeting where it was agreed had been overlooked by the leader of the Serb Orthodox Church, Patriarch Pavle, who had also put his signature on it. Earlier the Americans had clearly expressed that they would not deal with the war crime indicted leaders Karadzic and Mladic. What is apparent from Holbrooke’s accounts from the meetings with Milosevic is that he had direct access to them, and could contact and discuss with them any time. The next important issue to discuss was the stop in the siege of

Sarajevo, which was agreed to directly with Mladic through a messenger from Milosevic on the conditions that the NATO bombing was stopped. Negotiations had started.

The second important phase of the real negotiations was a meeting in Geneva where the foreign ministers of the three countries met with the negotiating team, representatives from the Contact Group and the EU representative at that time, the former Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt. This was the first meeting where the three warring parties had met on a diplomatic level in more than two years. The meeting resulted in an agreement, the Joint Agreed Principles, approved by the representatives of the three parties.

After new rounds of bombing, on 15 September 1995, finally an agreement is reached with the Serbs to lift the siege on Sarajevo, and on 21 September UN declared that the Serbs had withdrawn their heavy weapons from Sarajevo and the bombing is suspended. On 26 September an agreement is reached between the three parties on the future of Bosnia, which paved the way for further negotiations. The signing of the Dayton Agreement was reached after 20 days of negotiations at the Wright –Patterson Air Base at Dayton, Ohio. The negotiating team with the involved partners – locked up until they reached an agreement, has in Holbrooke's own words become a shorthand for a certain type of diplomacy – to do a "Dayton". The ambitious goal of turning the cease fire into a permanent peace and gain an agreement for a multiethnic state, the agreement was reached on 21 November 1995, and made final in Paris on 14 December the same year, signed by the three presidents Izetbegovic, Tudjman and Milseovic.

The Dayton Peace Agreement

The Dayton Peace Accords consisted of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and eleven annexes setting forth obligations by the parties and the international community to implement the agreement.

The annexes of the text contained provisions dealing with military aspects of the peace settlement, regional stabilization, elections, human rights, refugees and displaced persons, and even a new constitution. The annexes also described the role and responsibility of international military and civilian agencies to assist in the implementation of the Accords' provisions. The essence of the Accords was contained in the Contact Group Plan, and

reaffirmed in agreements on basic principles the parties had negotiated in September 1995. These included the following provisions:

- Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue to exist as a single state within its current, internationally recognized boundaries;
- Bosnia will consist of two entities, The Muslim-Croat Federation and Republica Srpska, which respectively occupy 51 and 49 percent of Bosnia;
- The central government will consist of a popularly elected three-member presidency and parliamentary assembly, which will reflect the multiethnic character of Bosnia and guarantee minority rights;
- The central government will have authority over foreign relations and trade, customs, monetary policy immigration, international communications , and inter-entity transportation;
- All powers not specified as belonging to the central government will be retained by the entities, including authority over defence and fiscal policy as well as the right to establish “parallel special relationships” with neighbouring countries so long as these are consistent with Bosnia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity;
- Refugees and internally displaced people have the right to return to their homes or to be compensated for their loss of property.

(The Dayton Peace Accords, http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=379, p1,2, Daalder 2000:137,1389)

According to Holbrooke, the Dayton agreement was a good agreement – on paper. It ended the war and established a single, multiethnic country. “But countless peace agreements have survived only in history books as case studies in failed expectations. The results of the international effort to implement Dayton would determine its true place in history”.

(Holbrooke 1999:335)

Chapter 3

Press coverage as election discourse

The material at hand

The main material of this analysis is data collected during my stay in Sarajevo in the period from beginning of April to 1 October 1996. This was the period when the activities of the OSCE was fully focused on organising the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, often named the most complicated elections in history. To comply with the Dayton Peace Accords, the elections had to be held within six months after entry into force of the Agreement. If a delay would be necessary, no later than nine months after entry into force. Thus the election date was set to 14. September 1996, barely within the nine months' deadline.

During my period of stay I had a unique opportunity to study the development of the elections preparations at close range. At the same time from my position in the OSCE Press Office I also had the opportunity to get an overview of the media coverage of the elections. I had access both to local news (although translated) as well as international news such as satellite TV and clippings from international News Agencies and newspapers. I tried to collect in a more or less systematic manner all the material I could get related to press and press coverage during my six months stay.⁷

The material chosen for this thesis is a selection of articles from the International Herald Tribune. Because of the nature of the data I choose to use Discourse Analysis as method.

The time lag since the event (the elections in 1996) makes interviews with any actors difficult. My personal situation has made it difficult to go back to Bosnia at a later stage to update my data and experience. Therefore I try to keep the 1996 experience as authentic as

⁷ I was lucky to get it all transported to Norway by an NGO (Network for Peace) which organised bus-trips going back and forth between Norway and Bosnia & Herzegovina for refugees who wanted to visit their country and see what the conditions were.

possible. I choose to use it as an example of a tendency in international and local media, which other researchers and observers have documented at a later stage: the context of the New World Order and the way it influences media of our times. (Nohrstedt and Ottosen 2000) This World Order has since the break-up of the Soviet Union meant a unilateral system in the world where the U.S. is dominating and keeping control.

For the purpose of establishing the contextual framework for my study, I will take a closer look at the assumption that media plays a vital role in a democratic society, and the following is a presentation of different theoretical aspects on this relationship, mainly based on descriptions of the role of the press in U.S. society, with emphasis on the particular characteristics of U.S. foreign news reporting.

On the relationship between media and politics in a democratic society

Elections as such are important elements of a democratic political process. A clear purpose of elections is to hold government officials accountable for their performance in office. But both elected and appointed government officials must be held accountable between elections as well. What role do the media play in that process? The way people come to respond to political communications and to perceive political leaders, institutions and issues, are clearly vital elements in how the political system works. How do communication through the media, in the form of news and public affairs as well as entertainment, affect people's responses and perceptions? Formerly people received information about politics, the government and political performance through the political parties and their own organisations and information channels. But the parties own ability to guide people's political behaviour has declined heavily during the past 25 years. People also receive information through different interest groups that they belong to. But the mass media is the main source of information today for political information and impressions for most people. Even when the decisions are partly based on conversations with family and friends the media are often the indirect source of information. For the vast majority of the general public, there is a great physical and psychological distance from the world of political affairs. That distance between political actors and the public, during elections and between them, is bridged by the communications of the mass media. According to Walter Lippman, people respond to political matters on the basis of "the pictures in their heads of what the world is like / pictures that are largely selected and arranged by the media (as referred in Alger 1996: 8). The mass media are

increasingly the central way people develop their information on and impressions of candidates, government, and so on. According to Alger a democratic process implies two essential elements. First of all, democracy means that alternative choices are made available to the public. In the *marketplace of ideas* that constitute a democracy, the choice is at the core of the concept. Secondly, the public must have in its hands the information it takes to make political decisions in a meaningful fashion. If the public is intended to serve as the foundation of the democratic process and hence to indicate basic directions for government through their electoral choices and other political participation, then the people must have the information to be able to make such decisions in an adequate manner, and act on them in an appropriate fashion. This also implies that the people also have an adequate level of general education and the freedom to select the option they see most fit to serve their interests. (Alger 1996 p.9).

Information and full access to it is a cardinal principle of a democratic system. According to Carl J. Friedrich “Freedom of the press is considered a cornerstone of constitutional democracy” and he continues “...the emergence of constitutional government, and in particular the crystallization of the systems of popular representation as we know them, are inextricably interwoven with the growth of the modern press. Without it constitutional government is unimaginable.” (Friedrich 1968 : 502 as quoted in Alger 1996 :10).

Friedrich even refers to Lincoln’s Gettysburg address ‘...that government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth’ calling it the most eloquent expression of the progressive spirit of democracy. (Friedrich 1968 p.32 as referred in Alger 1996:10).

According to Barber, democracy requires real, affirmative participation by the people. This participation is needed not only to ensure that government action is in accordance with the public’s wishes but also for creating and maintaining a harmoniously working community, which enables a democracy to sustain itself. (Alger 1996: 11)

How can ordinary citizens effectively exert their control of the politicians and how can they act to ensure the “government of the people and by the people”? The answer leads to the amount of information the public must have to be able to make effective political choices.

“ ‘Freedom of the press’ is a civil liberty under law, logically justified for the specific purpose of ...the development of an objectively informed or intellectually vigorous democracy” (G.E.G Catlin 1962: 197, as quoted in Alger 1996:11) Dahl calls it “enlightened understanding” and notes some vital particulars essential to the basic principle of an informed public. According to him, this principle “makes it hard to justify procedures that would cutoff or suppress information which, were it available, might well cause citizens to arrive at a different decision [on a candidate or an issue] ; or that would give citizens much easier access than others to information of crucial importance.” (Dahl 1989:112, as quoted in Alger 1996: 11).

In today’s world the media’s role in providing adequate information for people is crucial. Particularly is this the case in the U.S. where the political parties have declined significantly as reliable sources of information to the public to enable them to make reasonable political choices.

The public as such, e.g. society, is far more mobile and uprooted at this turn of the century as ever before. This is true all over the Western World, but applies particularly to the U.S. The economy is increasingly dominated by national and international corporations characterized by frequent job transfers, frequent changing of homes, constant travel etc. This means that a far higher percentage of the public does not keep stable, long-term social networks, which help share information on political matters and assist in its interpretation. Or to put it in Vance Packard’s words: the U.S. has become “a nation of strangers”, which again implies more dependence on the mass media for information and perspective. (Packard 1972 as referred in Alger 1996:12).

Another aspect of Western Society at the turn of the twentieth century is that larger, developed societies with the full scale of industrialization and urbanization have increasingly become *mass societies*. High mobility and rootlessness as mentioned above are key elements of these societies, as well as an “atomized” individual condition.

And mass societies constitute a mass public, often far removed from the elites for whom a lot of the serious newspapers are published.

According to Mc Nair, for instance the tabloidisation of news as a cultural expression of democratic development may reflect the interests and the priorities of the contemporary

mass public. A mass public sphere is by definition a populist public sphere in which commercial criteria plays a key role. Mc Nair refers to Hartley, who argues that popular newspapers can often play a subversive political role. His major example is from Great Britain, where the coverage of the royal family by the tabloid press somehow is pro democratic in all its cruelty. The portrayal of the royal family as humanly fallible and imperfect has roots back to journalism's radical origin in the struggle against feudalism, even if the primary contemporary motivation for such coverage is economic competition (Hartley 1996:201 as referred in Mc Nair 1998:116-117). In Britain the tabloids are often owned by foreigners who are not part of the British establishments, and have little or none respect for the traditional elite status or class. The position of some of the tabloids may be defined as subversive even by the most dogmatic Marxists. According to Mc Nair popular, populist journalist can be anti-establishment, as well as sexist, racist and homophobic. In the end popular journalism is a contradictory discourse, reflecting the reactionary content of popular attitudes as well as their anti establishment prejudices.

Mc Nair underscores that journalism of this kind is a peculiar British phenomenon. According to Mc Nair the United States lack a truly 'tabloid' newspaper culture, and with it a democratizing irreverence towards elites. He refers Taylor, who remarks that the '...lesson from America is that, without the tabloids and their spirit of irreverence, the press becomes a bastion of conformity dedicated to lofty purposes understood only by the few, an instrument for and by the elite' (Taylor 1991:18 as quoted in McNair 1998:118).

More on media and politics

Bernard Cohen has described three roles for the press related to foreign policy: observer, participant and catalyst (Cohen 1963 as referred in Davis 1992: 197).

The press as observer: This is the most obvious role. The press observes and reports the event of the policymaking process. Theoretically, reporters stand at the elbows of policymakers and report what they observe. These reports are disseminated to all interested parties, e.g. other public officials, affected groups and individuals and the general public. As observers, the press serves as transmission belt conveying information from various participants, who do not communicate directly, in order to inform for future policy-making. This process is essential in a democracy where policy-making is a public enterprise and the participants include, at least at some level, the voters.

The press as participant: The role of the press as participant in a policy making process is fulfilled by serving as representative for the public, government watchdog or critic, advocate of certain policy positions and actual policymaker. Policymakers and the public may look at the press as the voice of public opinion. As watchdog or critic, the press participates by watching over policymakers and offering criticism. Since such criticism is heard and responded to, the press moves from observer to actual participant in the process. However, this role also involves a certain danger that the press might transcend the public's expectations of press behavior towards public officials and lead to public resentment of the press's intrusion.

Another way the press may act as participant, is to actually advocate policy options. Although such advocacy, according to journalistic standards, is consigned to the editorial page, more subtle forms can occur in news reporting. Framing the issue in a certain way may be one form of position advocacy. The listing of available alternatives and the omission of others is another.

The press as catalyst: News content brings issues to the foreground and affects the public's issue agenda. It may also affect the public's reactions to the same issues. Issues which otherwise have been ignored or minimized become emphasized in public debate.

(Davis 1992: 198)

Foreign affairs reporting in U.S. media

In the field of foreign affairs reporting, Davis emphasizes that U.S. news media seem to be "following the flag". This means that they report on foreign affairs in accordance with the priorities of the U.S. government. There is an overweight of coverage on Western European affairs, due to the close political and economic ties between the United States and the countries of Western Europe. Social customs and political institutions are more similar between these countries and the United States, and the ethnic background of most Americans is rooted in Western Europe. There is also a substantial coverage of the Middle East in U.S. media, due to the traditional close relationship to Israel and extensive involvement in its relationship to its neighboring Arab countries. Presently the heavy U.S. involvement in Iraq means that coverage of the Middle East has become the highest priority of U.S. foreign news coverage over a long period of time.

Generally, according to Davis, foreign affairs reporting is primarily and predictably coverage of U.S. foreign relations with other nations, and secondarily coverage of countries close to the United States such as the Western European nations, Israel and Canada. A third, and distinctively subordinate category is coverage of events which do not specifically affect the United States and which occur in other countries than those listed above (Davis 1992 : 213). According to this, the coverage of the war, and particularly the peace and elections in Bosnia would probably fall under the first category, since the Dayton Peace Accords became such a high profiled endeavor for the Clinton administration.

Davis points out that today the news media has capabilities of world wide reach, and international political leaders follow closely the American news. This means that the American press plays a role as conduit for information between nations. Davis says there is no explicit relation between government and newspapers in the United States. However, in foreign affairs reporting, the journalists who work for networks and elite publications attempt to discover and convey accurately the thinking of senior administration officials in order to boost their own organization's credibility as a source of accurate news.

Foreign policy-makers often use the highly credible status of the press with its access to large audiences, to communicate messages to foreign governments. This tool is especially useful when there are no other forms of communication. An example is the Iran hostage crisis in 1979-1981. The communication between the U.S. government and the Iranian students holding the hostages in the U.S. embassy was occasionally conducted exclusively through the press. But the press can also become a vehicle for communication with foreign governments also in non-crisis situations. (Davis 1992:213)

This way of using the press raises questions about the conduct of foreign policy. Does this role reduce the independence of the press? Does it imply that the press is failing to fulfill its role in American politics when concentrating on communicating U.S. government policy? Davis suggests that journalists who follow the lead of the U.S. government may be failing its mission to serve the public. This practice may for instance lead to less coverage of administration embarrassments, and less critical and challenging reporting on policymakers.

First Amendment

Any media institution in the United States will claim to abide by the First Amendment of the constitution, ratified on December 15, 1791 with nine other amendments, known as the “Bill of Rights”. The First Amendment reads:

‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.’ (The Bill of Rights: A Transcription.

www.archives.gov/national_archives_experience/charters/print_friendly.html)

Thus freedom of press is considered an ideal, which the government should not interfere with under any circumstances. In the case of the owners of the International Herald Tribune, The New York Times and The Washington Post, tensions concerning the First Amendment have been many. The most outstanding examples are described in the following presentation. They include issues like the Pentagon Papers and Watergate, both leading to major embarrassment for the government, including that President Nixon had to leave office.

The International Herald Tribune

History

The predecessor to the International Herald Tribune was the European edition of The New York Herald started by James Gordon Bennett in 1887. One of the philosophies of Bennett was that it is better to create the news yourself rather than hang around waiting for something to report. He had inherited a large fortune, so money was never a problem. While

editor of The New York Herald, in 1869 he sent Henry M. Stanley to find the aged Livingstone in the heart of Africa. Stanley was worried about the expense, but Bennett told him not to worry, and paid whatever the cost, with the very clear message: “Find him!” (Robertson 1987:16). Bennett considered Paris a useful gathering post for news from all over the world: Africa, all over Europe, the Near East etc. The rapid technical developments after 1850 which included transportation such as steamships and railroads, contributed to the decision to create an overseas newspaper. The industrialization also created a wealthy bourgeoisie that mingled freely with the aristocracy. Rapid and comfortable transportation combined with communication by cable created a truly cosmopolitan class. This wealthy, cosmopolitan class became the first readers of the overseas edition of the New York Herald. (Robertson 1987:18)

Thus the paper gave a priority to serving this class, for instance through extensive reporting on fashionable resorts and hotels all over Europe. At the same time chic hotels and restaurants all advertised in the newspaper – advertising and reporting seemed to go hand in hand.

Independence

The Herald had an impact on the French press. It was a truly independent newspaper, reflecting only the views of the owner, himself being a member of the independent, cosmopolitan upper middle class that the newspaper served so well. In France the newspapers at the time would be owned by interest groups, political parties etc. The Herald was in the front line concerning the way it was edited: news were clearly separated from editorials and opinion. It was also in the avant-garde when it came to technicalities: nice paper, linotypes, photographic illustrations were used instead of drawings, which was the most common at the time.

But what the newspaper did not do, was to analyze what was behind the sunny, golden era it described. Thus, the wealthy, cosmopolitan world described by the Herald collapsed with the outbreak of the First World War. The Herald survived because it became a different newspaper. The newspaper went on to serve Americans stranded in Europe at the outbreak of the war, and later American military that came to serve the Allied cause. The coming of the American army caused the newspaper to grow enormously. It provided the

army with a link to home at the same time as it informed about what was going on with the war (Robertson 1989: 109). James Gordon Bennett died in 1916 before the war was over.

The new owner was Ogden Reid who bought the newspaper in 1924, with Laurence Hills as new editor in chief in Paris. Between 1924 and 1929 the circulation of the Herald increased from 12000 to 39000. In 1934 the two American newspapers The Chicago Tribune and the New York Herald merged, and became The New York Herald Tribune, European Edition, and continued under that name until 1966. It was bought by the Washington Post, and a new merger happened in 1967, this time with the New York Times. The new name became: *The International Herald Tribune*, published with the New York Times and the Washington Post.

Editorial policy

In the thirties the old Herald was unabashedly Republican. At the elections in 1932 it supported Hoover against Roosevelt. This reflected the political preference of the mother paper, The New York Herald at the time (Robertson 1989:180). Just a few days before Germany invaded France in June 1940 the newspaper closed, and did not reappear until Dec 22 1944.

During the first years after 1945 it continued to be a very Paris-based newspaper, covering everything that happened in Paris in the world of fashion, food, restaurants, culture etc. But financial problems put the final end to the Paris Edition of the New York Herald. It reappeared as *The International Herald Tribune* (IHT) after the merger first with Washington Post then with the New York Times as mentioned above. (Robertson 1989: 353)

Financially this solution became a success, by 1971 the circulation had risen to 120 000. The editor now wanted to target the newspaper at the new transnational and multinational elites of the European Common Market, rather than at American tourists abroad.

Liberal and Neutral?

At the elections in 1964 there was a break of the Republican tradition of the paper since the front page was saying “We Choose Johnson” (Lyndon B. Johnson was elected). At the

elections in 1968 the newspaper prepared an extensive coverage of the elections as usual, but at the editorial level for the first time in its history: it did not endorse any of the candidates.

A commentary made by the British columnist Clive Irving may express the position of the IHT in the later years:

Because the IHT is edited neither as an American province in Europe nor with the blinkered vision of any one European national loyalty, it somehow places the world in a far better balance than any other paper I know. Though edited by Americans, it also sees America with unusual detachment and knowledge... Despite its weaknesses in financial and industrial coverage and in retaining an idiomatic American aura in its makeup this is one newspaper rescued from death and given an emergent market by luck, judgement and hardnosed commercial decisions owing nothing to ancient interest. What a lesson. (Robertson 1989:393).

With the technological development from the seventies and up to today the idea of a global newspaper became more feasible than ever. At the same time the competition in international editing has increased. Examples are the international edition of the Financial Times, the Economist's international edition etc. This competition meant a lot of changes for the paper during the 1980ies. Computerized editing systems were installed with the continuous investments and updating it requires. Space for business and financial news has doubled, and a lot of material poured in from the parent papers the Washington Post and the New York Times. The paper continued the tradition set by Bennett – to separate objective news reporting from editorial opinion. These are pages that also give space to heavy criticism of U.S. policy. Neither criticism nor controversy over American institutions and politics is being downplayed. Contrasting points of views are to be found in the pages of the IHT. (Robertson 1989: 438)

The role of the printed press today

News is business, and media institutions have to survive financially. Throughout the twentieth century the competition in the media was enormous, and led to a lot of concentration of financial power. The competition from television and the world wide web has put an enormous pressure on the printed press, and only the financially most healthy have survived (see Herman & Chomsky, Brian Mc Nair).

The two owners of the International Herald Tribune in 1996, the New York Times and The Washington Post, have both survived the competition and emerged as financially very healthy companies. They both appear as large corporations in Fortune magazine's list of the top 500 companies. For example in 1990, The New York Times had a ranking as number 227 on this list, whereas The Washington Post was ranked as number 269 of the 500 top companies of the listing. (Emery & Emery 1992: 530)

All of the articles selected for analysis for this thesis are written by journalists covering international news from the New York Times and Washington Post, and printed in the International Herald Tribune. It is therefore relevant to take a closer look at these two newspapers as part of the context for the analysis.

According to the authors Emery and Emery of "The Press in America", the New York Times and the Washington Post are considered the three most pre-eminent American newspapers in addition to The Los Angeles Times, called "*the trio of highest quality*". (Emery & Emery 1992: 541). These authors underline that "*the obligations of any newspaper to its community are to strive for honest and comprehensive coverage of the news and for courageous expression of editorial opinion in support of basic principles of human liberty and social progress. Those newspapers that have been the most consistent in fulfilling these obligations have been rewarded with public and professional acclaim. Other factors that have operated to give a newspaper greater professional recognition are the brilliance of its individual leadership and a longstanding publishing tradition.*" (Emery & Emery 1992: 541) The authors point out that any American newspaper inherently is part of the power structure – community, regional and national. This is the structure that for the most part controls political, economic, military and social decision-making. This position makes it unlikely that these newspapers will fully challenge the structure they are a part of. Even though the top three newspapers mentioned cannot be expected to cause significant changes in society, they seem to be acting consistently on the side of the public good as that is generally defined, and they are therefore often honoured.

The New York Times

The New York Times was founded in 1851 and bought in 1896 by Adolph Ochs, the son of a German born Jew who had emigrated from Bavaria to Tennessee in 1845 (Diamond 1994: 39). Since 1896 the newspaper has stayed in the family, and is still published by a descendant

of Ochs, today the publisher being Arthur Ochs Shultzberger jr. The slogan of the late Adolph Ochs from 1896 still prevails as editorial policy for the newspaper:

“To give the News Impartially without Fear or Favour Regardless of any Party, Sect or Interest involved.”

(Salisbury 1980: ii) ⁸

According to Emery & Emery the New York Times “has ranked first in all the polls, continuing to hold its place in the forefront of American journalism by maintaining the tradition of telling the news with completeness and integrity.”(Emery & Emery 1992:541).

Internationally the Times was staunchly internationalist in outlook, but conservative in domestic affairs. Since 1960 it has supported Democratic presidential candidates, and is a vigorous defender of individual freedoms against reactionary attacks and illegal use of power. (Emery & Emery 1992: 543)

The Pentagon Papers

An important event in the history of the New York Times was the publishing of the so-called Pentagon Papers. On Sunday 12, 1971 the first report based on the Pentagon Papers was published, with the headline: *Vietnam Archive: Pentagon Study traces 3 decades of growing U.S. involvement*. This started a series of articles that were based on a secret Pentagon study prepared between June 1967 and January 1969, named: *“History of U.S. Decision Making Process on Vietnam Policy”* Only fifteen copies of the study were made, and they were classified *“top secret – sensitive”*. It consisted of two-and-a-half million words bound in forty-seven volumes. The disclosure of the study is considered the one single largest disclosure of classified documents in the history of the United States. (Rudensine 1996: 2)

The reports in the Times caught President Richard Nixon and his aides completely off guard, and with a few exceptions, neither Nixon nor his aides seemed to know of the existence of the Pentagon papers. President Nixon asked the courts to enjoin the Times from publishing further reports from the Pentagon Papers. This was the first time since the

⁸ Today the slogan printed on the first page of the paper is “All the News That’s Fit to Print” (NYT, February 24. 2005, p.1)

adoption of the U.S. Constitution that the federal government had sued the press to stop it from publishing information because of national security. (Rudenstine 1996:2). The court order to enjoin further publication because of national security was the first ever in U.S. history. The week after The Washington Post had gotten hold of the Pentagon Papers and started to publish parts of the classified history. This forced the government to file a second lawsuit, in Washington D.C. this time. Although the judge presiding the case in the New York District Court, Murray I. Gurfein was appointed by the Nixon administration, and at the start of the case questioned the patriotism of the Times, ended up by denying the government's request for an injunction, concluding that there were no "sharp clash" between the government's legitimate interest in keeping some defence information confidential and the New York Time's right to publish. In his opinion he also wrote that security is not "at the ramparts alone. A secure nation requires a free press, even one that is 'cantankerous', 'obstinate' and 'ubiquitous'." (Rudenstine 1996:3). The district court in Washington D.C. reached the same conclusion concerning the Washington Post, and both cases were appealed to the Supreme Court. On June 30, only 15 days after the first court case against the NYT, the Supreme Court denied the government their demand for injunction, and the two newspapers were free to publish the reports.

This Supreme Court decision is considered very important because the government lost its first effort to restrain the press.

Immediately following the Supreme Court decision, The New York Times and The Washington Post resumed publication of the Pentagon Paper.

The publication of the Pentagon Papers had an impact internally in the Democratic Party, and it increased the public's distrust of the national government, particularly the executive branch. This is a distrust that has deepened further over the years.

Ultimately the episode had a devastating impact on the Nixon administration. The dispute was used for all it was worth by Nixon as a means to strike at all those he considered political enemies, to intimidate the press, to divide the Democrats and strengthen his own re-election bid. The Supreme Court decision intensified his feeling that his administration needed badly to protect itself from those he believed were conspiring to undermine his capacity to govern. With his top aides, particularly Henry Kissinger, he created an atmosphere of crisis. In this atmosphere the so-called Plumbers Unit was created, which

eventually led to the Watergate break-in and all the following cover-up events. When the burglary and the cover-up became public, they led to the eventual undermining of Nixon's political support, forcing him to resign the presidency in August 1974. Thus the Pentagon Papers affair led to the unravelling and final disintegration of the Nixon presidency.

(Rudenshteyn 1996:5,6)

According to Rudenshteyn the Pentagon Papers case was crucial to testing the strength and resilience of many of the elements that are critical in a democratic order, revealing how two important institutions play a vital role in a democracy without being directly accountable from a political perspective: the press and the courts. (Rudenshteyn 1996: 6)

The Washington Post

It is also appropriate to put in a few lines about the other owner of the IHT at the time, the prestigious Washington Post. Stilson Hutchins founded it in 1877 as a Democratic newspaper. (Roberts 1989:1) From the start it was an instant success, among others because it provided close and inside reports from the political life of the capital city, and created a readership far beyond the local Washington DC area. From 1899 until 1933 when Eugene Meyer bought it at a bankruptcy sale, the newspaper had many owners and had deteriorated both economically and editorially. (Like the founder of the New York Times, Adolph Ochs, Meyer's parents were immigrants from Europe of Jewish origin).

Meyer's period of ownership (1933-1946) coincided with the New Deal politics of President F.D. Roosevelt. It was said of Meyer that he had managed to rescue, revive and revitalize the Washington Post by giving it the priceless ingredients of success: "integrity, decency and powerful idealism" (Roberts 1989:254).

The paper was known for its internationalist outlook from the start, and was also known for its liberal stance through outspoken and early criticism of Wisconsin Senator Joseph R. McCarthy in his efforts to arouse anti-communist hysteria.

Under the leadership of Katharine Graham who took over the Washington Post Company in 1963 (after the owner, her husband Philip L. Graham committed suicide)⁹ the newspaper continued this liberal stance.

Philip Graham developed a very close relationship to the Kennedy administration. According to Roberts this was one of the reasons why the Washington Post's coverage of the Viet Nam war was very slow in developing an independent position. From the beginning of the involvement in 1962, the newspaper supported the Viet Nam venture (Roberts 1989: 351). According to Roberts the close relationship resulted in a "far less critical reporting and editorializing than should have been the role of the Capital's leading newspaper" (Roberts: 1989: 361). A Saigon bureau was opened in 1964, but it was not until the end of 1965 that any editorials appeared doubting the war. Katherine Graham who had taken over as director in 1963, admitted that The Post supported Lyndon B. Johnson's Viet Nam policies a lot longer than any other newspaper in the country (Roberts 1989:386). But during 1966-67 the tide turned. As a result, President Johnson had become very angry with Mrs. Graham because of the way both The Washington Post and Newsweek (which the Post had bought in 1966) covered the Viet Nam war. Thus the old ties of friendship with the White House were gradually broken (Roberts 1989:392).

In the 1970s the Washington Post received a lot of attention because of the Watergate Crisis, when the publishers and the chief editors fully supported the investigative reporting of Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward, despite the threats of reprisals from the Nixon administration. The affair gave the paper a Pulitzer gold medal and much prestige, while Nixon had to resign.

An important aspect of the growth of the circulation of the Washington Post was the intensive coverage of Washington politics. The paper favoured democratic presidential candidates regularly, and endorsed Walter Mondale in 1984, after opposing much of the Reagan administration's program.

⁹ Katharine was the daughter of Eugene Meyer who had bought the newspaper in 1933. Katharine Graham's son Donald was named publisher in 1979, and took over the entire Washington Post Company in 1991. The company's assets include several television stations, Newsweek magazine, a local newspaper in Everett, an interest in a news service with the Los Angeles Times, and until 2002 a third interest in the International Herald Tribune.

Bob Woodward became assistant managing editor and led the Washington Post's investigation of the Iran arms sales scandal in 1986, which revealed diversion of funds to support the Contras in their effort to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. The Washington Post is considered *the* liberal intellectual newspaper of today. (Emery & Emery 1992:545-546)

The aim of this presentation of the International Herald Tribune with its origins and influential owners has been to give a thorough background for the analysis of the texts presented from this newspaper. The presentation of the newspaper, its owners and their intentions with their journalism is an important part of the context for my analysis of the coverage of the election in Bosnia.

Chapter 4

On Discourse Analysis

Some theoretical considerations

I have chosen to study newspaper texts about a specific issue in a Foreign Relations debate, e.g. the debate about the first elections in Bosnia after the Dayton Peace Accords were signed on November 21 1995. Discourse Analysis is chosen as the method for analysis of the texts, and the following is a presentation of different aspects of Discourse Analysis, as different authors see it both as theory and method.

According to Hagelund, there is no set way to do discourse analysis. This method of analysis consists of a whole set of multidisciplinary approaches which are practiced in different ways. As a general term, “discourse analysis “ (DA) can be seen as a general stance towards what has been termed the “linguistics, poststructuralist or post-modern ‘turn’ in the social sciences” (Hagelund 2003:45).

To make an analysis possible, Hagelund decided to use concepts and ideas from different parts of the literature on discourse, based on what would be useful for the analysis of her material, the Norwegian political debate on immigration (Hagelund:2004).

She sums up her approach to DA in three main points:

- The importance of being serious about the capacity of language to constitute reality. DA involves that the attention for the scope of analysis is directed towards linguistic practices and the capacity of these practices to produce certain versions of reality.

The point of departure for doing discourse analysis evolves around the notion that oral and written text is important – also in a sociological context. Both oral and written texts show people’s involvement in shaping the world they are talking and writing about. It also acknowledges that because we express our experience of the world through language, is it impossible to maintain a clear distinction between the

world and the language *within* the language. To many this talk about reality being constructed through discourse seems like vague and misty ideas far removed from the existence of the physical world. Hagelund finds Potter convincing in his arguments for how we all use rhetoric to convince others. (Potter 1996).

Potter argues that as language users, we all make descriptions. One way of thinking about representations is that they more or less reflect something else – mental concepts or external realities. Potter presents representations as building sites.

In the first place because representations launch versions of reality, and that it is through a number of such representations that reality appears. Secondly because the representations are constructions in themselves, composed of different components and rhetoric grasps.

Representations are action oriented; they are formulated to make something happen. At the same time they are epistemologically oriented, they are constructed in such a manner that they can be understood and treated as factual representations of reality.

Different types of discourse analysts approach linguistic construction of reality in different ways and from different levels of abstraction.

For my study of journalistic texts, the focus of analysis is the way they present themselves as descriptions of reality, as objective representations of American Policies towards Bosnia and the way they argue for the need to keep the deadline of the elections or not.

Hagelund admits that discourse analyses are difficult to do in concrete empirical work; they tend to concentrate on the purely discursive aspects of the analysis. According to her, this implies a challenge for future analyses:

- Understanding how the production of meaning happens.

Recognising the difficulty in doing DA as one method. People work with very different types of data under the umbrella of DA. A wide variety of analyses are used, including linguistic analysis of sentences, conversation analysis, extensive historical analyses. The literature offers different ways of studying how meaning is constituted through language, e.g. linguistic ways to construct different versions of

reality. Opinions differ as to whether a discourse analysis should be based on one approach or if it is legitimate to mix and match different approaches.

- Being the storyteller – and being conscious of it.

If the point of departure is that linguistic practices contributes to construct the reality they are a part of, this should also apply to the texts produced by the person doing the discourse analysis. The fact that it is difficult to draw a clear line between language and reality is something the analyst will have to deal with in his/hers own text.

Neumann points out that discourse analysis as method for social studies should be given more space than the case is today. He says that a new literature on method is needed, exactly because we need a variety of ways to work scientifically. We just have to accept the uncertainty, which is immanent in questioning the difference between reality understood as a physical given reality and reality understood as social representation, and also let the tension which surrounds this difference undergo scientific research. Discourse analysis is then one of several alternatives for those who want to make this their empirical field of research, and this should again lead to throwing new light on the assumptions and conditions which always are part of political practices. Knowing these assumptions and conditions will lead us to a deeper understanding of specific political actions (Neumann 2003:15).

What is Discourse?

Neumann looks for the meaning of the term in different dictionaries, where most of the definitions will have linguistic meanings. For the purposes of analysing discourse from the point of view of the social sciences, Neumann chooses other definitions. Fredrik Barth for instance, defines discourse: “ a process reflecting a distribution of knowledge, authority, and social relationships, which propels those enrolled in it” (Barth 1993:173 according to Neumann 2001:17).

Foucault who calls it ”Practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak ”

(Foucault 1972:49 according to Neumann 2001:17).

Pecheux has another: A discourse as a particular area of language use may be identified by the institutions to which it relates and by the position from which it comes and

which it marks out for the speaker. The position does not exist by itself, however. Indeed, it may be understood as a standpoint taken up by the discourse through its relation to another, ultimately an opposing discourse. (Cited in Macdonnel 1986:3 according to Neumann 2003:17)

In other words, definitions of “Discourse” seem to change with time and place. So Neumann makes the following summary, which may also serve my purposes: ‘*A discourse is a system for generating a set of statements and practices which, through inscription into institutions and appearing as more or less normal, have a constituting function of the reality of their bearers and have a certain degree of regularity in a set of social relations.*’ (Neumann 2001:18, translated by author).

The material from Bosnia consists only of material, which is written and has been printed. These texts are clippings from newspapers and news agency reports. They differ in genre, they may be: news reports, commentaries, editorial articles etc., but all of the articles can be defined within the framework of news. News in the press represents a type of discourse that is written, planned and fixed in a specific manner. The focus of the discourse analysis will concentrate on theories and styles of analysis, which account for the structures of written texts. This means that the analysis exclude for instance conversation analysis and analysis of visual and oral news as they appear in TV and radio.

News as Discourse

According to Van Dijk, news reports should be analysed as a particular type of discourse, as opposed to the prevailing influence in the social sciences in the study of mass communication, where the focus has been more or less exclusively on the economic, political, social or psychological aspects of news processes. News reports should be accounted for in their own right, e.g. as particular types of language use or text and as specific kinds of sociocultural practice (Van Dijk 1988:1,2).

Most of the articles analyzed for this thesis are news reports. News reports are composed and structured in specific manners, and hence the analysis should take into consideration these specifics.

Van Dijk sees discourse, in a wider sense, as a complex unit of linguistic form, meaning and action that can be included in the notion of a *communicative event* or a

communicative act. This concept means that discourse, unlike more intuitive and linguistic approaches, is not limited to the actual verbal utterance, that is to the text or dialogue itself. Particularly for the analysis of talk, it is obvious that the speaker and the person listening, including their personal and social properties and other aspects of the social situation belong to this event. According to this, a conversation, a trial in a courtroom, a classroom can all be examples of complex communicative events. These events may again be divided into smaller communicative acts: there could be a story within a conversation, the attorney's presentation in the courtroom, an explanation of a particular subject by the school teacher. Some of these, for example stories and argumentations, may exhibit properties similar to communicative acts or discourse types of other social settings.

This interactional nature of discourse is less obvious in written or printed discourse: the writer, the text and the reader are not participating in a simultaneously identifiable situation. Still, it may be appropriate to account for texts in the more dynamic terminology of discourse use in production, understanding and action. Empirically we speak of meanings expressed by or produced with the utterance, of publication of a text by a writer, or of meanings that are assigned to or inferred from a text by a reader. (Van Dijk 1988:9).

These are characteristics which also apply to news discourse. News reports can be studied as a specific type of public discourse. But they should be analyzed as "the result of cognitive and social processes of discourse and meaning production by journalists, or as related to the interpretation processes and media uses by newspaper readers or TV viewers". (Van Dijk 1988:9).

News reports also are characterized by specific ways of grammatical use, depending on the type of media they represent. There is a difference between the use of language and grammar in reports found in for instance Rupert Murdoch's popular press and the more serious newspapers like for instance The New York Times, Washington Post etc. The former will tend to use short sentences, a vocabulary based on everyday speech, "pub language" and simple grammatical structures. The latter, in Van Dijk's terms called "quality press", will tend to have long, complex sentences and many nominalizations, (*disruption* instead of *they disrupted* for instance). The formal jargon will be borrowed mostly from politicians.

The syntax of news reports is influenced by the principle to present the actual news as the most important, which is a regular, structural property of news reports. Instead of

saying: “Reliable sources declared that Iraq has been attacked by the US Air Force”, a news report would use a sentence more like: “Iraq has been attacked by the US Air Force, reliable sources declared”.

According to Van Dijk may an analysis of the grammatical use of language in the press reveal the perspective of the journalist or the newspaper. Sentence syntax expresses the semantic roles of participants in an event by word order, relational functions (subject, object) or the use of active and passive forms. Van Dijk analyses the headline:

“Police kills demonstrator”. The police is mentioned first in a subject position, and expresses that the police has the role of “agent”.

The sentence can also be as follows: “Demonstrator killed by police”. Here, the police is also an agent, but the demonstrator is here in first, subject position, and the police has a less prominent role.

A third version: “Demonstrator killed” may take the role of the police implicit, at the same time as the headline becomes syntactically ambiguous: the event described can be interpreted as to believe that the demonstrator was the killer and associate demonstrators with killing. Van Dijk refers research that shows that negative roles of the elite tend to be dissimulated by this kind of syntactic downgrading and implicitness.

The analysis of discourse should include a study of structures of sequences of sentences. This means, that the syntax or semantics of a sentence in discourse is described in terms of the sentential structures and interpretations of surrounding, usually preceding sentences in the same text. The order and function of words, or their underlying semantic role, may depend on such a discourse environment. The ideological point of view can be expressed not only by sentence structures but also by a textual dependence of syntax and semantics.

The analysis of discourse as a sequence of sentences provides an account of relative interpretations: The meaning or reference of words, clauses or sentences is studied as a function of those assigned to previous sentences. This aspect of discourse is often described in terms of local or sequential coherence. A basic rule of coherence is that sentence A is coherent to sentence B. For instance a sentence: “It was raining yesterday. We did not go out” is coherent. When it is raining; it is wise to stay inside to avoid getting wet. Whereas

the sentence: “It was raining yesterday. The interest rate of mortgages has risen by 10%” lacks coherence. The rainfall is not likely to influence the mortgage rate. A text is coherent if it describes a possible sequence of events. Coherence depends on our knowledge and beliefs, what we think is possible in the world.

Knowledge and interpretation

But it is not enough just to know the lexical meanings of words and their combinations. Knowledge of the world, and hence, a cognitive and social analysis of what people in a given culture know, and how such knowledge is used in the interpretation of discourse in general, and how it is used in establishing coherence in particular. Research in cognitive psychology and Artificial Intelligence has developed more knowledge about this and its effect on discourse interpretation. For instance research revealed that knowledge is organized in special clusters, so-called scripts, which contain all we know in our culture about a specific stereotypical type of episode. And the media rely heavily on socially shared knowledge and beliefs in the coherent and comprehensible account of special events that require knowledge or beliefs organized in scripts. These can contain topics such as civil war, terrorist attack, political meeting or voting.

Many political scripts involve group-based evaluative beliefs or opinions; they may also qualify as social attitudes.

“... Our subjective understanding of the coherence of a news report may depend on whether or not we share a particular knowledge script or socio-political attitude. This may be especially relevant in the understanding and evaluation of causes of events and reasons for action. With this kind of conceptual instrument, we are better equipped to study ideologically based differences in the relevant application of scripts or attitudes in news reporting when, for instance, reasons are given for the invasion of Grenada by U.S. troops as compared to their non-intervention in other countries in the Americas, such as Chile or Paraguay (Van Dijk1988:13).

Macrostructure

A semantic macrostructure makes explicit the overall topics or theme of a text and at the same time defines what could be called the overall coherence of at text.

“Macrostructures are derived from sentence meanings (propositions) of a text by a set of rules in an abstract, linguistic theory, by operations such as selection, generalization and construction. In a cognitive theory of discourse processing, these rules operate as tentative but effective macrostrategies that enable readers to derive the topic from a sequence of sentences.” (Van Dijk 1988:13)

To be able to do these operations, we depend heavily on our knowledge of the world (described as scripts above). For example the following proposition sequence: “U.S. planes flew to Iraq. They bombed Basra”. The macroproposition here is “The U.S. attacked Iraq”. We know that military attacks involve planes, that planes usually can fly and throw bombs, and throwing bombs is a way of attacking. Because we have a shared script of a military attack, we are able to comprehend newspaper reports about such attacks.

Such macrostructures and the cognitive operations in which they are used, are crucial to news production processes by reporters and editors and for comprehension, storage, memorization and later reproduction by media users. Such macrostructures explain how newsmakers continuously and routinely summarize the myriad of source texts (other media messages, wires, interviews, reports or press conferences) that are used in the production of a specific news report. The theory of macrostructures helps us account for the special properties of headlines and leads, which subjectively summarize the rest of the news report. Macrostructures also explain why readers usually only remember the main topes, that is, the highest level of the macrostructure of the news report. (Van Dijk 1988: 14).

To be able to organize the overall meaning or macrostructure of a text as a whole, we need a schematic superstructure. According to Van Dijk, such a schema can be defined by a set of characteristic categories and by a set of rules or strategies that specify the ordering of these categories. In this way, people in our culture share a narrative schema – featuring categories such as Summary, Setting, Orientation, Complication, Resolution, Evaluation and Coda. If one of the obligatory categories is lacking, people can conclude that the story is not finished, has no point, or simply is not story at all. According to Van Dijk, experimental research has shown that it is very difficult for language users to interpret and establish coherence only at the micro level, and construct ad hoc higher levels, in settings where there is no macrostructures and superstructures.

This means that global structures, both those of thematic content as well as those of schematic form, are crucial for theoretical analysis and for the actual production and understanding of a text. Such a schema must also produce news reports. Part of the news may have conventional functions that are used as obligatory or optional categories for its formal organization. For instance it is well known that there is a Summary category composed of Headlines and Lead. The body of the texts is also divided into schematic functions such as Main Events, Backgrounds, Context, History, Verbal Reactions or Comments. A special feature of news reports is that both macrostructures (topics) as well as the news schema that organizes them do not appear in the text in a continuous fashion. They seem to appear in an instalment-type, discontinuous way. The top of the macrostructure of a news report generally tends to be expressed first like this: first the headline (the highest macroproposition), then the Lead (the top of the macrostructure), and subsequently the lower macropropositions of the report, with details of content and the less prominent schematic categories towards the end. For the reader this means that the beginning of the text always contains the most important information. There is a significant link between news text structures and the strategies of news production and the uses of news reports in mass communications context. This is most obvious in news reports in the press, but more generally also holds for television news programs, which usually only express the higher-level macrostructures of a news story.

Since news reports are derived from a text on the basis of our knowledge and beliefs, they may of course be intersubjective: the most important information of a news event for one person or group may not be so for another. For instance a news report may be biased: unimportant pieces of information may be expressed in the headlines or lead, and important information may be placed at the end or omitted all together. (Van Dijk 1988:15-16).

News Report Structure

The general principle of the structure of a news report is that important information must come first. This does not only affect the overall thematic or schematic organization of the news report, but also the ordering of the sentences in paragraphs describing an episode and the ordering within the sentences themselves. This special dimension of relevance structuring may be studied at all levels.

Whereas relevance structuring expresses or signals what is most important, various special operations at each level are used to make the text more persuasive. This may be phonological operations such as rhyme or assonance, syntactic operations such as parallelism, and semantic operations such as comparisons or metaphors. They may use words that function as hyperboles (exaggerations, overstatements) or understatements. There may be words and sentence meanings that establish contrast or build a climax. These structures further contribute to a tighter organization of news information and thus may lead to better memorization by the reader and hence to enhanced persuasion. They may also activate particular scripts or attitudes, for instance when a demonstration is rhetorically framed in terms of violence and the use of comparisons or metaphors borrowed from military scripts (attack, defence etc).

Critical Discourse Analysis

For an analysis of the coverage of the preparations for and the elections in Bosnia in 1996 it will be useful to make an attempt at an analysis within the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). The best-known contribution to Critical Discourse Analysis is Norman Fairclough. But according to Jørgensen and Phillips (1999: 73) there are several contributors to the development of Critical Discourse Analysis. Based on characteristics developed by Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 271) CDA offers theories and methods in order to pose problems and empirically investigate the relationship between discourse practice and social and cultural developments in different social contexts (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999: 72).

Jørgensen and Phillips suggest five common characteristics among CDA contributions that enable us to identify them as belonging to a specific trend of research.

1. Social and cultural processes and structures share a linguist-discursive character.

Discursive practices are seen as important forms of social practices that contribute to constitute the social world (including social identities and social relations). Social and cultural reproduction and change happen partly through discursive practice at an everyday level (through production of texts and consumption processes). The aim of CDA is to show the linguist-discursive dimension of social and cultural phenomena and processes of change in late modernity. A diverse number of topics have been subject of discourse analysis: studies of organisations, pedagogic, topics in the field of mass-communication and racism, nationalism and identity, mass-communication and economy, mass-communication – democracy and politics.

2. Discourse is both constituting and constituted.

To critical discourse analysts discourse is an important form of social practice that both constitutes the social world and is constituted by other social practices. As social practice discourse is in a dialectic relationship to other social practices. Fairclough analyses how the discursive practices of the media contribute to create new forms of politics. The analysis implies that discursive practices are influenced by forces in society which do not only have a discursive character (for instance the structure of the political system or the institutional structure of the media). This comprehension of discourse separates the field from more post structural contributions, for instance the discourse theories of Laclau and Mouffe, who see

discourse exclusively as constituting. In CDA, language as discourse is seen both as a type of action that implies a possibility to change the world, as well as a type of action within a social and historical context, and which is in a dialectic relationship to other aspects of the social world.

3. Language usage should be analysed empirically in its social context.

CDA does concrete linguistic text analysis of language usage in social interaction. In this sense it differs from the discourse theories of Laclau and Mouffe who do not make empirical studies of language usage.

4. Discourse has an ideological function

CDA claims that discursive practices contribute to create and reproduce power relations between social groups – for instance between classes, men and women, ethnic minorities and the majority. These effects are considered *ideological* effects. CDA is focusing its research both on discursive practices that construct worldviews, social subjects, social relations including power relations. It is also focusing on the role these discursive constructions play in forwarding the interest of specific social groups. The critical aspect of CDA appears as it considers it an important task to reveal the way discursive practice maintains the social world, including distinctive power relationships.

5. Critical research

CDA does not consider itself politically neutral, rather, it sees itself as a critical contribution with a political commitment to social change. In the name of liberation, CDA takes side with the oppressed social groups. The criticism shall reveal the role discursive practice plays in sustaining different power relations. The intention is that the results of CDA should contribute in a useful manner to the fight for radical social change.

(Jørgensen and Phillips 1999: 73-76)

Fairclough and Critical Discourse Analysis

The concept “discourse” is defined in two central ways in the texts of Fairclough: One definition is: “*language use conceived as social practice*” (Fairclough 1995b:135) The second is: “*ways of signifying experience from a particular perspective.*” (Fairclough 1995b: 133)

According to Jørgensen and Phillips (1999: 146), Fairclough then uses the term *discourse* as an unambiguous determination of meaning within a limited domain. Fairclough gives an example by referring to patriarchal discourses vs. feminist discourses on sexuality.

But the term ‘discourse’ becomes problematic since it is not clear where the limits are between one discourse and the other. At the practical level in the analysis one can get the impression that “anything at any level could be a discourse”. (Jørgensen og Phillips 1999:149).

When CDA is applied on journalism, it is a way to try to understand how journalistic texts are composed by different social factors and how they contribute to sustain institutional norms and practices. At the same time these kinds of analyses have an interest in surveying trends of change in different kinds of journalism. CDA also tries to explain possible trends of change.

Ideology and Hegemony

The concept of ideology is very central to an understanding of social phenomena and change. Fairclough defines ideology as follows:

“Significations /constructions of reality (the physical world, social relations, social identities), which are built into various dimensions of the forms/meanings of discursive practices, and which contribute to the production, reproduction or transformation of relations of domination.” (Fairclough 1992:87)

It is not easy to reveal the ideology within a discursive practice. The notions may be so woven into our minds that they become naturalized and become part of our general conceptions. According to Hågvar (2003:23), Fairclough thinks that “people are not aware of

the hidden ideological patterns in the discourse”, and claims there is a need for an increased critical awareness among the common public, particularly in the institutions of education.

Inspired by Gramsci, Fairclough defines the concept of Hegemony as follows:

Hegemony is leadership as much as domination across the economic, political, cultural and ideological domains of society. Hegemony is the power over society as a whole of one of the fundamental economically-defined classes in alliance with other social forces, but is never achieved more than partially and temporarily, as an ‘unstable equilibrium’. (Fairclough 1992: 92)

According to Hågvar, CDA should : “...*help us understand how sociocultural and discursive practices, events and texts are conditioned by power relations and the fight for power, at the same time as it helps us see how the hidden ideology in the relations between discourse and society contributes to sustain power and ideology*” (Hågvar 2003:24, translation by author).

Fairclough’s Model

The analysis of any particular type of discourse, including media discourse, should keep its focus along two alternating dimensions, which are complementary:

- The communicative event – e.g. a case of language usage, for instance a newspaper article, a film, a video, an interview or a political speech.
- The ‘order of discourse’ – which is the summary of all types of discourses within a social institution or a social domain. Types of discourse consist of discourses and genres.

A *genre* is a way of using language, which is connected to and constitutes a part of a certain social practice like the different genres interview, news or advertising.

When Fairclough characterize his approach as *critical*, it is from a recognition that our social practice in general and our use of language in particular are bound up with causes and effects which we may not be aware of under normal conditions (Bordieu 1977 as referred in Fairclough1995a:54). Fairclough points out that particularly connections between the use of language and the exercise of power often are not clear to people, although at closer examination appear to be essential to the exercise of power.

Norman Fairclough has developed a three –dimensional framework which may serve as a model for critical discourse analysis. The main components of this model are:

Text, discourse practice and sociocultural practice. (Fairclough 1995a: 59) (See Annex 2)

Text

The analysis of the texts includes what Fairclough calls ‘linguistic analysis’. That should include analysis of vocabulary and semantics, the grammar of sentences and smaller units, the sound system (‘phonology’) and writing system. But it also includes an analysis of how the sentences are organised, including the ways in which sentences are connected together (‘cohesion’), how interviews are organised and how newspaper articles are structured.

Both *meanings* and *forms* of a text are important to analyse. (Fairclough 1995a:57)

Fairclough sees any text, including clauses and sentences, as having three main categories of functions simultaneously: *ideational, interpersonal* and *textual*.

In analysing a sentence in a written text, for instance, Fairclough highlights the articulation of three aspects which the analysis should focus on:

- *Ideational function - how the text articulates particular representations and recontextualizations of social practice – including carrying particular ideologies.*
- *Particular construction of reader and writer identities (what is highlighted, personality or individual aspects of identity, or status or role aspects of identity)*
- *A particular construction of the relationship between writer and reader (e.g. formal or informal, close or distant)*

He underlines that analysis of texts needs to be multisemiotic, which should include analysis of photographic images, layout and the overall visual organization of the text. (Fairclough 1995a:58)

Discourse practice and sociocultural practice

Included in the term ‘*discourse practice*’ are production, distribution and consumption of the text. In the analysis of ‘discourse practice’ it is important to note that by analysing the properties of the text, it also involves the process of production and consumption, which is part of the discourse practice. But in Fairclough’s model it is important to separate the

analysis of the two since they constitute two different dimensions. The analysis of discourse practice concentrates on how the author draws on already existing discourses and genres to create a text, and how the receivers of a text apply discourses and genres at hand in their consumption and interpretation of a text. TV news is a genre of news that may utilize different discourses (e.g. welfare discourse or a neoliberalist discourse) and genres ('hard-news' or 'soft news')

The term '*sociocultural practice*' may involve a wide range of practices: the immediate situational context, the wider context of institutional practices the event is embedded within, or the yet wider frame of the society and the culture. Fairclough recommends differentiating three aspects of social practice: economic, political (concerned with issues of power and ideology) and cultural (concerned with issues like value and identity). (Fairclough 1995a:62). Winther Jørgensen and Phillips point out that it is not sufficient to use discourse analysis to analyze the wider aspects of social practice. Sociological theory and culture theory will be necessary.

One of the central aims of Critical Discourse Analysis is to map the connection between language use and social practice. (Winther Jørgensen and Phillips 1999:82).

Elections as discourse

The type of discourses that evolved around the planned elections in Bosnia in 1996 will be the focal point of this study. The main outlet for public discourse in my analysis is the International press – represented by the most European of the American newspapers, the International Herald Tribune.

I have chosen to focus on the articles covering the elections in Bosnia in the *International Herald Tribune* from the period leading up to the election: June, July, August and September 1996.

In the terminology of Fairclough, the material can be defined as media discourse related to the aspect of social practice defined as '*political*' (issues of power and ideology are relevant)

Three main positions

The different discourses reflected in the media debate concerning the elections may be divided into three based on the positions taken in the debate. This division is inspired by Stuart Hall's identification of three hypothetical positions applying to decodings of a televisual discourse. For the purpose of the analysis of the debate over the elections in Bosnia, the same division may serve for an analysis of written, mainly news texts. (Hall 1980 (1992) :136-138)

1) Dominant – hegemonic position

This will be the position where the message is presented within *the dominant code*. By dominant code is meant when the receiver of the message takes the connoted meaning from a news report, and decodes the message in terms of the reference code in which it has been encoded. Within this position we may also find a so-called 'professional code', in the sense that the 'presenter' (in our case the journalist) assumes a relative independent position from the dominant code, which has already been signified in a dominant, hegemonic manner.

Hegemonic positions are those generated by political and military elites. The media presentation reflects this position by choice of images, selection of sources, who is interviewed etc. The dominant definitions are hegemonic precisely because they represent definitions of situations and events which are 'in dominance', (global) Dominant definitions connect events, implicitly or explicitly, to grand totalizations, to the great syntagmatic views-of-the world: they take large views of issues: they relate events to the 'national interest' or to the level of geo-politics, even if they make these connections in truncated, inverted or mystified ways.

The definition of a *hegemonic viewpoint* is, according to Hall:

- a) *it defines within its terms the mental horizon, the universe, of possible meanings, of a whole sector of relations in a society and culture, and*
- b) *that it carries with it the stamp of legitimacy- it appears coterminous with what is 'natural', 'inevitable', 'taken for granted' about the social order.*

(Hall 1980 (1992) : 137)

2) Negotiated position

Decoding within the negotiated position contains a mixture of adaptive and oppositional elements: it acknowledges the legitimacy of the hegemonic definitions to make the grand significations (abstract), while, at a more restricted, situational (situated) level, it makes its own ground rules – it operates with exceptions to the rule. It accords the privileged position to the dominant definition of events while reserving the right to make a more negotiated application of the term ‘local conditions,’ to its own more corporate positions. This negotiating position of the dominant ideology is full of contradictions, although these come through in a visible manner on certain occasions.

Negotiated codes operate through what may be called particular or situated logics: their differential and unequal relation to the discourses and logics of power sustains these logics. An example of this position used by Hall, is how a worker responds to the proposal of an Industrial Relations Bill, which limits the right to strike, and argues for a freeze of wages.

At the level economic debate involving ‘national interest’ the decoder may adopt the hegemonic definition, and agree that ‘we must all pay ourselves less in order to combat inflation.’ However, this position may have little, if any, relation to his or her willingness to go on strike for better pay and conditions or to oppose the Industrial Relations Bill at the level of factory-floor or union organization.

Hall launches the suspicion that the great majority of so-called ‘misunderstandings’ arise from the contradictions and disjuncture between hegemonic-dominant encoding and negotiated-corporate decodings. The term ‘failure in communications’ derives from these mismatches in these levels.

3) Oppositional position

It is possible for a viewer (reader) to understand both the literal and the connotative inflection given by a discourse, but to decode the message in a globally contrary way. The person may detotalize the message in the preferred code in order to redefine the message within some alternative framework or reference. For instance a viewer/reader may listen to a debate on the need to limit wages, but ‘reads’ every mention of ‘national interest’ as ‘class interest’.

News frames

Newspaper articles are narratives, and a lot of studies have been made of typical narrative structures and schemata in journalism, emphasizing the syntactic structure of the news text.

A term, which is receiving more and more attention in media research is the concept of *news frames*. There are many definitions of news frames, but a certain common understanding has emerged. Such frames are defined as an “organising theme” (Gamson 1992 as referred to by Hornmoen 2003:186). They are also “conceptual tools which the media and individuals rely on to convey, interpret and evaluate information” (Neuman et al. 1992:60 as referred to by Hornmoen 2003:186). They constitute a “persistent pattern of cognition, interpretation and presentation, of selection, emphasis and exclusion” (Gitlin 1980:7 as referred to in Hornmoen 2003:186). According to Entman *framing* includes selection and emphasising certain aspects of reality:

To frame is to select some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described (Entman 1993:52 as referred to by Hornmoen 2003:187)

Framing is thus a constructing and organising practice, and frames can be understood as a certain pattern which helps journalists to select and present information within rather scarce time frames and limited formats.

The study of frames does not only focus on the selection of themes in the coverage of the news media, rather than focus on the ways in which the themes are being presented, and which aspect of an event or a theme is being emphasised. Semetko and Valkenburg identify five central news frames, central because they “largely account for all the frames that have been found in the news” (Semetko & Valkenburg 2000:95 as referred to by Hornmoen 2003:187).

- 1) *The Conflict-Frame* - this is a type of frame which emphasises conflicts between individuals, groups or institutions in order to capture the attention of the public.
- 2) *The Human Interest-Frame*: gives a human face or an emotional angle to the presentation of an event, a theme or a problem.

- 3) *The Economic Consequences-Frame*: reports on events, themes or problems related to which economic consequences they will have for an individual, a group or institution, region or country.
- 4) *The Morality-Frame* puts the event, theme or problem in a context of religious axioms or moral decrees. For instance can a newspaper article convey the viewpoints of an interest group to raise questions on sexually transmitted illnesses. Such an article may contain moral and social messages on how to act.
- 5) *The Responsibility- Frame* presents an event, a theme or a problem in such a way that the responsibility for the cause of the problem or the solution of it is being ascribed to either the authorities, an individual or a group.

For my analysis it will be interesting to see whether the texts utilize one or several of these frames. The use of frames tends to emphasise a particular problem definition. It is of interest to see if this is the case of the selected material about the elections in Bosnia.

Presuppositions

Presuppositions are propositions that a producer of texts takes for granted or which are established already. For instance when a person expresses an opinion in a journalistic text, there are always a set of assumptions behind it. According to Fairclough, presuppositions are not so much what is present in a text as what is not being expressed through a text, the absences from the text. (Fairclough 1995a : 106) For instance the concept “The Third World” presupposes a whole range of knowledge about a lot of countries presumably belonging to the entity “ The Third World”. If the term “The Third World” is referred to connected to the term “crisis”, a whole lot of assumptions come to mind: poverty, peasantry, inequality, maybe hunger, war, lack of food and water. These will be presuppositions that are implicit in the term “The Third World”. Another example is “The Soviet Threat” which used to be commonplace in British press before the Soviet Union dissolved. The term “The Soviet Threat” implies the presupposition that there is a threat from the Soviet Union towards the West.

Fairclough points out that one of the most common absences in news stories is the absence of historical context. News is as a rule constructed as isolated from prior or subsequent events – isolated from history.

According to Fairclough it makes sense to differentiate presence, rather than just contrasting what is present and what is absent. One might think in terms of a scale of presence, running from ‘absent’ to ‘foregrounded’. Absent-presupposed- back grounded – fore grounded.

Something which is presupposed is in a way present in the text, but as part of the implicit meaning. Something which is explicitly present in a text, may be informationally backgrounded or informationally foregrounded. (Fairclough 1995a:106).

The distinction between what is explicit and implicit is very important in discourse analysis. Analysis of implicit content may give valuable insights into what is taken as given, as ‘common sense’. Generally speaking ideologies are implicit assumptions. Presuppositions may function in an ideological manner by referring propositions to a room, which already is established, as something given. As part of the intertextual context of the text, they belong to a sphere that is “already read” (Hornmoen 2003:190). They don’t invite to any questioning of the assumptions about the assertion. Thus presuppositions can constitute the readers in an ideological manner as subjects with certain former experiences with texts, assumptions that constitute parts of a mutual, apparently non-ideological ‘common sense’. According to Fairclough (1992, 2001 as referred to in Hornmoen 2003:191) presuppositions are efficient for manipulating others. Their implicit character makes them difficult to identify and eventually reject. Producers of texts in the mass media can manipulate the public by ascribing circumstances to experiences that they want the public to accept. At the same time it cannot be taken for granted that the producer of the text is aware of his/hers own presuppositions.

The character of presuppositions as ‘common sense’ does not make them less interesting, for instance when the ‘given’ situation in the text is disputable or controversial. (Hornmoen 2003:191).

Reported speech – discourse representation

The distinction between different levels of reported speech or discourse in journalism gives an important background for understanding of representations and the constitutions of power relations in the selected texts. Fairclough makes a distinction between ‘primary discourse’ (representing or reporting discourse), and ‘secondary discourse’ (the discourse represented and reported). Referring to Volosinov (Volosinov 1973 as referred to in Fairclough 1995b : 55) he suggests a typology of discourse representation built around the dynamic interrelationship of primary discourse and secondary discourse: in certain styles of representation primary and secondary discourse are clearly differentiated, in others they are merged. The distinction may also be called Direct Discourse (DD) and Indirect Discourse (ID). (Fairclough 1995b: 55). DD claims to represent the original utterance word by word in the original text, whereas ID just reproduces the text as a paraphrase. In DD the words represented are normally attributed to the original quoted source. Conventionally DD is also marked by quotation marks , followed by an attribution to the speaker. Thus there is also a categorical, orthographic difference between DD and ID: DD appears between quotation marks, ID is without. DD lets another voice – different from the voice of the journalist – be represented in the text with the journalist as mediator. This way there is at least two voices in the text: the voice of the reporter and the voice of the person reported. The latter is given certain autonomy. This is not the case in ID. The reporter speaks on behalf of the reported voice.

According to Waugh (Waugh 1995:138 as referred to in Hornmoen 2003:189) is journalistic discourse a mixture of DD and ID in addition to the report of the journalist. The report of the journalist is the part of a journalistic text which is performed directly by the journalist without being attributed to anybody else.

Borders between DD and ID may be floating in a journalistic report. The voice in journalism may be ambiguous, ‘double voiced’ in the term of Bakhtin.(Bakhtin 1981 as referred to by Hornmoen 2003:189). Fairclough also emphasizes how an ambivalence in the ‘voice’ is characteristic of indirect speaking or discourse, in the way that we can not be sure whether what is being reproduced are the words in the original discourse or not. ID is normally not distinguished from the journalistic report for instance by quotation marks, and it is therefore normally difficult to distinguish them. So called primary and secondary speech

(or the voice of the journalists and the voice of the represented) is not clearly differentiated. According by Fairclough, indirect discourse in journalism can both reproduce words that were used as sources, and transform them or translate them to discourses more according to the reporter's own voice. According to Fairclough:

"....Reports are rarely even-handed with all the various voices represented. Some are given prominence, and some marginalized. Some are used to frame others. Some are legitimized by being taken up in the newsreader's or reporter's voice, others are not. Equity and balance cannot be assessed by merely noting which voices are represented, and, for instance, how much space is given to each: the web of voices is an often subtle ordering and hierarchization of voices (Fairclough 1995a:81).

In a perspective of power it is interesting to differentiate between indirect speech and journalistic report. Which voices should we assume are allowed to talk and dominate what is called 'journalistic report'.

Important questions to ask in an analysis are: *How are the different discourses represented in the articles? Which voices are present and represented in the articles?*

The importance of represented discourse cannot be decided without reference to how it works and is being contextualised. Selection of specific words in the representing discourse has an effect on the interpretation of the represented discourse. Fairclough shows how the choice of verb for the represented speech frames it and gives certain guidelines for how to interpret it.

For instance is the interpretation of 'he claimed' or 'he warned' different from 'he said'. In journalism there will always be contextual elements in a report that invites a certain attitude from the reader to the represented speech.

Which actors are represented?

The attention should be directed towards which processes are represented in the text and how they are represented. Which actors, individuals or groups, are presented as responsible for the processes, in other words as agents. They may be academics, researchers, politicians, celebrities or persons with specific know how; specialists.

It is important to differentiate between which participants in the text appear as *actors* and who are referred to as *objects*, persons who are influenced by the actions of others (Hellsping and Ledin 1997:131 as referred in Hornmoen 2003: 191). It is also important to observe which processes the different actors are reported to initiate. A certain attention should also be paid to the way the public is addressed, which relations are established between different actors like politicians, the implicated journalist, the public involved and other participants in the text.

Representations and the study of International Relations

Hansen analyses the war in Bosnia in a poststructuralist framework, within which she develops a method of reading as well as a methodology for research designs and selecting texts. She chose the Western debate on Bosnia because it illustrates “the with and depth of the theoretical framework and hence the widest empirical scope of the theory: competing representations as well as competing policies, constructions of the Other as radical as well as non-radical, a transformation of representations and policy over time, the articulation of historically pregnant concepts as part of the construction of identity, political dissent as well as hegemony, the influence of media and literary non-fiction on foreign policy discourse; and it was a foreign policy issue which was constructed as so important that it mobilised responses from Western powers and institutions” (Hansen 2006: 11).

The discursive ontology of poststructuralism is deeply intertwined with its understanding of language as constitutive for what is brought into being. Language is social and political, an inherently unstable system of signs that generate meaning through a simultaneous construction of identity and difference. Policy discourse is seen as relying upon particular constructions of problems and subjectivities, but it is also through discourse that these problems and subjectivities are constructed in the first place.

Identity is at the centre of poststructuralist discourse analysis. The assumption relevant to the study of foreign policy draws upon the idea that representations of identity are linked to a conceptualization of identity as discursive, political, relational and social. Saying that identity is discursive and political is to argue that representations of identity place foreign policy issues within a particular interpretative framework. The consequence being that foreign policy can be formulated as an adequate response.

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- The emphasis on the *political* in the poststructuralist concept of identity marks a difference for instance to a concept of identity as ‘culture’. Thus it differs greatly from the anthropological study of marriage rituals, neither is it part of aesthetic analysis of artefacts such as art, architecture, music, literature, nor ‘people’s culture.’
 - The *relational* conception of identity means that identity is explained through reference to what it is not. For instance when identity is referred to as ‘American’, ‘European’, ‘Barbaric or ‘underdeveloped’ involves constituting another identity or set of identities as being non-American, non-European, civilized or developed.
 - The conceptualisation of identity as *social* implies understanding it as established through a set of collectively articulated codes, not as a private property of the individual or a psychological condition. (Hansen 2006:6).

The concept of ‘The Other’

Hansen argues that identity is relational, discursive, political and social. The national ‘Self’ constitutes the ‘Other’ through degrees of difference – these degrees of difference may range from the radically different to the familiar. This constitution of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ can be taking place through two simultaneous logics – a logic of differentiation and a logic of linking – as well as through the articulation of identity in spatial, temporal and ethical terms. The different types of texts that foreign policy evolve around, can be structured by a smaller number of basic discourses, which again articulate radically different relationships between Self and Other. (Hansen 2006:12)

Referring to Campbell (1992/1998), Hansen claims that states need to articulate threats and radical ‘Others’ to construct its identity. Thus a construction of difference is turned into ‘Otherness’. Construction of Otherness is present in a lot of American foreign and security policy, although not in all of it (Campbell 1992 as referred in Hansen 2006:39).

Hansen mentions different examples of foreign policies that draw upon ambiguous and complex constructions of differences, for instance the concept of ‘Nordic Identity’. This was a construction made by Swedish, Danish and Norwegian politicians during the Cold War as an identity transcending the nuclear rivalry of the antagonistically opposed superpowers USA and the Soviet Union. The ‘Nordic Identity’ would imply policies of neutrality, disarmament, development and peacekeeping.

Other examples mentioned by Hansen are: the construction of the Colonial Other as exotic and different from the West, still attractive in a mysterious way (Said 1978 as referred by Hansen: 40). Romanticism, as represented by the poet Lord Byron, constructed 'The Other' as an object of admiration, vitality and passion, qualities that have gone missing in Western civilisation (Hansen 2006: 40).

Basic discourses in the debate over Bosnia

Hansen analyses the basic discourses in the Western debate over Bosnia. 'Basic discourses' are identified by texts which 'construct different Others with different degrees of radical difference; articulate diverging forms of spatial, temporal and ethical identity; and construct competing links between identity and policy' (Hansen 2006:52). 'Basic discourses' is an analytical distinction of an *ideal-type* kind.

Hansen claims that it is useful to settle for a small number of basic discourses within a debate. The goal of this would be to identify discourses that articulate very different constructions of identity and policy and which thereby separate the political landscape between them. The following points could function as theoretical and methodological guidelines:

- Since basic discourses should indicate the main structural positions within a debate, they should be based on the reading of a large number of texts, preferably from a wide variety of sources, media and genres. The reading should identify the signs most frequently articulated, the relationship between *Self* and *Other* and the policy that is coupled to these concepts and the articulations of spatial, temporal and ethical identity.
- Basic discourses should be built on explicit articulations of *key representations* of identity. Examples are 'the Balkans' and 'genocide' in the Western debate on Bosnia, 'civilization' in debates on the importance of religion and culture for post-Cold War conflicts, 'quagmire' and 'Vietnam syndrome' in the American debate on Iraq.
- The analysis should draw on available conceptual histories of the representations that are chosen. The point of conceptual history is not just to create a comparison to past discourses, but also to conduct a genealogical reading which traces the constitution

of the present concept to understand when and how it was formed as well as how it succeeded in marginalising other representations (Foucault 1984 as referred by Hansen 2006:53).

- Basic discourses should be composed in such a way that the Others and Selves that are being articulated differ both in how the relation of Otherness is constructed and their spatial, temporal and ethical constructions of identity, and which Other is constructed as the most significant.
- Because basic discourses articulate very different Selves and Others, and because identity and policy are interlinked, it is expected that basic discourses advocate rather different foreign policies.

Hansen analyses the basic discourses dominating the Western debate on the Bosnian war, and identifies two basic discourses, that she calls ‘the Balkan Discourse’ and ‘the Genocide Discourse.’

The Balkan discourse of the 1990s constructed the Balkans as violent, tribal, hating and backward. This type of ‘Otherness’ was thought to have been embodied in the Balkans for hundreds if not for thousands of years. The Balkan discourse implied that the Balkans would be unable to break these patterns and progress toward more civilized and Western forms of behaviour, and therefore the West had neither the capacity nor any moral responsibility for intervening to stop the war (Hansen 2006:96).

As reports of Bosnian Serb atrocities started to reach Western media, a counter discourse was being formed. This basic discourse centred on the construction of the war as ‘genocide’, and through that challenged the spatial, temporal and ethical dimensions of the Balkan discourse, which had led to a ‘policy of inaction.’ This discourse rearticulated the Balkan discourse construction of a uniform ‘Balkan’ to a space of ‘three factions’ by separating a multicultural and democratic ‘Bosnian victim’ from a ‘Serbian aggressor’

(Hansen 2006:96 & 111). The articulation of Serb warfare as ‘genocide’ instituted at fundamental Western ethical responsibility for acting in defence of the Bosnian government

and population. The 'genocide' discourse argued that the West would have to act. This discourse led to a construction of 'Western responsibility' that was pursued on the basis of a traditional security discourse of interests, but through a radical rearticulating of the spatial and temporal identities of the 'Balkan discourse.' This implied that instead of looking at the different war faring parties as equal, the 'Bosnians' were constructed as 'victims' who were not responsible for the outcome of the war or its conclusions. Thus 'Bosnia' was separated from 'Serbia' in this discourse, and 'Bosnia' was even seen as a place where multiculturalism and tolerance existed, almost like in the 'cosmopolitan' West. This line of thinking again created further support for Western action, not only was 'Bosnia' a victim of genocide, it was a country whose identity was similar to, in some cases even superior to, the one of 'the West.' Thus 'Bosnia' was relocated from its place in an Orientalized 'Balkan' in 'the far corner of Europe' to Europe's geographical and cultural 'heart.' *'What is left of the Western democracies if they are no longer willing to defend civic society in the heart of Europe?'* argued Charles A. Kupchan, a former staff member of the National Security Council under the Clinton administration in an article in Los Angeles Times in 1995 (As referred in Hansen 2006:113).

Parts of the following analysis of the media debate on the elections in Bosnia in 1996 is inspired by some of Hansen's concepts: 'Self', 'Other' and I will make an attempt at defining 'Basic discourses' represented in the material. .

Chapter 5

U.S. Press Coverage of the Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina

For the purposes of this study I will make a discourse analysis of the material I gathered between 1 April and 1 October 1996. The selected material consists of articles from the American newspaper *International Herald Tribune* (IHT), at the time published by the *Washington Post* and *The New York Times*, and considered the most European of the American newspapers. The *International Herald Tribune* is considered a neutral, independent newspaper. Its reporting is balanced, using denotative language. The analysis will try to reveal this newspaper's hidden, subtler ideological and hegemonic tendencies, at the same time as it seems to be very open to debate and discussions of central themes, particularly concerning U.S. foreign policy.

Contextual framework

The New World Order

An important ideological presupposition when analysing an international debate taking place in the early 1990ies is the concept of The New World Order. As a concept of today, it was re-launched by the former President George H. W. Bush to describe the new position of the U.S. after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The speech given on September 11, 1990 is named Towards a new World Order, when he threatens to invade Iraq, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Underlying the concept is an understanding that a new global era is evolving in which views represented by neo-liberals and idealists have predicted that freedom, rights and morality will prevail in the world. With the fast expansion of market economy on a global scale hopes for democratic reforms globally are rising. The best-known representation of this ideological idealist trend is Francis Fukuyama's analysis of the global situation after the Cold War. On the opposite of this scale do Samuel Huntington and his prognosis of future clashes of civilizations mainly represent the views by the Realist School in International Relations. In this view, the 'New World Order' will not be marked by peace

and global understanding, but by new conflict lines primarily along cultural and religious ‘fault lines’ across the globe. (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2000:12). At the essence of the concept of the New World Order is that the U.S keeps it hegemonic power with an undisputed strong influence over other international institutions like the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), OSCE and NATO. With the war on terror and the new emerging powers like China and India this is presently changing, but looking back at 1996 which is the period for this analysis, the New World Order was defined by the U.S. with the European powers (EU) and NATO- member countries included as part of the concept of the West. (Drezner 2007:36).

Hegemony – an attempt at clarification

For the purpose of my analysis it is important to clarify the concept ‘Hegemony’ as it may have several meanings according to who makes the definition. I choose to distinguish different levels of the definitions, and separate them accordingly:

- 1) At the global level, my perception is that the premise of The New World Order, e.g that the U. S. holds an unchallenged position as the only superpower in the world, seems to be an underlying presupposition that is not disputed in my material. What is disputed, is the way this power is executed.
- 2) The second level of definition of ‘Hegemony,’ is more in line with Gramsci/Fairclough one referred above, is where ‘Hegemony’ is defined as leadership as much as domination across economic, political, cultural and ideological domains of society. Hegemony being a constant power over society by the ‘*fundamental economically defined classes*’ (Fairclough 1992:92).
- 3) Yet a third definition relating strongly to the Gramsci/Fairclough one is the one introduced by Hall, in his categorisation of positions in media texts, which he calls ‘Dominant-hegemonic position’. Hall gives a more detailed description of what is conceived as the ‘dominant code’ above (see page 80), and his division of three positions within media debates is an important premise for my analysis.

All three ways of defining ‘Hegemony’ are woven into the presuppositions of the media texts for analysis.

The Dayton Peace Accords and Elections

The most important point of departure and a basic part of the context for this study is the Dayton Peace Accords and its provisions on elections. The Agreement on Elections as part of the DPA is formulated in Annex 3.¹⁰

The four articles of this Annex sets out the general rules for:

1. Conditions for Democratic Elections
2. The role of the OSCE in preparing and supervising the elections
3. The activities of the Provisional Election Commission (PEC), responsibilities, mandate, composition and functioning, privileges and immunities
4. Eligibility – who is eligible to vote, including refugees and displaced persons.
5. The creation of a Permanent Election Commission

Of particular interest to the analysis of the media debate related to the elections are the provisions set down in Article 1 concerning Conditions for Democratic Elections:

The Article reads:

1. *The Parties¹¹ shall ensure that conditions exist for the organization of free and fair elections, in particular a politically neutral environment; shall protect and enforce the right to vote in secret without fear and intimidations; shall ensure freedom of expression and of the press, shall allow and encourage freedom of association (including of political parties); and shall ensure freedom of movement.*
2. *The Parties request the OSCE to certify whether elections can be effective under current social conditions in both Entities and, if necessary, to provide assistance to the Parties in creating these conditions.*
3. *The Parties shall comply fully with paragraphs 7 and 8 of the OSCE Copenhagen Document, which are attached to this Agreement.*

¹⁰ See full text in Annex 1

¹¹ The meaning of “Parties” in this text is the Parties which were the signatories to the Dayton Peace Accords : The bodies representing Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Concerning number 3, the paragraphs 7 and 8 mentioned in the Copenhagen document, give more details on the conditions of elections and the rights of voters and candidates, including the presence of election observers.

The core issue in the Election Discourse:

Were Conditions Met?

Much of the media discourse in the months leading up to the elections was centred around the question whether conditions for holding the elections were met or not. These conditions were stated in Article 1 of the Annex 3 of the DPA. The focal points of these conditions being that the Parties shall ensure the following conditions for free and fair elections:

- A politically neutral environment
- The right to vote in secret without fear of intimidation
- Ensure freedom of expression and of the press
- Allow and encourage freedom of association
- Ensure freedom of movement

The analysis of the media discourse will evolve around the debate about the conditions for free and fair elections. The dominating discourse is the Election Discourse, described as one of the main Basic Discourses of the debate.

The main question for the analysis being – how does the press coverage reflect the central issue in the debate:

- Were conditions met for holding the elections on September 14, 1996?

- How does the expressed position to this question reflect whether the press shows support for or shows an independent/critical stand to the policies of the U.S. administration at the time?

Other sub-questions to help the analysis are:

- Does the article mainly reflect IC/US interests – hegemony and unipolarity?

-
- Is it mainly preoccupied with internal OSCE issues/ problems?
 - Does it mainly reflect Bosnian interests – eg Bosnia’s position in the Balkans/Europe?

What is the main focus of interest of the Election Discourse – as reflected in the press coverage:

- 1) Is the main focus international politics/European politics/ Bosnian politics?
- 2) If Bosnian politics is the main focus, in what way is it represented:
 - a. As a “normal” political process, seen from a Western point of view?
 - b. As an “abnormal” process? Included in this focus is a discourse where there are a lot of conflicts between the three rivalling Parties in Bosnia, relating to the ‘Balkanization’ discourse described below.
- 3) Is the main focus US politics? Is the main focus political difference between the main parties, Democrats and Republicans? What is the relevance of the up-coming U.S. elections?

Which other discourses are represented within the Election Discourse?

(eg. Western/U.S. political discourses, Bosnian political discourses,
Bosnian Ethnicity Discourse, U.S. Military, Bosnian Military,

Which discourses are articulated to characterise the different actors in the debate?

a) Do they fall within the definition of the Basic Discourses as they are described below (page 10).

(Eg Western, U.S. official, OSCE specific, Balkanization discourse etc.)

What are the main representations in the material?

- Which ‘Selves’ and ‘Others’ are represented in the material:
- Is it only the American ‘Self’ or can also Bosnia be represented as a ‘Self’?
- Serbs are obviously represented as ‘Others’ - can also other groups and nations/nationalities be described as ‘Others’?

Which positions are represented in the Election Discourse?

Concerning the latter, I will try to make a three-fold position system of the discourse inspired by Stuart Hall's way of organising positions, as described in Chapter 4.

Assumptions about the media coverage

Based on the material at hand (mainly articles from the *International Herald Tribune* which background is further described in Chapter 3), and on the above description of the role of media in a democratic society, it may be relevant to propose some assumptions about the media coverage related to the role of media in democratic developments in the USA, and in our context related to U.S. foreign policy as it was performed by the Clinton Administration in 1996.

I will launch the following assumptions about the media coverage of the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996.

Assumption 1:

The coverage of the process leading to the elections in Bosnia in 1996 is based on a concept that the press has an active role to play in the political landscape – mainly as a communicator of information about political decisions.

Assumption 2

Considering the high profile of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the prestige put into the elections by the Clinton administration, one assumption is that the U.S. media would follow up on the thinking of the administration and show their full support for the administration's wish to keep the deadline for the elections no matter what – in other words show *loyalty* to the Clinton administration's efforts to go through with the elections.

Position to the elections – definition of codes

The issue of "position" becomes central to this analysis. In the analysis of the different articles I have divided them into three groups according to the attitude (position) towards the elections: *positive, neutral and negative*. This is a sort of coding, based on the general

message the article conveys (attitude, position) concerning the election process and the way the preparations are conducted in the period of analysis. The analysis covers a total of 80 articles from the *International Herald Tribune* (and a few from the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times*) during the months June, July, August and September 1996.

As the analysis of the selection of articles below will show, the definition of the codes *positive, neutral and negative* emerges in the following manner as criteria within the elections discourse as it is reflected in the media debate represented by the analysed articles in the *International Herald Tribune*:

Positive:

An article of the selected material which reflects a positive coverage of the election process, is characterized by:

- The majority of the sentences in the article express a positive attitude towards:
 - a) Holding the elections according to the Dayton Peace accords (at the prescribed date, Sept. 14, 1996)
 - b) The process of preparations for the elections:

This process includes:

- The role of the OSCE in the preparations,
- The dominating role of the U.S.A. in the preparations for the elections, including the U.S. role within the OSCE
- More positive than negative towards the shortcomings of the preparations in meeting the important conditions defined in the Dayton Peace Accords for free and fair elections, according to Article 1 of the Annex 3 of the DPA¹²

Neutral:

¹² The conditions are referred on page See the full text of the Dayton Peace Agreement in Annex 1.

An article of the selected material which reflects a neutral coverage of the election process, is characterized by:

- The majority of the sentences in the article express a neutral attitude towards:
 - c) Holding the elections according to the Dayton Peace accords (at the prescribed date, Sept. 14, 1996)
 - d) The process of preparations for the elections:

This process includes:

- The role of the OSCE in the preparations,
- The dominating role of the U.S.A. in the preparations for the elections, including the U.S. role within the OSCE
- A neutral coverage of the shortcomings of the preparations in meeting the important conditions defined in the Dayton Peace Accords for free and fair elections , according to Article 1 of the Annex 3 of the DPA

Negative:

An article of the selected material which reflects a negative coverage of the election process , is characterized by:

- The majority of the sentences in the article express a negative attitude towards:
 - e) Holding the elections according to the Dayton Peace accords (at the prescribed date, Sept. 14, 1996)
 - f) The process of preparations for the elections:

This process includes:

- The role of the OSCE in the preparations.
- The dominating role of the U.S. in the preparations for the elections, including the U.S. role within the OSCO.

-
- More negative than positive towards the shortcomings of the preparations in meeting the important conditions defined in the Dayton Peace Accords for free and fair elections, according to Article 1 of the Annex 3 of the DPA.

All 80 articles in the material were sorted according to this coding, based on the criteria listed above. The table below shows the summary of the positions. (See tables in Annex 3 for the total summary of each month).

POSITION TO ELECTIONS IN BOSNIA –
U.S. PRESS JUNE – SEPTEMBER 1996

Month	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Total
June	5	5	12	22
July	2	3	15	20
August	2	0	12	14
September	4	1	19	24
Total number of articles	13	9	58	80
Percentage (%)	16,25 (16)	11,25 (11)	72,5 (73)	100,00

Table 1: Position to elections in Bosnia in articles covering the preparations for and the election in Bosnia & Herzegovina in U.S. press June-September 1996

The high percentage of articles negative to the elections should indicate that the assumption (Assumption 2) about the U.S. press supporting its government in foreign policies is not valid. On the contrary, it indicates that the press was very critical to the way the Clinton administration pressed to keep the elections within the deadline set by the Dayton Peace Accords. This also indicates a large extent of independence on the part of the U.S. press, in spite of the attempts of the administration to make the press more positive.

The frequency of articles about U.S. policies in Bosnia indicates that Assumption 1 is valid; the press sees itself as an actor in the political landscape, it plays an active, democratic role.

Chapter 6

Analysis of election discourse

In this chapter I will do an attempt at a Critical Discourse Analysis of a selection of articles from my material. The selected articles are picked out among the almost 100 articles that constitute the total material from April to October 1996. The material from April and May was not complete, and is therefore not part of the material that constituted the basis for the table of Chapter 5.

Each article used in my analysis will have one of the three codes described in Chapter 5 : *positive, negative or neutral*. These codes relate to the over-all impression of the content – were they positive, negative or neutral to the issue of holding the elections on 14 September 1996, to the way the election preparations was being performed, to the U.S. role in the elections preparations etc, as described above.

The majority of the articles I have chosen for analysis are *news articles*. In the total material there are several articles that express opinions, like editorial articles written by the editor, or opinions expressed in the opinions columns. For my present analysis I have mainly chosen to analyse news articles/news reports. From a discourse perspective they are more interesting, since they in theory should be “objective”, when closer analysis very often shows that they really are not. News discourse is very often based on *presuppositions*, suppositions that are taken for granted, and the reading public is expected to understand the implicit meaning of them without explanation. For the analysis it is therefore important to try to detect such presuppositions in the news texts. For instance are ideologies in general implicit suppositions, and may appear as a background, something taken for granted in a news text.

Basic Discourses

The analysis will also try to detect the main ‘basic discourses’ within the texts.¹³ The following is a presentation and an attempt at definition of the most important basic discourses in the material:

Peace Discourse: This is a discourse that contains many of the other discourses in the material. It is a discourse practiced by the International Community (U.S.; OSCE, EU etc) , e.g. all forces who were involved in the process for making peace in Bosnia. This discourse represents the Western ‘ Self’ as opposed to the Balkan ‘Other’. It is a discourse involving all aspects of the peace process, not just the election process that is the focus of this thesis. Discourses within the Peace Discourse will relate to all aspects of the process of implementing the Dayton Peace Accord and include issues like promotion of Human Rights and Regional Stabilisation, this last issue including military issues, stability and security.

Election Discourse: This is one of the basic discourses within the Peace Discourse. The Election Discourse includes all material where the elections and the preparations for the elections is the main topic. Included in the Election Discourse are issues like all the conditions mentioned in the DPA for holding elections, like a politically neutral environment, the right to vote in secret without fear of intimidation, freedom of expression and of the press, freedom of association, freedom of movement. All aspects coming up during the process of preparing the elections in Bosnia are included in the Election Discourse, this include OSCE internal issues e.g. problems with staff and funding, and organisational issues.

Within the Election Discourse several other Basic Discourses can be detected, for instance:

U.S. Political Discourse: a discourse that relates mainly to U.S. political issues.

Clinton’ Election Discourse: This is a discourse which main focus is Clinton’s re-election campaign which was going on at the same time as the preparations for the elections in

¹³ Note that ‘Basic Discourses’ are constructions made for analytical purposes, and will as such not be able to cover all aspects of the media discourse evolving in the media debate over the elections in Bosnia.

Bosnia in 1996. The elections in Bosnia became an important part of Clinton's re-election discourse.

OSCE-specific Discourse: is a discourse that mainly deals with OSCE internal problems, e.g. financial and human resources, internal conflicts, expressed disagreements between OSCE-officials etc.

Human Rights Discourse: a discourse that mainly focuses on the human rights issues within the election discourse, of which the most important are the freedom of movement, freedom of association, freedom of expression and of the press etc.

Dayton Discourse: the main focus of this type of discourse was all issues directly related to the Dayton Peace Agreement. This discourse may cover issues not directly related to the elections, like military issues, stability/ security issues etc.

Western Discourse: a discourse which presupposes that the West is a unit which lives up to the ideals of democracy, human rights, peace etc. and has good intentions in the way it conducts the preparations for the elections through the OSCE.

U.S. Discourse: a discourse that presupposes that U.S. interests are equal or more important than other interests, e.g. interests of Europe, the EU, the OSCE, the Bosnian people etc. This discourse refers to 'Washington' as the political centre from where all important decisions come, decisions which also involve other nations, for instance the 56 OSCE member states from Europe, Central Asia and North America, including Bosnia & Herzegovina.

'Balkanization Discourse' : A discourse which implies a view of the Balkans as violent, tribal, barbaric, tribal, uncivilised and backward, as opposed to modern economic and democratic development, Ethnic division is included in the discourse, as well as nationalism, and leaders who promote division and conflict as opposed to unity and cooperation. The term implies a concept of "The Other" as opposed to the Western 'Self', and implies certain images of a mysterious and more exotic culture than the European, located between the West and the East.

The term '*Balkanization*' emerged after World War 1, and today still means: 'inner fragmentation and outer accessibility' (Mc Manner as quoted in Hansen 2006:104-105).

The term was first used by journalist Paul Scott Mowrer in 1921, and referred to “ *the creation, in a region of hopelessly mixed races, of a medley of small states with more or less backward populations, economically and financially weak, covetous, intriguing, afraid, a continual prey to the machinations of the great powers, an to the violent promptings of their own passions.*” (As quoted in Todorova 1997:34)

In the context of the debate on the elections in Bosnia, ‘Balkanization Discourse’ involves anything and anybody representing the three Parties in the Bosnian war who actively tries to counter the process of preparing the elections the way they were set out in the Dayton Peace Accords.

Bosnia Discourse: this is a discourse that differs from the Balkanization discourse in the sense that the main perspective is Bosnian, but with more positive connotations than the Balkanization discourse, assuming that the Bosnian government and the Bosnians are pro a democratic development and all positive aspects of the Dayton process. The discourse also includes an assumption that Bosnia and Bosniaks were the main victims of the conflict, and they need assistance in bringing their society back on its feet after the war.

Media Discourse: the main focus of this discourse is the media as such, being Western media or local media.¹⁴

¹⁴ Note that there are several issues that are mentioned in the articles and that are relevant to the discussion on the elections that have not been defined within the framework of Basic Discourses. Examples of such issues are: military issues, stability/security issues, the issue of refugees, return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).



Article 1 : IHT 15 May 1996

Planning for Bosnian Vote Disrupted

U.S. Official's Exit Underscores Doubts Poll Can Be Held on Schedule

By John Pomfret
Washington Post Foreign Service

SARAJEVO, Bosnia—The sudden resignation of a top American official has disrupted planning for next September's Bosnian elections, a key element of the Dayton peace process, Western diplomats and Bosnian officials say.

The departure announcement by William Steubner, chief of staff of the mission of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), underscored troubles and controversy faced by the Vienna-based organization assigned to carry out Bosnia's first nationwide vote since 1991, before the war.

Steubner's exit followed an attempt to resign by a colleague, Jody Thompson, a Canadian who heads the OSCE's task force on elections in Bosnia. Earlier this month, she tendered her resignation but was persuaded to return to the mission, officials said.

An OSCE spokeswoman said both gave personal reasons for their actions. But the real explanation, officials say, involves a disagreement over whether Bosnia will be ready for an election by September.

According to colleagues, Steubner argued that Bosnia will not meet any of the conditions the OSCE has set out for it to hold an election, such as relatively free media, the right of people to return to their homes and vote and, most important, exclusion from the electoral process of indicted-war criminals, such as Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic.

Steubner is a former U.S. Army major who has worked in Bosnia throughout the war. Some Clinton administration officials have said that as a supporter of the presumptive Republican presidential candidate, Senate Majority Leader Robert J. Dole, Steubner has used his position to derail the Bosnian elections, hurting implementation of the Dayton accord and thus President Clinton's reelection campaign.

This charge is vehemently denied by Steubner and several of his colleagues.

The stakes in the disagreement are high, both for Bosnia and for the U.S. part of the operation. They help explain the acrimonious backbiting that has characterized this incident and appears to infect the OSCE's operation.

Steubner's supporters worry that if the elections go ahead, they will tend to legitimize the forced population transfers, called "ethnic cleansing," that were carried out mainly by the Serbs during Bosnia's 3½-year war, and thus bring Bosnia another step toward ethnic partition. West-

ern diplomats generally agree that ethnic partition in Bosnia is a recipe for more war.

Under the Dayton peace deal, nationwide elections are supposed to be held in Bosnia between "six and nine months" from the start of the NATO-led peacekeeping deployment last December. U.S. and other Western officials look to the elections to trigger a withdrawal of some of the forces and the first signal that an end is near for the operation, the most significant U.S. engagement in European security affairs since the end of the Cold War. The United States has contributed 20,000 troops, hundreds of millions of dollars and diplomatic leadership to the mission.

When U.S. troops began moving into Bosnia, Clinton promised that the soldiers would be home within a

"We want to make this vote as democratic as we can."

— Robert Frowick,
head of OSCE mission to Bosnia

year of their deployment—Dec. 20. The Pentagon has since modified that stance, saying U.S. troops will begin withdrawing from Bosnia on or around that date. Any delay of the election would probably postpone the pullout further, creating political problems for Washington.

Thus, pressure has been intense on Robert Frowick, a career U.S. diplomat who heads the OSCE mission to Bosnia, to certify by next month that the elections will be held in September. In an interview, Frowick acknowledged that pressure and argued that the dangers of postponing the vote were greater than those associated with holding it in September.

"We want to make this vote as democratic as we can, but people have got to understand that we're not talking about an ordinary situation here at all," he said.

Frowick contended that Bosnia's elections are perhaps the most complicated in modern history. The vote for the leaders of one country, supposedly reunited under the Dayton plan, will take place in three mini-states—one Serb, one Croat and one Muslim. More than 1,200 foreign supervisors will be monitoring the voting. But much of the balloting will take place outside of Bosnia, by the hundreds of thousands of refugees who await true peace so they can re-

turn to their homes. And inside Bosnia, many of those voting will be doing so outside their villages—either by choice or because they were kicked out of their homes.

Bosnia's nationwide election will have a trial run at the end of the month in the once-divided city of Mostar, and already there are troubles there. Muslim and Serb leaders are threatening to boycott the vote because of a Croat demand that no absentee ballots be accepted. Earlier the Muslims had agreed to the Croat demand but later changed their minds.

Officials divide the OSCE's problems into two categories—logistical and political.

The election program marks the first time the Vienna-based organization has taken on such a massive endeavor, and officials acknowledge that it has undergone growing pains. "We were never equipped to handle something like this before," said an American official. "We are in way over our head."

So far, OSCE officials say, the agency has still not opened all its planned 22 field offices, and several of the functioning offices lack staff. Money has also been a problem. The OSCE has said it needs \$37 million to implement elections and has yet to receive it from foreign donors.

An internal report said that given these logistical challenges, the organization could not expect to schedule the vote until Nov. 1, four days before the U.S. elections. That report, according to Joanna van Vliet, a spokeswoman for the mission, prompted a shake-up.

"There have been problems," she said, "but we are adjusting to that and finding solutions."

But another source of trouble faces the mission: Bosnia's battered political spectrum.

Under the Dayton deal, agreed to in November, indicted war criminals such as Karadzic and Gen. Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serb military commander, are not supposed to be holding leadership positions.

That hasn't happened. Karadzic recently announced that he plans to run for another term as president of the Serb area of Bosnia.

Another condition set by the OSCE for a free and fair election in Bosnia is the development of independent media. So far that is not happening, either.

Frowick last week met Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and requested that they advocate freer media in the sectors they influence in Bosnia.

Article 1 (IHT 15 May 1996)

Headline: “Planning for Bosnian Vote Disrupted”

”U.S. Official’s Exit Underscores Doubts Poll can be Held on Schedule.”

Article written by journalist John Pomfret (originally for *The Washington Post*) published in *The International Herald Tribune* (IHT) of 15 May 1996.

Code : Negative

Category: News Article

ARTICLE 1: BREAKDOWN OF SENTENCES

No.	Text	Position/ Main Perspective	Basic discourses
1.	The sudden resignation of a top American official has disrupted planning for next September’s Bosnian elections, a key element of the Dayton peace process, Western diplomats and Bosnian officials say.	Negative Western/U.S./Bosnian	Election discourse/ Western Discourse
2.	The departure announcement by William Steubner, chief of staff of the mission of the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), underscored troubles and controversy axed by the Vienna based organization assigned to carry out Bosnia’s first nationwide vote since 1991, before the war.	Negative Western /OSCE/	Election discourse/ Western Discourse/ OSCE-specific
3.	Steubner’s exit followed an attempt to resign by a colleague, Judy Thompson, a Canadian who heads the OSCE task force on elections in Bosnia.	Negative Western/OSCE	Election discourse/ Western Discourse OSCE -specific
4.	Earlier this month, she tendered her resignation, but was persuaded to return to the mission, officials said.	Negative Western/OSCE	Election discourse Western Discourse/OSCE specific

5.	An OSCE spokeswoman said both gave personal reasons for their actions.	Neutral Western/OSCE	Election Discourse Western/OSCE specific
6.	But the real explanation officials say, involves a disagreement over whether Bosnia will be ready for an election by September	Negative Western/OSCE	Election Discourse Western/OSCE specific
7.	According to colleagues, Steubner argued that Bosnia will not meet any of the conditions the OSCE has set out for it to hold an election, such as relatively free media, the right of people to return to their homes and vote and, most important, exclusion of the electoral process of indicted war criminals, such as Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic.	Negative Western/OSCE	Election Discourse Western Discourse OSCE-Specific Balkanization Discourse
8.	Steubner is a former U.S. Army major who has worked in Bosnia throughout the war.	Neutral U.S./ Bosnia	Western Discourse U.S./ Bosnia specific
9.	Some Clinton administration officials have said that as a supporter of the presumptive Republican presidential candidate, Senate Majority leader Robert J. Dole, Steubner has used his position to derail the Bosnian elections, hurting implementation of the Dayton accord and thus President Clinton's re-election campaign.	Negative Western / U.S specific	Election Discourse Western Discourse U.S. specific Clinton's Elections Discourse
10.	This charge is vehemently denied by Steubner and several of his colleagues.	Negative Western/U.S. Specific	Western Discourse / Conflict
11.	The stakes in the disagreement are high, both for Bosnia and for the U.S. part of the operation.	Negative Western/U.S. specific Bosnia	Western Discourse/ Conflict Bosnia /U.S. specific
12.	They help explain the acrimonious backbiting that has characterized this incident and appears to infect the OSCEs operation.	Negative OSCE - conflict	Western Discourse/ Conflict OSCE Specific
13.	Steubner's supporters worry that if the elections go ahead, they will tend to legitimize the forced population transfers, called "ethnic cleansing" that were carried out mainly by the Serbs during Bosnia's 3 ½- year war, and thus bring Bosnia another step toward ethnic partition.	Negative Western/ Bosnian / problem perspective	Election Discourse Balkanization Discourse Bosnia Discourse

14.	Western diplomats generally agree that ethnic partition in Bosnia is a recipe for more war.	Negative Western / Bosnian / Problem perspective	Western – Bosnian Discourse Balkanization Discourse
15.	Under the Dayton peace deal, nationwide elections are supposed to be held in Bosnia between “six and nine months” from the start of the NATO-led peacekeeping deployment last December.	Neutral Western/ Bosnian	Election Discourse Western –Bosnian Discourse
16.	U.S. and other Western officials look to the elections to trigger a withdrawal of some of the forces and the first signal that an end is near for the operation, the most significant U.S. engagement in European security affairs since the end of the Cold War.	Positive Western/U.S /perspective	Election Discourse U.S. Discourse – Military
17.	The United States has contributed 20.000 troops, hundreds of millions of dollars and diplomatic leadership to the mission.	Neutral U.S. perspective	U.S. Discourse Military / Diplomatic
18.	When U.S. troops began moving into Bosnia, Clinton promised that the soldiers would be home within a year of their deployment – Dec. 20.	Neutral U.S. vs. Bosnian	U.S. Discourse Military/ Political Clinton Discourse
19.	The Pentagon has since modified that stance, saying U.S. troops will begin withdrawing from Bosnia on or around that date.	Neutral U.S. / Bosnian	U.S. Discourse Military/ Political
20.	Any delay of the election would probably postpone the pullout further, creating political problems for Washington.	Positive U.S.	U.S. Discourse Military/ Political
21.	Thus, pressure has been intense on Robert Frowick, a career U.S. diplomat who heads the OSCE mission to Bosnia, to clarify by next month that the elections will be held in September.	Positive U.S / Bosnia OSCE	Election Discourse U.S.Political Discourse
22.	In an interview, Frowick acknowledges that pressure and argued that the dangers of postponing the vote were greater than those associated with holding it in September.	Positive U.S. / OSCE	Election Discourse U.S: - OSCE specific
23.	“ We want to make this vote as democratic as we can, but people have got to understand that we’re not	Positive	Election Discourse

	talking about an ordinary situation here at all,” he said.	U.S./OSCE	OSCE/ Bosnia
24.	Frowick contended that Bosnia’s elections are perhaps the most complicated in modern history.	Positive OSCE/ Bosnian	Election Discourse OSCE/ Bosnia
25.	The vote for the leaders of one country, supposedly reunited under the Dayton plan, will take place in three mini-states – one Serb, one Croat and one Muslim.	Neutral Dayton/ Bosnian	Election Discourse Dayton / Bosnia Balkanization
26.	More than 1200 foreign supervisors will be monitoring the voting.	Neutral Western	Election Discourse Western
27.	But much of the balloting will take place outside of Bosnia, by the hundreds of thousands of refugees who await true peace so they can return to their homes.	Neutral Western/ Bosnian	Election Discourse Bosnia/ Refugees
28.	And inside Bosnia, many of those voting will be doing so outside their villages – either by choice or because they were kicked out of their homes.	Negative Bosnian	Election Discourse Bosnia / voters
29.	Bosnia’s nationwide election will have a trial run at the end of the month in the once divided city of Mostar, and already there are troubles there.	Neutral Conflict Bosnian	Election Discourse Bosnia Balkanization
30.	Muslim and Serb leaders are threatening to boycott the vote because of a Croat demand that no absentee ballots be accepted.	Negative Conflict Bosnia	Election Discourse Bosnia Balkanization
31.	Earlier the Muslims had agreed to the Croat demand but later changed their minds.	Negative Conflict Bosnia	Election Discourse Bosnia Balkanization
32.	Officials divide the OSCE’s problems into two categories – logistical and political.	Negative Conflict OSCE	Election Discourse OSCE-specific
33.	The election program marks the first time the Vienna – based organization has take on such a massive endeavour, and officials acknowledge that it has	Negative OSCE -problems	Election Discourse OSCE-specific

	undergone growing pains.		
34.	“We were never equipped to handle something like this before,” said an American official. “We are in way over our heads.”	Negative Western OSCE-problems	Election Discourse Western discourse OSCE-specific
35.	So far, OSCE officials say, the agency has still not opened all its planned 22 field offices, and several of the functioning offices lack staff.	Negative Western /OSCE-problems	Election Discourse Western Discourse OSCE-specific
36.	Money has also been a problem.	Negative Western/OSCE	Election Discourse
37.	The OSCE has said it needs USD 37 million to implement elections and has yet to receive it from foreign donors.	Negative Western/OSCE problems	Election Discourse Western Discourse OSCE Specific
38.	An internal report said that given these logistical challenges, the organization could not expect to schedule the vote until Nov. 1, four days before the U.S. elections.	Negative U.S. perspective OSCE- problem	Election Discourse Western U.S.Political Discourse
39.	That report, according to Joanna van Vliet, a spokeswoman for the mission, prompted a shake-up.	Negative Western/OSCE -problem	Election Discourse OSCE-specific
40.	“There have been problems,” she said, but we are adjusting to that and finding solutions.”	Negative Western/ OSCE-problem	Election Discourse OSCE-specific
41.	But another source of trouble faces the mission; Bosnia’s tattered political spectrum.	Negative Bosnian problem	Election Discourse Bosnia/ political Balkanization Discourse
42.	Under the Dayton deal, agreed to in November, indicted war criminals such as Karadzic and Ge. Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serb military commander, are not supposed to be holding leadership positions.	Negative Bosnian Problem	Election Discourse Bosnia/political Balkanization Discourse
43.	That hasn’t happened.	Negative	

44.	Karadzic recently announced that he plans to run for another term as president of the Serb area of Bosnia.	Negative Bosnian problem	Election Discourse Bosnia/ political Balkanization Discourse
45.	Another condition set by the OSCE for a free and fair election in Bosnia is the development of independent media.	Neutral Bosnian problem	Election Discourse OSCE/ Bosnia concern
46.	So far that is not happening either.	Negative	
47.	Frowick last week met Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and requested that they advocate freer media in the sectors they influence in Bosnia.	Neutral OSCE /Bosnian	Election Discourse OSCE/Bosnia/ media Balkanization Discourse
	Highlighted quote (textbox): “We want to make this vote as democratic as we can.” - Robert Frowick, head of OSCE mission in Bosnia.		

Table 2: Article 1- Breakdown sentence by sentence.

Summary:

In mid-May a particular incident called the attention of the international press. The chief of staff of the OSCE mission in Sarajevo, the American William Steubner, resigned. His resignation is linked to the attempt at resignation from the Canadian Judy Thompson, head of the Elections Department of the OSCE. Both resignations were through OSCE official channels attributed to personal reasons, while IHT refers to “officials” saying that the real explanation involves “...a disagreement over whether Bosnia will be ready for an election by September.” Steubner argues that “Bosnia will not meet any of the conditions the OSCE has set out for it to hold an election, such as relatively free media, the right of people to return to their homes and vote and, most important, exclusion from the electoral process of indicted war criminals, such as Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic.”

Mr. Steubner was a former US Army major, who had worked in Bosnia throughout the war, and is in the article referred to as a republican, he supports candidate Dole and deliberately

seeks to derail the Bosnian election, and thus” *hurting implementation of the Dayton accord and thus President Clinton’s re-election campaign.*”

Mr Steubner vehemently denied the charges, but he was seriously worried “... *that if the elections go ahead, they will tend to legitimize the forced population transfers, called ‘ethnic cleansing’ that were carried out mainly by the Serbs during Bosnia’s 3 ½-year war, and thus bring Bosnia another step toward ethnic partition. Western diplomats generally agree that ethnic partition in Bosnia is a recipe to more war.*” The reason for the heavy U.S. engagement is attributed to: contribution of 20 000 troops, hundreds of million of dollars, and diplomatic leadership to the OSCE mission, being the U.S. career diplomat Mr, Robert Frowick. He was struggling to keep the deadline and has to certify that the elections will be held by mid-June. He expressed the view that even though the situation is not perfect, postponing the vote is more dangerous than keeping the deadline. The main problems facing the planned elections were categorised as logistical and political. The logistical problems relate to OSCE-internal problems like lack of personnel and funding. The political problems relate to Bosnian political problems, contrary to the provisions set out in the DPA; both indicted war criminals Karadzic and Mladic are moving around freely and holding leadership positions, and another condition for holding free and fair elections set by the OSCE is not being met, the development of independent media.

Main focus: were conditions met?

The article is very negative to the main focus of the election discourse, whether conditions were met. Mr Steubner represents the view that conditions are not and will not be met within the planned deadline for the elections.

Conflict frame

I define the article within the conflict frame, conflict is conveyed in the headline, and the main message of the text is Mr. Steubner’s opposition and conflicting position to the way the elections preparations are conducted.

Contextual framework:

IC/US interests – vs. Bosnian interests

The overall perspective represented in this article is mainly Western and within this perspective U.S. interests are dominating, even when OSCE issues are discussed. Even though the USA is part of the international effort represented by the OSCE to settle the peace through organising the elections, the overall perspective of this article reflects U.S. interests.

Election Discourse and the Basic Discourses within

As Election Discourse, the main focus of interest is also American politics; the US elections seem to be just as important as the elections in Bosnia, in other words the U.S. discourse overshadows a discourse that represents Bosnian interests.

Steubner is referred to as supporter of the Republican candidate Dole, and the Clinton administration officials who are referred, say that “....*Steubner has used his position to derail the Bosnian elections, hurting implementation of the Dayton accord and thus President Clintons re-election campaign.*”(Sentence No. 9) The representatives of the Clinton administration consider the elections in Bosnia a U.S. political issue, their discourse is a U.S. discourse.

Steubner denies the charges that he is actively supporting the Dole-campaign, and his supporters lead the issue back to what the election discourse was supposed to be about; the elections in Bosnia. They use a Balkanization Discourse when expressing the worry that if the election goes ahead, this will tend to legitimize ethnic cleansing and bring Bosnia another step towards ethnic partition, which again would lead to more war.

But another important sequence of the article goes on to explain why the US authorities are so keen to keep the deadline – 20 000 US troops are involved, and Clinton had promised that they should be home within a year of their deployment. A delay of the election would create political problems for Washington. Again, the focal point is American politics, not Bosnian, in other words a U.S. Discourse

The article about Steubner's resignation can serve as an example of the important role American domestic politics played in the US involvement with the OSCE in Bosnia and the planned elections.

Other parts of the International Community are touched upon in the sequence of the article referring to the OSCE. Apparently the OSCE mission in Sarajevo lacks more or less everything: 22 planned field offices are unopened, they lack staff and money. US elections are again the point of reference, since an internal report has suggested that with this speed, the OSCE would not be able to organise elections until 1 November, which would be four days before the US elections. Again, the elections in Bosnia become an important U.S. discourse.

Bosnian issues are touched upon as ... *'a source of trouble facing the mission'.... and as 'Bosnia's tattered political spectrum'*. According to the DPA indicted war criminals were not supposed to run for the elections, but Karadzic had recently announced that he *'plans to run for another term as president of the Serb area of Bosnia.'*

Bosnian politics is mentioned as “a source of trouble” for the International Community trying to help Bosnia organising the elections, but obviously the Bosnian's themselves will not listen, Karadzic is still on the list running for office.

When Bosnia is mentioned in the election discourse context, it is represented in a very negative manner, through words as: ‘trouble’ and ‘war criminals’. Clearly these references are part of a Balkanization Discourse with all the meaning which is included in the term.

The main perspective of this article is very U.S. dominated, U.S. internal politics are important: (the campaign Clinton vs. Dole), U.S. efforts in brokering the Dayton Peace Accords, U.S. intentions and efforts to prepare for and organise free and fair elections , U.S. efforts to guarantee security (20 000 troops).

The elections in Bosnia according to the article seem to be more or less a U.S. endeavour, with a little help from some other member states of the OSCE, and very little involvement from Bosnia itself. This reflects the main presupposition that the U.S. is the leading actor in the process of preparing the elections , and very little happens unless the U.S. gets involved and takes a leading role, reflecting its natural place as the leading power in the New World Order.

Dominant –hegemonic position

In the terms of Stuart Hall the article is definitely within the *dominant code*, in the sense that the main angle and context is U.S. politics, directed at a U.S. audience, taking for granted that this point of departure is the dominating view of the U.S. hegemonic position within the New World Order.

Main representations in the article:

Again the International Community and its main representative, the USA dominate the voices that are represented in the article:

References are made to “officials”, “Western Diplomats”, the U.S. diplomat heading the OSCE mission, the OSCE spokeswoman. The protagonist or leading character (William Steubner) is not interviewed directly in the article, only referred to through “colleagues”, “OSCE spokeswoman”, “Clinton administration officials” “Steubners supporters” etc.

Another voice that comes through clearly is the voice of the Head of Mission Robert Frowick.

Apart from one reference to “Bosnian Officials” there are no Bosnian voices represented in the article.

Addressee

According to Thwaites, Davis and Mules (2002:17), an addressee of a text is the position it constructs as its destination: where it says it is going.

Since the article is originally published in *The Washington Post*, the addressee presumably is an American audience in the first place. *The Washington Post* with its proximity to the White House, Pentagon and the U.S. administration at large, will have a readership among the top U.S. administrators and politicians. An article about problems facing one of the most “significant U.S. engagements in European security affairs since the end of the Cold War”, will be directed towards central persons in State Department who are involved with Bosnia issues.

But since the article also is printed in the *International Herald Tribune* which has a world-wide coverage, a much larger readership is expected: anybody out there interested in

international politics, and maybe U.S. foreign politics in particular. A Bosnian public, however, does not seem to be included as “addressees” for this article.

I would claim that the article is intended to reach U.S. officials in power to do something about the situation in Bosnia, and other members of the International Community who might have an interest in the situation.

A dominating U.S. discourse

Critical Discourse Analysis focuses on how power relations and ideologies are formed through language, including power language of the news discourses of media. Article one can be considered part of a larger discourse in the context of the New World Order, where the hegemonic power relations in the world are set: The United States of America is the most powerful, and all others (including the EU, other NATO countries, the OSCE, the countries of South East Europe etc) have to listen to and take part in the U.S. discourse, preferably also abide by it. Within the U.S. discourse there are many other discourses, different viewpoints and opinions, for instance the political discourse defining Democrats and Republicans, but the *dominating discourse* in this article is definitely based on a U.S. perspective, and a perspective of the elections taking place in Bosnia (Bosnia discourse) is only mentioned in a few of the clauses of the article.

Article 2 :

IHT 17 June 1996

Alarm Over Karadzic Clouds Peace Process

By Daniel Williams
Washington Post Service

FLORENCE — Considering that he is a global pariah who is virtually confined to his homeland, the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, cast a remarkably broad shadow last week over an international conference on the Bosnian peace process.

For two days at the conference in Florence, Mr. Karadzic was the focus of intense and sometimes bitter debate among delegates to the Peace Implementation Council, made up of more than 40 countries and organizations involved in the reconstruction of Bosnia.

Alarm over his continued grip on power colored almost every discussion about reaching an enduring Balkan peace.

The U.S. envoy John Korbhum arrived in Bologna over the weekend to pressure President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia to help oust Mr. Karadzic, The Associated Press reported.

Mr. Karadzic is regarded as a prime instigator of Serbian resistance to complying with peace accords signed last year in Dayton, Ohio, which ended three and a half years of war. In large part due to Serbian intransigence, key elements of the accord designed to pacify Bosnia have yet to be even partially fulfilled.

In addition, as an indicted war criminal who continues to travel freely in the Balkans, Mr. Karadzic epitomizes the pitfalls inherent in the unwillingness of the United States and other sponsors of the Dayton accords to put muscle behind the agreements.

Surrender of indicted war criminals is only one element that is going unfulfilled. Others, including permission for the return of refugees to their places of origin, free travel throughout divided Bosnia and the creation of a free press, are being flouted, not only by the Serbs but also by the Muslim-led Bosnian government and its Croatian allies.

"The condition we are facing is simple and at the same time fraught with danger," said Antonio Cassese, president of the UN war crimes tribunal in The Hague, who campaigned for Mr. Karadzic's arrest. He added that the credibility of leading powers — the United States, Russia, France, the

United Kingdom, Germany — was at stake if they did not take action regarding the obligations that they had guaranteed.

For all their pessimism regarding Mr. Karadzic, officials nevertheless said they were heartened by the conclusion during the conference of an arms control agreement that they said would help stabilize the entire Balkan region. The accord was signed by the Bosnian factions as well as Serbia and Croatia.

The agreement set ceilings on the number of weapons in five categories: battle tanks, artillery pieces larger than 75mm, armored combat vehicles, combat planes and attack helicopters. Yugoslavia, of which Serbia is the dominant republic, remains the leading regional power, with a more than two-to-one edge in weapons over Croatia and Bosnia.

Under the agreement, Bosnia as a whole would be allowed the same number in each category as Croatia, but the Bosnian total is split between the Bosnian-Croat federation and the Serb Republic and would allow the federation twice as many weapons as the Serbs.

While detailed inventories of arsenals remain to be conducted, it is thought that the new limits would force reductions in the Serbs' weaponry while allowing the federation's to increase.

In 16 months, each party must be within the limits, and the agreement empowers international inspectors to monitor progress.

Mr. Korbhum, the U.S. envoy who was heavily involved in the negotiations, predicted that the accord would be a factor in "military stability for the entire region."

The United States is committed to training the mostly Muslim Bosnian Army and is trying to collect military aid from allies to fund armaments, and Mr. Korbhum argued that U.S. training will create a "sense of parity" among the Bosnians.

The other major business of the conference, which ended Friday, was to promote countrywide elections by Sept. 14 meant to create a common Bosnian Parliament.

On that score, the conference overlooked the apparent lack of human rights and democratic conditions in Bosnia in the name of moving ahead. Under the Dayton accord, Sept. 14 is the deadline



Adolf Ogi, the Swiss defense minister, inspecting Swiss soldiers in Sarajevo who are part of the peacekeeping force in Bosnia.

for holding the vote. Dayton called for establishment of a neutral political environment before the elections, but, according to ground monitors, no such climate exists, either in the Serb Republic or in the sectors controlled by the Muslim-led government and the Croats.

"There is troubling evidence of a trend not only to accept but also to institutionalize ethnic separation," said the report delivered by Carl Bildt, the international mediator in charge of overseeing civilian affairs in Bosnia.

U.S. officials did not dispute the reports and complaints, but maintained that postponing elections would only aggravate them.

Virtually everyone in Florence agreed that as long as Mr. Karadzic remained head of the Bosnian Serb republic, reconciliation would never happen.

There was, however, a yawning gap between expressions of dismay at the conference and willingness to take steps to get rid of Mr. Karadzic.

In the end, conference members concluded it was up to Mr. Karadzic to make himself disappear.

"The council made clear to the leadership of the Serb Republic that the continuation in public authority of Mr. Karadzic was unacceptable," the final communiqué said.

"He should remove himself from the political scene."

IHT June 17 1996

Article 2 (IHT 17 June 1996)

Headline: “Alarm over Karadzic Clouds Peace Process”

The article is written by Daniel Williams from *The Washington Post* Service and appeared in *International Herald Tribune* on 17 June 1996.

Code: Neutral

Category: News Article

ARTICLE 2: BREAKDOWN SENTENCE BY SENTENCE

No.	Text	Position/ Main Perspective	Dominating discourses/ Basic discourses
1.	FLORENCE - Considering that he is a global pariah who is virtually confined to his homeland, the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, cast a remarkably broad shadow on the Bosnian peace process.	Negative Western/Bosnian-conflict	Peace Discourse Balkanization Discourse
2.	For two days at the conference in Florence, Mr. Karadzic was the focus of intense and sometimes bitter debate among delegates to the Peace Implementation Council, made up of more than 40 countries and organizations involved in the reconstruction of Bosnia.	Negative Western vs. Bosnia Conflict	Peace Discourse Balkanization Discourse
3.	Alarm over his continued grip on power colored almost every discussion about reaching an enduring Balkan peace.	Negative Western vs. Bosnia	Peace Discourse Balkanization Discourse
4.	The U.S. envoy John Kornblum, arrived in Belgrade over the weekend to pressure President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia to help oust Mr. Karadzic, The Associated Press reported.	Positive U.S. vs. Balkan	Peace Discourse Balkanization Discourse
5.	Mr. Karadzic is regarded as a prime instigator of Serbian resistance to complying with peace accords signed last year in Dayton, Ohio, which ended three and a half years of war.	Negative Western/Bosnia	Peace Discourse Balkanization Discourse

6.	In large part due to Serbian intransigence, key elements of the accord designed to pacify Bosnia have yet to be even partially fulfilled halfway through the yearlong deployment of a U.S led peacekeeping force.	Negative U.S./West/ vs. Balkan	Peace Discourse Balkanization Discourse
7.	In addition, as an indicted war criminal who continues to travel freely in the Balkans, Mr. Karadzic epitomized the pitfalls inherent in the unwillingness of the United States and other sponsors of the Dayton accords to put muscle behind the agreement.	Negative U.S./ West vs. Balkan	Peace Discourse Balkanization Discourse
8.	Surrender of indicted war criminals is only one element that is going unfulfilled.	Negative Balkan	Peace Discourse Balkanization Discourse
9.	Others, including permission for the return of refugees to their places of origin, free travel throughout divided Bosnia and the creation of a free press, are being flouted, not only by the Serbs, but also by the Muslim-led Bosnian government and its Croatian allies.	Negative Balkan	Dayton Discourse Balkanization Discourse
10.	“The condition we are facing is simple and at the same time fraught with danger,” said Antonio Cassese, president of the UN war crimes tribunal in The Hague, who campaigned for Mr. Karadzic’s arrest.	Negative Western vs. Balkan	Western Discourse Balkanization Discourse
11.	He added that the credibility of leading powers – the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, Germany – was at stake if they did not take action regarding the obligations that they had guaranteed.	Negative Western vs. Balkan	Western Discourse
12.	For all their pessimism regarding Mr Karadzic, officials nevertheless said they were heartened by the conclusion during the conference of an arms control agreement that they said would help stabilize the entire Balkan region.	Neutral West / Balkan	Peace Discourse Balkanization Discourse Stability/ Security Discourse
13.	The accord was signed by the Bosnian factions, as well as Serbia and Croatia.	Positive Western/ Balkan	Peace Discourse Balkanization Discourse Stability/ Security Discourse
14.	The agreement set ceilings on the number of weapons in five categories: battle tanks, artillery pieces larger than 75mm, armoured combat vehicles, combat planes and attack helicopters.	Positive	Peace Discourse Stability/ Security Discourse

15.	Yugoslavia, of which Serbia is the dominant republic, remains the leading regional power, with a more than two-to-one edge in weapons over Croatia and Bosnia.	Neutral Balkan	Peace Discourse Balkanization Discourse Stability/ Security Discourse
16.	Under the agreement, Bosnia as a whole would be allowed the same number in each category as Croatia, but the Bosnian total is split between the Bosnian-Croat federation and the Serb Republic and would allow the federation twice as many weapons as the Serbs.	Neutral Balkan	Peace Discourse Balkanization Discourse Stability/Security Discourse
17.	While detailed inventories of arsenals remain to be conducted, it is thought that the new limits would force reductions in the Serbs' weaponry while allowing the federation's to increase.	Neutral Balkan	Peace Discourse Balkanization Discourse Stability/ Security Discourse
18.	In 16 months, each party must be within the limits, and the agreement empowers international inspectors to monitor progress.	Neutral Western/ Balkan	Peace Discourse Balkanization Discourse Stability/ Security Discourse
19.	Mr. Kornblum, the U.S. envoy who was heavily involved in the negotiations, predicted that the accord would be a factor in "military stability for the entire region."	Positive U.S vs. Balkan	Peace Discourse U.S. Discourse Stability/Security Discourse
20.	The United States is committed to training the mostly Muslim Bosnian Army and is trying to collect military aid from allies to fund armaments, and Mr. Kornblum argued that U.S. training will create a "sense of parity" among the Bosnians.	Positive U.S. vs Bosnia	Peace Discourse U.S.- Bosnian Discourse Stability/ Security Discourse
21.	The other major business of the conference, which ended Friday, was to promote countrywide elections by Sept. 14 meant to create a common Bosnian Parliament.	Neutral Bosnian perspective	Election Discourse
22.	On that score, the conference overlooked the apparent lack of human rights and democratic conditions in Bosnia in the name of moving ahead.	Negative West vs. Bosnia	Election Discourse Balkanization Discourse
23.	Under the Dayton accord, Sept 14 is the deadline for holding the vote.	Neutral (Factual)	Election Discourse Western – Dayton Discourse

24.	Dayton called for establishment of a neutral political environment before the elections, but according to ground monitors, no such climate exists, either in the Serb Republic or in the sectors controlled by the Muslim-led government and the Croats.	Negative West vs. Balkan	Election Discourse Balkanization Discourse
25.	“There is troubling evidence of a trend not only to accept but also to institutionalize ethnic separation,” said the report delivered by Carl Bildt, the international mediator in charge of overseeing civilian affairs in Bosnia.	Negative Western vs. Bosnia	Election Discourse Balkanization Discourse
26.	U.S. officials did not dispute the reports and complaints, but maintained that postponing elections would only aggravate them.	Neutral U.S. / Western	Election Discourse
27.	Virtually everyone in Florence agreed that as long as Mr. Karadzic remained head of the Bosnian Serbs’ republic, reconciliation would never happen.	Negative Western vs. Balkan	Election Discourse Balkanization Discourse
28.	There was, however, a yawning gap between expressions of dismay at the conference and willingness to take steps to get rid of Mr. Karadzic.	Negative Western vs. Balkan	Election Discourse Western Discourse Balkanization Discourse
29.	In the end, conference members concluded it was up to Mr. Karadzic to make himself disappear.	Negative Western vs. Balkan	Election Discourse Balkanization Discourse
30.	“The council made clear to the leadership of the Serb Republic that the continuation in public authority of Mr Karadzic was unacceptable,” the final communiqué said.	Negative Western vs. Balkan	Election Discourse Balkanization Discourse
31.	“He should remove himself from the political scene.”	Negative	Balkanization Discourse

Table 3: Article 2-Breakdown of text sentence by sentence.

Summary:

The reported event is a meeting in Florence of the Peace Implementation Council, made up of more than 40 countries and organizations involved in the reconstruction of Bosnia.

The article refers to the visit of U.S. envoy John Kornblum who had gone to Belgrade the week-end before to pressure President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia to help oust Mr. Karadzic “...*the prime instigator of Serbian resistance...*” and “...*due to Serbian intransigence, not even parts of the DPA have been fulfilled “...halway through the yearlong deployment of a U.S.-led peacekeeping force.”*” The indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic keeps on travelling freely in the Balkans, and thus “...*epitomizes the pitfalls inherent in the unwillingness of the United States and other sponsors of the Dayton accord to put muscle behind the agreement.*”

In addition important elements like return of refugees, free travel throughout the divided Bosnia, and freedom of press, are being flouted by all Parties.

At the conference an arms control agreement was signed by both the Bosnians, Serbia and Croatia., which was considered a positive step forward in the direction of stability in the area.

The planned elections were the other major business of the conference, and a report presented by the High Representative Carl Bildt provided evidence that ethnic cleansing not only was accepted but also institutionalised. In spite of other apparent lacks in the compliance with the Dayton Accords, U.S., officials still maintained that postponing elections only would aggravate the situation. The final communiqué from the conference concluded that Mr. Karadzic was a major obstacle to reconciliation in Bosnia, and it was important that he removed himself from the political scene.

Analysis:

Main context:

This news report from the conference of the Peace Implementation Council is an example of the enormous concern shown by the International Community (IC) concerning the peace process in Bosnia. The U.S. is of course a part of this council, represented by the U.S. envoy Mr John Kornblum , who is referred to twice in the article. First in the sentence 4, as someone who “*arrived in Belgrade over the weekend to pressure President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia to help oust Mr. Karadzic,*” and again as a person predicting a positive development regarding the arms control agreement, in sentence 19: “*the accord would be a factor in “military stability for the entire region”*”. The conference takes place on 14 June,

only a few months before the planned elections, and is thus a key barometer of how the International Community was evaluating the process., with the ambiguities expressed both by the High Representative Carl Bildt and U.S. representatives, still deciding to keep the process moving on.

Negotiated position:

According to Hall's division of positions, the article falls into the category "negotiated position", because it contains a mixture of adaptive and oppositional elements.

The article acknowledges the legitimacy of the hegemonic definitions, while at the same time sections of the article are critical to some aspects of the hegemonic position defined by the U.S. and the rest of the I.C. (*the more than 40 countries and organisations involved in the reconstruction of Bosnia*). For instance is there clear criticism of the U.S. and I.C. of the fact that Karadzic is still travelling freely in the Balkans, and of the fact that none of the conditions for holding the elections are fulfilled. On the other hand, the reporting of the part of the conference that managed to negotiate an agreement of arms control is very positive, thus leading me to categorise the article in the "negotiated position".

Conflict frame

Since the shadow of Karadzic is overshadowing a peace conference, I define it within the conflict frame, a frame often chosen by journalists to capture attention for a specific problem-

Prime instigator against compliance – dichotomies: the bad guys vs. the good guys

Even though the article is coded as neutral, the majority of the sentences are within the negative definition (18 of 31). The more positive part of the article refers to the section discussing the deal on arms control, which obviously is a positive step forward for the development towards peace in Bosnia & Hercegovina. But as the headline indicates, Karadzic's shadow is clouding the peace process. And as a 'global pariah' as he was referred to in the article, Mr Karadzic was the focus of attention of the conference. '*Alarm over his continued grip on power coloured almost every discussion about reaching an enduring Balkan peace*'

He is considered the '*prime instigator of Serbian resistance to complying with (the) peace accords*' '*In large part due to Serbian intransigence, key elements of the accord designed to pacify Bosnia have yet to be even partially fulfilled halfway through the yearlong deployment of a U.S. led peacekeeping force.*'

In other words, *the bad guys*, in the representation of Mr Karadzic, are here leading the obstacles which are preventing the peace process, delaying the fulfilment of the peace process so that one of the main representations of the good guys, namely U.S. troops, can go home.

The 'bad guys' are here representing the Balkanization Discourse, whereas the 'good guys' led by the U.S. envoy Mr. Kornblum but also include the U.S. peacekeeping troops, represent the specific U.S. discourse which is highly present in much of the material.

This article also conveys criticism of the US and '*other sponsors of the Dayton accords*' (IC) in sentences five, six and seven where the fact that Karadzic, as an indicted war criminal continues to travel freely in the Balkans, '*epitomized the pitfalls inherent in the unwillingness of the United States and other sponsors of the Dayton accords to put muscle behind the agreement*'.

Were conditions met?

Surrender of indicted war criminals is only one element that is going unfulfilled. '*Others, including permission for the return of refugees to their places of origin, free travel throughout divided Bosnia and the creation of a free press, are being flouted, not only by the Serbs but also by the Muslim-led Bosnian government and its Croatian allies.*' The way this is expressed in sentence 9 of the article, it is very negative to the process. I have called this a specific 'Dayton discourse' within the Peace Discourse, and all three Parties held responsible for the lack of compliance, truly within the 'Balkanization Discourse.'

The section discussing the '*the other major business of the conference, ... to promote countrywide elections by Sept14 meant to create common Bosnian Parliament*' is not reported as undivided favourable. The conference overlooked '*the apparent lack of human rights and democratic conditions in Bosnia in the name of moving ahead*'. According to the Dayton Peace Accords, before elections there should be a neutral political environment, and referring to '*ground monitors*', '*no such climate exists, either in the Serb Republic or in the sectors controlled by the Muslim-led government and the Croats.*'

(Sentence 24.) Underscoring the serious situation, the report from High Representative Carl Bildt, about institutionalising ethnic cleansing adds to the negative perspective.

Within the Election Discourse of these paragraphs the Balkanization Discourse dominates and the main actors within this discourse are blamed for aggravating the situation.

Still the U.S. representatives maintain that the process must go on, '*maintaining that postponing the elections would only aggravate them.*' (Sentence 26.)

Peace Discourse including Western Discourse vs. Balkanization Discourse

U.S. politics is not so much at the forefront in this article as in article 1. The interest in making the peace plan and the elections work seem to be shared by all the 40 nations of the Peace Implementation Council, although the U.S. perspective is strongly represented through the reported speech of Mr John Kornblum.

The voices represented are thus the U.S. through Mr Kornblum, the rest of the International Community through the Peace Implementation Council and representatives such as the president of the UN war crimes tribunal, Antonio Cassese and the High Representative, Carl Bildt.

Bosnia and Bosnian interests are represented in a very negative manner. The Balkanization Discourse is dominating all references to Bosnia and other Balkan actors. The main focus of interest is Mr Radovan Karadzic, the former Bosnian Serb leader. In the article he is the main representative of the 'Other', epitomizing all that is negative and bad and making problems for the process and the good intentions of the Western/U.S. 'Self'.

Mr Karadzic's name is mentioned 12 times in the article. He is characterised as the main reason why the peace process is not proceeding. According to the article, he literally threw a '*broad shadow*' over the peace conference (1st sentence)

He was the focus of '*intense and sometimes bitter debate*' (2nd sentence), the strong U.S. envoy Mr Kornblum had to go to Belgrade to talk to another strong man, president Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia to ask for help to oust Mr Karadzic, (4th sentence).

He is regarded the '*prime instigator to Serbian compliance with peace accords.*' (5th sentence)

He *‘epitomized the pitfalls inherent in the unwillingness of the United States and other sponsors of the Dayton accords to put muscle behind the agreement.’* (7th sentence).

He puts the ‘credibility of leading powers – the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, Germany –’ at stake *‘if they did not take action regarding the obligations that they had guaranteed.’* (sentence 9).

Virtually everyone present in Florence agreed that as long as he *‘remained head of the Bosnian Serb’s republic, reconciliation would never happen’* (sentence 27).

The article pints at a *‘yawning gap between expressions of dismay at the conference and willingness to take steps to get rid of Mr Karadzic’* (sentence 28)

As a conclusion, the conference members meant *‘it was up to Mr. Karadzic to make himself disappear’* (sentence 29)

Although the council managed to make it clear to *‘the leadership of the Serb republic that the continuation in public authority of Mr Karadzic was unacceptable’*, according to the final communiqué. (sentence 30)

‘He should remove himself from the political scene’ (sentence 31).

Main representations:

As mentioned already, U.S. politics is not as much to the forefront of the scope of interest in this article as in Article 1. In this article the broader interest of the international community is at the forefront. But how are Bosnian interests represented?

Bosnian interests as a country struggling for peace and democratic development are not represented in the article at all. Bosnia is represented through the opposite of peace and democracy, namely through Mr Karadzic, hardly a representation to be proud of. The representation of Bosnia in this text is as passive, as a ‘patient’, receiving help from the actors, the international community led by the USA.

Addressee:

As in Article 1, also since the article originally was printed in the Washington Post, the Addressees for this article will be the same audience: primarily an American audience,

hopefully powerful politicians in the proximity to the government institutions in Washington D.C. through the *International Herald Tribune*, a more mixed audience is reached, international intellectuals who want to and need to have knowledge of international politics. Included in this audience may also be some Bosnians, but they do not constitute the main addressee for this article either although Bosnian Muslims would be pleased by the content.

Article 3:

IHT 23 July 1996

2 'Lone Rangers' in Diplomacy: Holbrooke and Germany's '008'

U.S. Mediator in Spotlight For Success on Karadzic

By Michael Dobbs
Washington Post Service

BELGRADE — Having spent much of the night negotiating with obdurate Bosnian Serbs, Richard C. Holbrooke, Washington's special envoy, was not in the mood to be kept waiting by CNN.

When a producer in New York told him his live interview was being delayed a few minutes to make way for another update on the TWA airliner disaster, he launched into one of his celebrated rages.

"You don't understand," he growled over the satellite hookup. "We have to be back in Wash-

ington for meetings at the White House. I must report to the secretary of state. Our aircraft has a fixed slot time. If we don't get this slot, we will have to overnight in Shannon, Ireland."

The architect of November's peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina looked ostentatiously at his watch. "We have to leave this building in precisely seven minutes."

The outburst evoked howls of laughter from members of the U.S. negotiating team, gathered in the control room of Belgrade television to watch their boss tell CNN how he had arranged the removal from power of the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic.

This was vintage Holbrooke. The notion of a fixed "slot time" at Belgrade airport—at this time one of the world's most underused air traffic

See HOLBROOKE, Page 8

Continued from Page 1

facilities — was preposterous.

But what did that matter, as long as the threat of a walkout was credible to the CNN producers in New York?

With a minute or so to go to air time, CNN caved in. Mr. Holbrooke would go first, at the top of the hour, relegating news of the air disaster to second place. Chalk-up another — albeit minor — negotiating triumph for one of the most accomplished practitioners of shuttle diplomacy since Henry A. Kissinger was secretary of state.

Mr. Holbrooke retired from the State Department in February to spend more time with his new wife, Kati Marton, and to work for a Wall Street firm. (Some officials at the State Department suspect that his goal is to become secretary of state in a second Clinton administration.)

But last week, the 55-year-old diplomat was back to his old tricks, shuttling furiously between Balkan capitals, twisting the arms of assorted strongmen, giving interviews as he dived in and out of presidential offices and surviving on three to four hours of sleep a night.

In sweeping historical terms, there was not that much to show for this frenetic activity. Under intense pressure both from the West and the Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic, Mr. Karadzic agreed to step down as leader of the Bosnian Serbs. He will be replaced by politicians who are no less nationalistic than he is.

There was no mention in the agreement of the Bosnian Serbs' military leader, General Ratko Mladic, who, like Mr. Karadzic, has been indicted for gen-

ocide by the war crimes tribunal at The Hague.

And Bosnia still seems headed for ethnic partition.

In tactical terms, however, Mr. Holbrooke's mission was a success. Mr. Karadzic's resignation enables Washington to claim that the "minimal conditions have been met for 'free and fair elections'" on Sept. 14.

It lessens the embarrassment for the Clinton administration, which has been campaigning for months to win the ouster of General Mladic and Mr. Karadzic.

The political heat is now off the

United States to organize an operation to capture the two men, which, if it went wrong, could have adversely affected Mr. Clinton's re-election chances.

In short, Mr. Holbrooke has proved himself indispensable yet again. He has succeeded where others failed.

The way he orchestrated public and private pressure against the Bosnian Serbs, taking one step at a time, was reminiscent of his tactics during the months leading up to the Dayton peace accord.

Then, as now, he sought to "lock in" any progress by going public before anyone could have second thoughts.

Article 3 (IHT 23 July 1996)

Headline: “2 ‘Lone rangers’ in Diplomacy: Holbrooke and Germany ‘s ‘008’¹⁵ - U.S. mediator in Spotlight for success on Karadzic “

Article written by Michael Dobbs, *Washington Post Service*, published in the *International Herald Tribune* on 23 July 1996.

Code: Positive

Category: News Article

ARTICLE 3: BREAKDOWN SENTENCE BY SENTENCE

No.	Text	Position / Main Perspective	Dominating discourses/Basic Discourses
1.	BELGRADE – having spent much of the night negotiating with obdurate Bosnian Serbs, Richard C. Holbrooke, Washington’s special envoy, was not in the mood to be kept waiting by CNN.	Neutral U.S.vs.Balkan	U.S. Discourse Balkanization Discourse
2.	When a producer in New York told him his live interview was being delayed a few minutes to make way for another update on the TWA airlines disaster, he launched into one of his celebrated rages.	Neutral U.S.	Media Discourse U.S. Discourse
3.	“You don’t understand,” he growled over the satellite hookup.” We have to be back in Washington for meeting at the White House, I must report to the secretary of state.	Neutral U.S.	U.S. Discourse
4.	Our aircraft has a fixed slot time. If we don’t get this slot, we will have to overnight in Shannon, Ireland.”		U.S. discourse
5.	The architect of November’s peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina looked ostentatiously at his watch. “We have to leave this building in precisely seven minutes.”	Positive	U.S. discourse

¹⁵ The part of the article matching the part of the title “Germany’s ‘008’ was not included in the material, and is not part of the analysis. To keep the correct reference the title is kept as it was in the original material, see page 136.

6.	The outburst evoked howls of laughter from members of the U.S. negotiating team, gathered in the control room of Belgrade television to watch their boss tell CNN how he had arranged the removal from power of the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic.	Positive U.S. vs. Bosnia	U.S. discourse Balkanization Discourse
7.	This was vintage Holbrooke.		U.S. discourse
8.	The notion of a fixed “slot time” at Belgrade airport – at this time one of the world’s most underused air facilities - was preposterous.	U.S. vs. Balkan	U.S. discourse
9.	But what did that matter, as long as the threat of a walkout was credible to the CNN producers in New York?	Neutral	Media discourse
10.	With a minute or so to go to air time, CNN caved in.	Neutral	Media discourse
11.	Mr. Holbrooke would go first, at top of the hour, relegating news of the air disaster to second place.	Positive U.S.	Media discourse
12.	Chalk up another – albeit minor – negotiating triumph for one of the most accomplished practitioners of shuttle diplomacy since Henry A. Kissinger was secretary of state.	Positive U.S.	U.S. Discourse Political Discourse
13.	Mr. Holbrooke retired from the State Department in February to spend more time with his new wife, Kati Marton, and to work for a Wall Street firm.	Neutral /factual U.S.,	U.S. discourse
14.	(Some officials at the State Department suspect that his goal is to become secretary of state in a second Clinton administration.)	Neutral	U.S. discourse Political Discourse
15.	But last week, the 55-year –old diplomat was back to his old tricks, shuttling furiously between Balkan capitals, twisting the arms of assorted strongmen, giving interviews as he dive in and out of presidential offices and surviving on three to four hours of sleep a night.	Positive U.S. vs. Balkan	U.S. Discourse Balkanization Discourse
16.	In sweeping historical terms, there was not that much to show for this frenetic activity.	Neutral	
17.	Under intense pressure both from the West and the Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic, Mr Karadzic agreed to step down as leader of the Bosnian Serbs.	Positive U.S. vs. Balkan	Western Discourse Balkanization Discourse

18.	He will be replaced by politicians who are no less nationalistic than he is.	Negative Balkan	Political discourse Balkanization discourse
19.	There was no mention in the agreement of the Bosnian Serbs' military leader, General Ratko Mladic, who, like Mr. Karadzic, has been indicted for genocide by the war crimes tribunal at The Hague.	Negative Balkan	Political discourse Balkanization discourse
20.	And Bosnia still seems headed for ethnic partition.	Negative Bosnian	Balkanization discourse
21.	In tactical terms, however, Mr. Holbrooke's mission was a success.	Positive U.S.vs. Bosnia	U.S.Discourse
22.	Mr. Karadzic's resignation enables Washington to claim that the minimal conditions have been met for "free and fair elections" on Sept.14.	Positive U.S vs. Bosnia	Elections discourse
23.	It lessens the embarrassment for the Clinton administration, which has been campaigning for months to win the ouster of General Mladic and Mr. Karadzic.	Positive U.S. vs. Bosnia	Election discourse U.S. discourse Balkanization discourse
24.	The political heat is now off the United States to organize an operation to capture the two men, which, if it went wrong, could have adversely affected Mr. Clinton's re-election chances.	Positive U.S. vs.Bosnia U.S. political	Election discourse U.S. discourse Balkanization discourse
25.	In short, Mr. Holbrooke has proved himself indispensable yet again.	Positive U.S.	U.S. Discourse
26.	He has succeeded where other failed.	Positive U.S.	U.S. discourse
27.	The way he orchestrated public and private pressure against the Bosnian Serbs, taking one step at a time, was reminiscent of his tactics during the months leading up to the Dayton peace accord.	Positive U.S.	U.S. discourse Balkanization Discourse
28.	Then, as now, he sought to "lock in" any progress by going public before anyone could have second thoughts.	Positive U.S.	U.S. discourse

Table 4: Article 3- Breakdown of text sentence by sentence

Summary

The U.S. diplomat who brokered the Dayton Peace Agreement, Richard C. Holbrooke, leaves for the Balkans to “talk to the Serbs” to put a pressure on them to make Karadzic step down. He manages to get such a promise, and the election campaign can start. The report opens by describing Holbrooke as he manipulates the CNN to make his story the top headline story by looking ostentatiously at his watch and claiming an airplane would be leaving at a very specific time, and he would have to leave the building in seven minutes...

The article applauds the accomplishments of the diplomat, by ‘*chalking up another – albeit minor – diplomatic triumph for one of the most accomplished practitioners of shuttle diplomacy since Henry A. Kissinger was secretary of state.*’

It is implied that Holbrooke’s ambition is to become the next Secretary of State. His frenetic shuttle diplomacy resulted in the promise of Mr Karadzic to step down as leader of the Bosnian Serb Party (SDS), thus enabling Washington to claim that the minimal conditions have been met for ‘*free and fair elections on Sept. 14.*’ According to the article, this lessens the embarrassment from the Clinton administration, which for months had been campaigning for the ouster of General Mladic and Mr. Karadzic. However, there was no mention of General Mladic as part of the result of Holbrooke’s shuttle diplomacy. The article is very preoccupied with Clinton’s chances of re-election, which have improved thanks to Holbrook’s heroic efforts.

Analysis:

Context:

According to the timeline for the elections, the election campaign was supposed to start on July 14. But as the title of Article 2 implies, the ‘dark shadow of Karadzic’ was still preventing it. As long as Karadzic as an indicted war criminal appeared on the list of the Bosnian Serb Party (SDS), this was so much against the Dayton Peace Agreement, that the U.S. ambassador in charge of the OSCE in Sarajevo, Mr. Frowick, postponed the elections until Karadzic had stepped down as party leader and candidate for the SDS. The pressure on

the Clinton administration to make Mr. Karadzic step down was felt very strongly by the OSCE mission in Sarajevo and particularly heavy on Mr. Frowick's shoulders. With Mr. Holbrooke's shuttle diplomacy this pressure was now relieved, and the preparation for the elections could go on as planned.

Positive code: The article is coded as positive, because the majority of the sentences (13 out of 28) are characterized as positive (see the definitions of the codes on page 99-10).

Perspective:

The article reflects a U.S. sphere of interest. By visiting Belgrade in a hurry, talking to Milosevic and Karadzic, Holbrooke manages to make them agree to make Karadzic step down. In doing so, Mr Holbrooke is saving Clinton's face, and paving the way for the elections to go on as planned – *'the minimal conditions have been met for "free and fair elections"'*. At the same time this act *'lessens the embarrassment for the Clinton administration, which has been campaigning for months to win the ouster of General Mladic and Mr Karadzic'*. The U.S. sphere of interest is underlined by the following sentence (No. 24) : *'The political heat is now off the United States to organize an operation to capture the two men, which, if it went wrong, could have adversely affected Mr. Clinton's re-election chances.'*

Election Discourse as U.S. Discourse

The article is part of an elections discourse, in the sense that elections are mentioned, but only as Clinton's re-election. Whoever thought this was about elections in Bosnia, would have to look elsewhere. I have therefore categorized most of the articles as part of a basic discourse type called 'U.S. Discourse', see definition pages 104-106. Some of them are purely media discourse, while others are Political Discourse within the U.S. Discourse.

Were conditions met?

The reason why Holbrook had to undertake his speedy diplomatic mission was of course to save the Dayton Peace Accords and the scheduled elections. The whole operation is meant to limit the effect of the acknowledged fact that one of the main conditions of the DPA was still disturbing the preparations for the elections, and jeopardizing the U.S. intentions. But

through his successful mission, Washington is now able “*to claim that the minimal conditions have been met for “free and fair” elections on Sept. 14*”.

Dominant – hegemonic position

In the terms of Hall, this article can be defined within the dominant – hegemonic position. It is very positive to the U.S. definition of the situation towards Bosnia, and the problems of Bosnia seem to be solved in the best way by Americans.

Responsibility frame

The article is defined within the responsibility frame, focusing on the main representative for U.S. responsible politics towards Bosnia, Mr. Holbrooke.

Representation - A tale of a hero

The main actor in this article is Mr Richard C. Holbrooke. In fact he is presented as a hero. This is the tale of the hero who managed to talk some sense to the hardliners in Belgrade, who was the main actor in the brokering of the deal that led to the Dayton Peace Accords. The article refers to the manner he manipulates the CNN as ‘*vintage Holbrooke*’ (sentence No. 7). He is referred to as ‘*one of the most accomplished practitioners of shuttle diplomacy since Henry A. Kissinger was secretary of state*’ (sentence No. 12).

The article shows some ambiguity concerning how important his latest success was, but leaves us with the definite impression that his furious shuttle between Balkan capitals, ‘*twisting the arms of assorted strongmen, giving interviews as he dived in and out of presidential offices and surviving on three to four hours of sleep a night*’ still was a major accomplishment that apparently only Mr. Holbrooke could manage.

The ambiguity is also shown concerning the importance of the result of Holbrooke’s efforts. The fact that Mr Karadzic agreed to step down as leader of the Bosnian Serbs, will probably have the result that ‘*he will be replaced by politicians who are no less nationalistic than he is.*’ (Sentence No.18) And in sentence 20: ‘*Bosnia still seems headed for ethnic partition.*’

But Holbrooke saved the face of his President, and helped pave the way for the elections to be held within the deadline, 14 September 1996. In this context he becomes a

hero. So the main actor in this discourse, Mr Richard Holbrooke, represents America, the “good guy” who lets nothing stop him, travels all the way from Washington D.C to Belgrade with the sole ambition to talk sense to the “bad guys” (Milosevic and Karadzic) and makes them obey!

Holbrooke has proved himself ‘*indispensable*’; he has ‘*succeeded where others failed*’ (sentences No 25 & 26). ‘*The way he orchestrated public pressure against the Bosnian Serbs, taking one step at a time, was reminiscent of his tactics during the months leading up to the Dayton peace accord.*’ (Sentence No.27) The true American hero is back on the scene, cleaning up the mess after all the other failures (e.g. Europeans, other members of IC). And the final sentence that further proves the geniality of this man: ‘*Then, as now, he sought to “lock in “ any progress by going public before anyone could have second thoughts.*’ (Sentence No. 28):.And seen through the eyes of the media community, represented by the journalist writing the piece, the assumption that Holbrooke is a true hero is underlined by such a deliberate way of using the press.

The representation of the peace process in Bosnia is as an American project. The Bosnians are not represented in the article at all, apart from in the shape of everybody’s main enemy, Mr Karadzic, and as one of the incarnations of the Balkanization Discourse.

Addressee:

The addressee for this article will be the same as for the former two articles: originally written for the *Washington Post* and printed in the *International Herald Tribune*. The hope would be that a positive article like this one would have a positive effect on the environment surrounding the White House in Washington D.C. , boosting the president’s image as still the leading figure in the peace process in Bosnia.

And through the worldwide distribution of the *International Herald Tribune* the same positive image of president Clinton would not hurt either.

Article 4 : IHT 23 August 1996

Bosnian Serb Switches From Purges to Politics

Will Elections Legitimize 'Cleansers'?

By John Pomfret
Washington Post Staff Writer

VIENNA — The last time Atif Hunic remembers seeing Vojkan Djurkovic, the Bosnian Serb militia commander had just extorted her life savings of \$600, she said, sold her house out from under her and was promising that he would not kill her and her mother — just expel them from their home.

Mr. Djurkovic and his gang of gunmen ultimately banished Miss Hunic and about 30,000 other Muslims and Croats from around the east Bosnian city of Bijeljina, according to Western aid officials. They looted and auctioned off the cities' houses, and made themselves very rich men.

Mr. Djurkovic, in a recent interview, referred to his campaign of expulsions as "the Djurkovic model."

"If not for me, they would have ended up like the Muslims in Srebrenica," he said, referring to the massacre of thousands of Muslims by Bosnian Serb forces. "I won my battle against them, but I saved their lives."

Now Miss Hunic and thousands of refugees who were expelled from Serb-held territory in Bosnia are locked in another battle with men like Mr. Djurkovic, who have laid down their weapons and launched political campaigns instead. This one will be fought not on the streets but in the ballot boxes, on Sept. 14, the day set for Bosnia's nationwide elections.

The clash could not be clearer. On one side are Miss Hunic's hopes that Bosnia's elections, as envisaged by the Dayton peace accord, will get the stage for her eventual return home. On the other is Mr. Djurkovic's wish to use the elections to ensure that none of his victims come back and to legitimize his version of "ethnic cleansing." In the words of a senior UN official, he is seeking to "anoint himself with the holy water of the vote."

Mr. Djurkovic and others like him seem set to win again. After organizing and carrying out the bulk of the ethnic purges in Bijeljina as the local head of the ominously titled Office of Population Exchange, Western officials say, Mr. Djurkovic has changed hats, from mobster to politician.

He is running for the post of deputy mayor. His party is somewhat ironically named the Serb Refugee Democratic Party.

Nothing prevents Mr. Djurkovic from running. Although Western aid officials said they had amassed substantial documentation linking him to widespread ethnic purges and the brutalization of scores of Muslims, he has not been indicted by the international war crimes tribunal in The Hague. Western officials said he had been the representative of the Serbian paramilitary leader, Zeljko Raznatovic, known as Arkan, one of the most violent of the Belgrade-based Serbian mercenaries

operating in Bosnia from 1992 to 1995. But only people indicted by the tribunal are banned from the ballot.

"It just shows how perverted this whole election process is," said an American official working with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which is coordinating the vote. "This election will take a guy like that and legitimize him."

Miss Hunic is one of 641,000 Bosnian refugees living in 35 countries abroad who have registered to vote along with more than a million people in Bosnia.

But she will not vote for Mr. Djurkovic. Miss Hunic said she would vote for Muslim candidates who were refugees like her and who had not dared to return to Bijeljina since Mr. Djurkovic kicked them out three years ago.

"What happens if my candidates win?" said Miss Hunic, who is in a refugee center on the outskirts of Vienna. "Will NATO drive them to their offices in a tank?"

Miss Hunic's question cuts to the heart of one of the issues bedeviling the Western organizers of Bosnia's elections and the NATO commanders backing them up. Election officials believe there is a high probability that Muslim refugees, like those from Bijeljina and other towns in eastern Bosnia, will succeed in electing Muslim politicians in areas seized by the Serbs. But how will the victors be able to go to work if the town hall is occupied by Serbian gunmen like Mr. Djurkovic?

A NATO spokesman said this week that the alliance had no intention of escorting politicians to work. "That's not our job," the spokesman said. But few, if any, Muslims would dare venture into the heart of Serb-held territory without an escort.

"We would not allow Muslim politicians to come back," Mr. Djurkovic said. He added that he recently started a private protection agency that Western aid officials believed would be used to keep Muslims from returning home.

The Dayton peace plan saw the elections as a way to cement ties between the Muslims and the Croats, and between their federation and the Serbs.

But instead of uniting Bosnia and helping refugees like Miss Hunic go home, the elections will strengthen Mr. Djurkovic and his brand of criminal nationalism, Western officials said.

The ramifications of this scenario do not bode well for Bosnia. The Muslim-led government signed the Dayton peace agreement only because it guaranteed refugees, mostly Muslims, the right to return home. If that right were stymied by the election, numerous Western officials predicted, then there would be more war in Bosnia.

"The Muslims will fight because they have no other option," said a long-serving senior UN official in Bosnia. Referring to the Muslims' right to return home, he said, "If that right evaporates, they will attack."

Article 4 (IHT 23 August 1996)

Headline: “Bosnian Serb Switches from Purges to Politics Will election Legitimize Cleansers?”

Article written by John Pomfret , *Washington Post Service*, published in *The International Herald Tribune* on August 23, 1996

Code : Negative

Category: News Article

ARTICLE 4: BREAKDOWN OF SENTENCES

No.	Text	Position/ Main representation	Dominating discourses/Basic discourses
1.	VIENNA-The last time Almira Huntic remember seeing Vojkan Djurkovic , the Bosnian Serb militia commander had just extorted her life savings of \$ 600, she said, sold her house out from under her and was promising that the would not kill her and her mother – just expel them from their home.	Negative Bosnian	Bosnia discourse Balkanization discourse
2.	Mr Djurkovic and his gang of gunmen ultimately banished Miss Huntic and about 30.000 other Muslims and Croats from around the east Bosnian city of Bijeljina, according to Western aid officials.	Negative Western vs. Bosnian	Bosnia discourse Balkanization discourse
3.	They looted and auctioned off the exiles’ houses, and made themselves very rich men.	Negative Bosnian	Bosnia discourse Balkanization discourse
4.	Mr. Djurkovic, in a recent interview, referred to his campaign of expulsions as “the Djurkovic model.”	Negative Bosnian	Bosnia discourse Balkanization discourse
5.	“If not for me, they would have ended up like the Muslims in Srebrenica,” he said, referring to the massacre of thousands of Muslims by Bosnian Serb forces.	Negative Bosnian	Bosnian discourse Balkanization discourse

6.	"I won my battle against them, but I saved their lives."	Negative Bosnian	Bosnian discourse Balkanization discourse
7.	Now Miss Huntic and thousands of refugees which were expelled from Serb-held territory in Bosnia are locked in another battle with men like Mr. Djurkovic who have laid down their weapons and launched political campaigns instead.	Negative Bosnian	Election discourse Balkanization discourse
8.	This one will be fought not on the streets but in the ballot boxes on Sept., 14, the day set for Bosnia's nationwide elections.	Neutral Bosnian	Election discourse Balkanization discourse
9.	The class could not be clearer.	Negative	Election discourse Balkanization discourse
10.	On one side are Miss Huntic's hopes that Bosnia's elections, as envisaged by the Dayton peace accord, will set the stage for her eventual return home.	Positive Bosnian	Election discourse Dayton discourse
11.	On the other is Mr. Djurkovic's wish to use the elections to ensure that none of his victims come back and to legitimise his version of "ethnic cleansing."	Negative Bosnian	Election discourse Balkanization discourse
12.	In the words of a senior UN official he is seeking to "anoint himself with the holy water of the vote."	Negative	Election discourse Balkanization discourse
13.	Mr. Djurkovic and others like him seem set to win again.	Negative	Election discourse
14.	After organizing and carrying out the bulk of the ethnic purges in Bijeljina as the local head of the ominously titled Office of Population Exchange, Western officials say, Mr Djurkovic has changed hats, from mobster to politician.	Negative Western vs. Bosnian	Election discourse Balkanization discourse
15.	He is running for the post of deputy mayor.	Neutral	Election discourse
16.	His party is somehow ironically named the Serb Refugee Democratic Party.	Negative Bosnian	Election discourse Balkanization discourse
17.	Nothing prevents Mr. Djurkovic from running.	Negative	Election discourse
18.	Although Western aid officials said they had amassed substantial documentation linking him to widespread ethnic purges and the brutalization of scores of	Negative	Election discourse

	Muslims, he has not been indicted by the international war crimes tribunal in The Hague.	Western vs. Bosnian	Balkanization discourse
19.	Western officials said he had been the representative of the Serbian paramilitary leader, Zeljko Raznatovic, known as Arkan, one of the most violent of the Belgrade-based Serbian mercenaries operating in Bosnia from 199 to 1995.	Negative Western vs. Balkan	Bosnia discourse Balkanization discourse
20.	But only people indicted by the tribunal are banned from the ballot.	Negative Bosnian	Election discourse Balkanization discourse
21.	“It just shows how perverted this whole election process is,” said an American official working with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which is coordinating the vote.	Negative Western vs. Bosnia	Election discourse Balkanization discourse
22.	“This election will take a guy like that and legitimize him.”	Negative Western vs. Bosnian	Election discourse Balkanization discourse
23.	Miss Huntic is one of 641.010 Bosnian refugees living in 55 countries abroad who have registered to vote along with more than a million people in Bosnia.	Positive Bosnian	Election discourse Bosnian discourse
24.	But she will not vote for Mr. Djurkovic.	Negative	Election discourse Balkanization discourse
25.	Miss Huntic said she would vote for Muslim candidates who were refugees like her and who had not dared to return to Bjiljelina since Mr. Djurkovic kicked them out three years ago.	Positive Bosnian	Election discourse Bosnian discourse Balkanization discourse
26.	“What happens if my candidates win,” said Miss Huntic, who is in a refugee center on the outskirts of Vienna.	Negative Bosnian	Election discourse Bosnian discourse
27.	“Will NATO drive them to their offices in a tank.”	Negative West vs. Bosnian	Election discourse Bosnian discourse
28.	Miss Huntic’s question cuts to the heart of one of the issues bedevilling the Western organizers of Bosnia’s elections and the NATO commanders backing them up.	Negative West vs. Bosnian	Election discourse Bosnian discourse

29.	Election officials believe there is high probability that Muslim refugees, like those from Bijeljina and other towns in eastern Bosnia, will succeed in electing Muslim politicians in areas seized by the Serbs.	Negative Bosnian	Election discourse Bosnian discourse
30.	But how will the victors be able to go to work if the town hall is occupied by Serbian gunmen like Mr. Djurkovic?	Negative Bosnian	Election discourse Bosnian discourse Balkanization discourse
31.	A NATO spokesman said this week that the alliance had no intention of escorting politicians to work. "That's not our job," the spokesman said.	Negative Western	Election discourse Bosnian discourse
32.	But few, if any, Muslims would dare venture into the heart of Serb-held territory without an escort.	Negative Bosnian	Election discourse Bosnian discourse Balkanization discourse
33.	"We would not allow Muslim politicians to come back," Mr. Djurkovic said.	Negative Bosnian	Election discourse Bosnian discourse Balkanization discourse
34.	He added that he recently started a private protection agency that Western aid officials believed would be used to keep Muslims from returning home.	Negative Western / Bosnian	Election discourse Bosnian discourse Balkanization discourse
35.	The Dayton peace plan saw the elections as a way to cement ties between the Muslims and the Croats, and between their federation and the Serbs.	Positive Western /Bosnian	Election discourse Bosnian discourse
36.	But instead of uniting Bosnia and helping refugees like Miss Huntic go home, the elections will strengthen Mr. Djurkovic and his brand of criminal nationalism, Western officials said.	Positive Western vs. Bosnian	Election discourse Bosnian discourse Balkanization discourse
37.	The ramifications of this scenario do not bode well for Bosnia.	Negative Bosnian	Election discourse Bosnian discourse
38.	The Muslim led government signed the Dayton peace agreement only because it guaranteed refugees, mostly	Positive	Dayton discourse

	Muslims, the right to return home.	Bosnian	Bosnian discourse
39.	If that right were stymied by the election, numerous Western official predicted, then there would be more war in Bosnia.	Negative Western vs. Bosnian	Election discourse Bosnian discourse Balkanization discourse
40.	“The Muslims will fight because they have no other option,” said a long serving senior UN official in Bosnia.	Negative Bosnian	Bosnian discourse Balkanization discourse
41.	Referring to the Muslims’ right to return home, he said, “if that right evaporates, they will attack.”	Negative Bosnian	Bosnian discourse Balkanization discourse

Table 5: Article 4 – breakdown of text sentence by sentence.

Summary:

The main focus of the article is the perspective of a young female Bosnian Muslim refugee, Miss Huntic, who was expelled from her house in Bijeljina and is presently living in Vienna. Mr. Djurkovic and his gang was the main perpetrator of the ‘ethnic cleansing’ she was a victim of, and Mr Djurkovic is now running as candidate for the post of deputy major in her former home town. The opposite situation of the two Bosnians is the focal point of the article, discussing both the fact that persons like Mr. Djurkovic can run freely as a candidate of the elections, and that Miss Huntic even though she had a possibility to vote as a refugee, the Muslim candidate she votes for will not have the possibility to take office as long as persons like gunmen like Mr. Djurkovic will occupy the town hall. Or ‘ Will NATO drive them to the office in a tank?’ is her rhetoric questions, to which NATO –officials say no. The fear expressed in the article is that the elections will strengthen nationalists like Mr. Djurkovic instead of helping refugees like Miss Huntic go home. The article refers Western officials expressing the fear that if the elections don’t contribute to guarantee the right of the refugees to return, war will break out in Bosnia again

Analysis:**Dramatic context: clashing interests**

The article presents a rather dramatic plot, visualising one of the central conflicts in the Bosnian context: the conflict between the persecuted Bosnian Muslims who had to leave all their belongings and homes behind and become refugees in foreign countries, and the persecutor, in this case represented as a Bosnian Serb militia commander, belonging to one of the most notoriously violent paramilitary gangs of the war, Arkan's men. Miss Huntic, representing the victims of ethnic cleansing, and Mr Djurkovic, representing the cleansers.

Negative code:

The article is coded as negative because almost a large majority (33 out of 41) of the sentences in the article expresses a negative attitude towards the elections.

Change of perspective:

As an exception to the other articles in the selection for analysis where the perspective is mostly Western or more precisely a U.S. perspective, the main perspective of this article is Bosnian. The main actors interviewed are Bosnians, representing two sides of the conflict: Ms Almira Huntic is Bosnian Muslim interviewed in a refugee camp in Vienna, and Mr Vojkan Djurkovic, a former Bosnian Serb militia commander, now running for the local elections in the home town, Bijeljina in Eastern Bosnia. This was also the former home town of Ms Huntic, from where she and her family had been expelled by exactly Mr Djurkovic and his men during the war.

The journalist uses the two characters to visualize two important perspectives in the election discourse: the perspectives of the 'cleansed' and of the 'cleanser'. *'The clash could not be clearer. On one side are Miss Huntic's hopes that Bosnia's elections, as envisaged by the Dayton peace accord, will set the stage for her eventual return home. On the other is Mr. Djurkovic's wish to use the elections to ensure that none of his victims come back and to legitimize his version of "ethnic cleansing". In the words of a senior UN official, he is seeking to "anoint himself with the holy water of the vote".* (Sentences No. 9 through 12).

The two Bosnian characters, Miss Huntic and Mr Djurkovic, are the main actors in the article, presented as *agents* in the terms of Van Dijk. (Van Dijk 1988:9) They are the driving forces behind the development of the story in this article. The Western perspective in this article is represented by anonymous voices, referred to as *Western diplomats*, *Senior UN officials*, *Western officials*, *Western organizers of elections*, *NATO spokesman etc.* In other words, presented as less important, not in the first subject position.

Were conditions met?

The dramatic contrast in the main plot of the article is that the villain, Mr Djurkovic, is running for the local elections in the hometown, Bijeljina. According to the Dayton everything is fine: Miss Huntic is allowed to cast her vote for a candidate running in her home town, even if she is living abroad. And there is no provision against Mr Djurkovic being a candidate for the elections; he is not on the list of war criminals indicted by the tribunal in Hague. In the words of one of the anonymous persons expressing views in the article, an American official working for the OSCE: *"It just shows how perverted this whole election process is," "this election will take a guy like that and legitimize him."* (Sentences No. 21 & 22). This American election official is criticising the planned election. This is a criticism of the result of the Dayton, which looks good on paper, but when it comes down to the grass roots level like in this instance, does not work for the best of the people of Bosnia. In other words, this is not just a criticism of a situation whether the conditions set down in the DPA were met or not, this is a criticism of the way Dayton was functioning, a basic criticism of the procedure.

The second important issue in the article relates to the provision in the DPA on "freedom of movement." Miss Huntic is worried about what happens if her preferred Muslim candidates (also refugees like her) would win. How are they going to be able to enter the Town Hall of Bijeljina if it is occupied by *"Serbian gunmen like Mr Djurkovic?"* (Sentences No. 26 & 27 and 30)

And NATO does not give much relieve, a NATO spokesman says that the alliance has no intention of escorting politicians to work. *"That's not our job"*, he is quoted as saying.

(Sentence No. 31) And since Mr Djurkovic says that “*We would not allow Muslim politicians to come back,*” it is believed that ...“*few, if any, Muslims will dare venture into the heart of Serb-held territory without an escort.*” (Sentences No. 32 &33).

The conclusion, again referring to Western officials, will be that the elections according to the Dayton peace plan, which was meant to cement the ties between the federation of Muslims and Croats and the Serbs, will strengthen Mr. Djurkovic and his brand of criminals. According to the article, Western officials also predicted that if the right of Muslims to return home will be stymied by the elections, there would be more war in Bosnia.

Bosnian perspective – Bosnian Discourses

In this article the Bosnian perspective and a Bosnian Discourse and the Balkanization Discourse dominate completely. This is a way the journalist tries to visualise how the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord works for the people it is meant to help, the Bosnians. Through using representatives from the opposing groups, we are taken to the core of the problem: the possible return of Muslim refugees who have been expelled from their homes, and the hard-line Bosnian Serb militiaman who has turned politician.

This is at the core of a specific Bosnian discourse, and visualizes central problems of the Balkanization Discourse.

Addressee

This article is also part of the Washington Post Service printed in the International Herald Tribune, and as such most likely also directed towards the political elites in Washington, as a warning about how high level politics may function on the ground.

Article 5: IHT 31 August / 1 September 1996

Dole Presses Clinton to Delay Vote By Bosnians

By William Claiborne
Washington Post Service

SAN LUIS OBISPO, California — Bob Dole has urged President Bill Clinton to postpone presidential and parliamentary elections in Bosnia Herzegovina, saying that under present conditions, the Sept. 14 balloting will be a "fraud with the American stamp of approval."

Mr. Dole, the Republican presidential nominee, called the planned elections "a sham in the making." He said opposition candidates had been intimidated, refugees had been unable to return to their homes, and war criminals were roaming free. He also said that there had been little progress toward development of independent media and that freedom of movement had not been established within Bosnia.

"Elections held under these circumstances will only serve to unfairly legitimize national extremists, entrench ethnic divisions and condemn Bosnia and its people to authoritarianism and partition," Mr. Dole said Thursday in a letter to Mr. Clinton that the Dole campaign released on the next-to-last day of a week-long vacation and campaigning trip to California.

Municipal elections in Bosnia were postponed indefinitely this week by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. However, the Clinton administration has said that presidential and parliamentary elections should proceed as scheduled.

"I cannot conceive of a single compelling national interest for pressing forward on Sept. 14," Mr. Dole said. "Indeed, to the contrary, I believe that putting American prestige behind such a process only serves to undermine our leadership and makes a mockery of our commitment to democratic principles, while making it more difficult for U.S. troops in Bosnia to accomplish their goals. I cannot comprehend why the United States supports holding elections under such circumstances."

Mr. Dole said U.S. policy toward Bosnia was "in need of serious alterations."

Mr. Dole did not refer to the Bosnian elections in a campaign speech to several thousand enthusiastic supporters here. But he reiterated his campaign promises that he would never relegate decision-making in critical matters affecting U.S. foreign policy to the United Nations or any of its organizations.

Mr. Dole's campaign also released a letter he wrote to Vice President Al Gore in which he sharply criticized Mr. Gore's speech Wednesday night at the Democratic National Convention. Referring to Mr. Gore's endorsement of Clinton as one half of a "two-headed monster," Mr. Dole said the comment was a "statement that certainly did nothing to restore civility to our political discourse."

Article 5 (IHT 31 Aug/1 September 1996)

Headline: “Dole Presses Clinton to Delay Vote by Bosnians”

Article written by William Claiborne, *Washington Post Service*, published in the *International Herald Tribune* on Saturday- Sunday August 31 to September 1 1996.

Code : *Negative*

Category: *News Article*

ARTICLE 5: BREAKDOWN SENTENCE BY SENTENCE

No.	Text	Position / Main representation	Dominating discourses/Basic discourses
1.	SAN LUIS OBISPO, California – Bob Dole has urged President Bill Clinton to postpone presidential and parliamentary elections in Bosnia- Herzegovina, saying that under present conditions, the Sept. 14 balloting will be a “fraud with the American stamp of approval. “	Negative U.S. vs. Bosnia	Election discourse U.S. discourse
2.	Mr. Dole, the Republican presidential nominee, called the planned elections “ a sham in the making.” He said opposition candidates had been intimidated, refugees had been unable to return to their homes, and war criminals were roaming free.	Negative U.S. / Bosnian	Election discourse U.S. /Bosnian discourse Balkanization discourse
3.	He also said that there had been little progress toward development of independent media ant that freedom of movement had not been established within Bosnia.	Negative Bosnian	Election discourse Human Rights Discourse Bosnian discourse

4.	“Elections held under these circumstances will only serve to unfairly legitimise national extremists, entrench ethnic divisions and condemn Bosnia and its people to authoritarianism and partition,” Mr. Dole said Thursday in a letter to Mr. Clinton that the Dole campaign release on the next-to-last day of a weeklong vacation and campaigning trip to California.	Negative Bosnian	Election discourse Bosnian discourse Balkanization Discourse
5.	Municipal elections in Bosnia were postponed indefinitely this week by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe..	Neutral/ fact	Election discourse
6.	However, the Clinton administration has said that presidential and parliamentary elections should proceed as scheduled.	Positive U.S. / Bosnian	Election discourse
7.	“I cannot conceive of a single compelling national interest for pressing forward on Sept. 14,” Mr Dole said.	Negative	Election discourse
8.	“Indeed to the contrary” I believe that putting American prestige behind such a process only serves to undermine our leadership and makes a mockery of our commitment to democratic principles, while making it more difficult for U.S. troops in Bosnia to accomplish their goals.	Negative U.S. vs. Bosnia	Election discourse U.S. discourse
9.	I cannot comprehend why the United States supports holding election under such circumstances.”	Negative U.S.	Election discourse U.S. discourse
10.	Mr. Dole said U.S. policy towards Bosnia was “in need of serious alternations.”	Negative U.S. vs Bosnia	Political discourse U.S. discourse
11.	Mr. Dole did not refer to the Bosnian elections in a campaign speech to several thousand enthusiastic supporters here. ¹⁶		
12.	But he reiterated his campaign promises that he would never relegate decisionmaking in critical matters affecting U.S. foreign policy to the United Nations or any of its organizations.		

¹⁶ Sentences from 11 through 15 in this article do not touch the topic of Bosnia and are therefore not part of the analysis.

13.	Mr. Dole's campaign also released a letter he wrote to Vice president Al Gore in which he sharply criticized Mr. Gore's speech Wednesday night at the Democratic National Convention.		
14.	Recalling that Mr. Gore had referred to him as one half of a "Two headed monster."		
15.	Mr. Dole said the comment was a "sad statement that certainly did nothing to restore civility to our political discourse."		

Table 6: Article 5 – breakdown of text sentence by sentence.

Summary:

In a campaign speech in California, the Republican presidential nominee, Bob Dole, has urged President Bill Clinton to postpone presidential and parliamentary elections in Bosnia-Herzegovian, saying that under present conditions, the Sept 14 balloting will be a "fraud with the American stamp of approval". Mr. Dole, called the planned elections a "sham in the making". He said opposition candidates had been intimidated, refugees had been unable to return to their homes, and war criminals were roaming free. He also said that there had been little progress toward development of independent media and that freedom of movement had not been established within Bosnia.

"Elections held under these circumstances will only serve to unfairly legitimize national extremists, entrench ethnic divisions and condemn Bosnia and its people to authoritarianism and partition." (Sentence No.4) In a letter to Mr Clinton, Mr. Dole expresses his concern saying that he cannot see ... *"a single compelling national interest for pressing forward on Sept. 14 "* *"Indeed to the contrary, I believe that putting American prestige behind such a process only serves to undermine our leadership and makes a mockery of our commitment to democratic principles, while making it more difficult for U.S. troops in Bosnia to accomplish their goals. I cannot comprehend why the United States supports holding elections under such circumstances."* He added that U.S. policy toward Bosnia was *"in need of serious alteration."* (Sentences No. 7 through 10).

Analysis

Context

The clear context of this article is U.S. domestic politics and the up-coming U.S. elections where Senator Robert J. Dole is the Republican opposition candidate to the Democrat Bill Clinton. As in the first article, the main issue reflected in the article is U.S. foreign politics, of which politics in Bosnia is an important part.

In the lead paragraph Mr Dole urges president Clinton to postpone “*presidential and parliamentary elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina*” saying that under present condition, “*...the Sept. 14 balloting will be a ‘fraud with the American stamp of approval’.*”

The presupposition here would be that it is in the power of the President of the United States to decide whether or not to hold elections in a remote country in the Balkans, in this case in Bosnia – Herzegovina. The article also represents the view that the issue of elections in Bosnia is a central issue in the domestic elections campaigning in the U.S. The fact that the Republican presidential candidate was against holding the elections on the prescribed date was used as an argument from Clinton’s supporters against all others who were in doubt about the elections – they would be accused of supporting the Republicans. Making these elections work had become an important element of Clinton’s own re-election campaign.

Were conditions met?

In the second paragraph Mr. Dole mentions several of the conditions from the DPA that are not met, as he calls the elections “*...a sham in the making*”. He said “*...opposition candidates had been intimidated, refugees had been unable to return in their homes, and war criminals were roaming free.*” He also said that there had been little progress toward development of “*...independent media and that freedom of movement had not been established within Bosnia*”.

“*Elections held under these circumstances will only serve to unfairly legitimize national extremists, entrench ethnic divisions and condemn Bosnia and its people to authoritarianism and partition.*”

Dole here points out some very central issues and important conditions set down in the Dayton Peace Agreement that still had not been met two weeks before the elections.

Criticism dismissed as political opposition?

As objective facts, these statements are true. But for the team preparing for Clinton's and the Bosnian Elections, this kind of criticism would be considered hostile and similar to Article 1, easy to refer to as coming from a political enemy, in this case the spear head of the political enemy, the presidential candidate of the opposition. Thus his criticism is easy to dismiss, and also loses its effect even though it may objectively be true.

In Dole's letter to Clinton as referred in the article, Dole claims that the present policy “...serves to undermine our leadership and make a mockery of our commitment to democratic principles, while making it more difficult for U.S. troops in Bosnia to accomplish their goals. I cannot comprehend why the United States supports holding elections under such circumstances.” (Sentence 8).

This is very harsh criticism of the Clinton Administration, claiming that they contribute to making a mockery of American commitment to democratic principles by insisting on keeping the deadline for these elections.

Conflict frame

This article can clearly be categorized as part of a conflict frame, Dole representing the complete opposite and total criticism of Clinton's Bosnia politics.

Dominant – hegemonic position

In the terms of Stuart Hall, however, the article can be defined within the dominant, hegemonic position, since its point of departure definitely is U.S. politics and its connoted dominant position in world politics, taking for granted that the opinions of a political candidate representing the political opposition in the U.S. will also have repercussions in international politics, in this case in Bosnia.

A dominating U.S. discourse

The U.S. discourse dominates this article. The majority of the articles are within the main election discourse, and within this discourse the main basic discourse is a U.S. discourse.

This discourse works two ways: In the first place, it is a discourse related to the up-coming U.S. elections, in this case represented by the opposition candidate, and reflects again how an important foreign policy issue like the elections in Bosnia becomes a central element in domestic U.S. politics. In the second place, U.S. policies towards Bosnia is a foreign policy issue, which is based on a *relationship* between the two countries, a relationship which in the U.S. discourse is reflected as a relationship where the U.S. is the 'Big Uncle', the helper, the provider of services like democracy, foreign aid, support for arms, and Bosnia is at the receiving end, dependent on the support from the U.S.

In terms of identity, this reflects a U.S. 'Self' being the dominating, powerful, but also generous and helpful towards the 'Other', here represented by Bosnia, being the victim and the dependent part in the relationship.

Addressee:

The addressee for this article is an American public of prospective voters, who are inclined to change their opinion or possibly vote differently after reading the article. Even though the subject matter relates to foreign policy, the topic to consider for the addressee is domestic, U.S. politics in the run-up to U.S. elections, in which the Elections in Bosnia had become a hot topic.

Article 6:

IHT 30 August 1996

Bosnian Elections

IHT
30.8.96

Campaign intimidation and fraudulent voter registration in Bosnia have reached the point where minimally acceptable conditions for national elections on Sept. 14 no longer exist. The voting should be postponed 30 days and more active steps taken by NATO forces and civilian election supervisors to remedy the worst abuses by mid-October.

On Tuesday the chief international election supervisor for Bosnia, Robert Frowick, postponed voting for municipal officers also scheduled for Sept. 14, citing a pervasive pattern of misconduct. The same problems taint the national, regional and presidential elections, which he did not reschedule. They threaten to turn what was supposed to be an exercise in democracy into a ratification of ethnic bullying.

For a time it looked as if the election process could be cleaned up enough to go ahead on schedule. That would have met the timetable spelled out in the Dayton peace agreement and allowed new Bosnia-wide institutions to begin functioning well before NATO troops and civilian monitors are scheduled to withdraw in December. But such optimism is no longer sustainable. The Serbian, Croatian and Muslim nationalist parties now entrenched in their respective parts of Bosnia have fatally compromised the credibility of a mid-September vote.

Party-controlled newspapers and radio and television stations are fanning ethnic hatreds and spreading slanders against rival groups. Thugs are breaking up opposition rallies and threatening opposition candidates and their supporters. In Bosnian Serb areas, some of the same individuals and groups that directed the war seem to be dominating the electoral process.

Bosnian Serb leaders like Radovan Karadzic, though ostensibly sidelined, see the elections as a way to ratify their wartime conquests and are eager for them to go forward quickly. Party activists loyal to Mr. Karadzic, working in conjunction with the government of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia, have

coerced Bosnian Serb refugees into registering to cast their votes in formerly Muslim towns, hoping to overwhelm the votes likely to be cast by Muslims evicted from these same localities.

Bosnia's president, Alija Izetbegovic, seems to fear that honest elections could dilute his Muslim nationalist party's monopoly of power in government-controlled areas. His government has blocked the operation of the independent broadcasting network designed by international authorities to allow independent candidates to be heard.

It will take until mid-October to create the minimal conditions for an internationally credible election to proceed. Mr. Frowick's civilian election supervisors and NATO troops should use this time to rerun the voter registration process under much tighter international control. They should guarantee physical protection to opposition rallies, using armed NATO troops if necessary. NATO should also provide physical protection for the establishment and operation of an independent broadcasting network under international control.

If Bosnia's voters freely return ethnic fanatics to office, that is their choice. But citizens should be able to choose from a wide spectrum of candidates in a climate free of intimidation and coercion. The United States and the international community, for their part, should not have to defend the credibility of an election that Bosnians can see for themselves has been shamelessly manipulated.

The Dayton agreement provides for the use of NATO forces to produce secure conditions for, among other things, the conduct of free and fair elections. NATO's main job — disengagement of the warring armies — has been accomplished. It would not unduly add to the burden or risk of the troops to ask them now to provide security for candidates and voters. There is unlikely to be long-term peace in Bosnia without credible elections.

—THE NEW YORK TIMES.

Article 6 (IHT 30 August 1996)

Headline: “Bosnian Elections”

The article is an editorial from *The New York Times*, printed in the *International Herald Tribune* on 30 August 1996.

Code: Negative

Category: Editorial

ARTICLE 6: BREAKDOWN SENTENCE BY SENTENCE

No.	Text	Position / Main representation	Dominating discourses/Basic discourses
1.	Campaign intimidation and fraudulent voter registration in Bosnia have reached the point where minimally acceptable conditions for national elections on Sept. 14 no longer exist.	Negative Bosnian	Election discourse Bosnia discourse Balkanization discourse
2.	The voting should be postponed 30 days and more active steps taken by NATO forces and civilian election supervisors to remedy the worst abuses by mid October.	Negative	Election discourse Bosnia discourse Western discourse
3	On Tuesday the chief international election supervisor in Bosnia, Robert Frowick, postponed voting for municipal officers also scheduled for Sept 14, citing a pervasive pattern of misconduct.	Negative West vs. Bosnia	Election discourse Bosnians discourse Balkanization discourse
4.	The same problems taint the national, regional and presidential elections, which he did not reschedule.	Negative	Election discourse
5.	They threaten to turn what was supposed to be an exercise in democracy into a ratification of ethnic bullying.	Negative Bosnian	Election discourse Balkanization discourse

6.	For a time it looked as if the election process could be cleaned up enough to go ahead on schedule.	Neutral	Election discourse
7.	That would have met the timetable spelled out in the Dayton peace agreement and allowed new Bosnia-wide institutions to be functioning well before NATO troops and civilian monitors are scheduled to withdraw in December.	Positive Western vs. Bosnia	Election discourse
8.	But such optimism is no longer sustainable.	Negative	
9.	The Serbian, Croatian and Muslim nationalist parties now entrenched in their respective parts of Bosnia have fatally compromised the credibility of a mid-September vote.	Negative Bosnian	Election discourse Balkanization discourse
10.	Party-controlled newspapers and radio and television stations are fanning ethnic hatreds and spreading slanders against rival groups.	Negative Bosnian	Election discourse Balkanization discourse
11.	Thugs are breaking up opposition rallies and threatening opposition candidates and their supporters.	Negative Bosnian	Election discourse Balkanization discourse
12.	In Bosnian Serb areas, some of the same individual and groups that directed the war seem to be dominating the electoral process.	Negative Bosnian	Election discourse Balkanization discourse
13.	Bosnian Serb leaders like Radovan Karadzic, though ostensibly sidelined, see the elections as a way to ratify their wartime conquests and are eager for them to go forward quickly.	Negative Bosnian	Election discourse Balkanization discourse
14.	Party activists loyal to Mr. Karadzic, working in conjunction with the government of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia, have coerced Bosnian Serb refugees into registering to cast their votes in formerly Muslim towns, hoping to overwhelm the votes likely to be cast by Muslims evicted from these same localities.	Negative Balkan7Bosnian	Election discourse Balkanization discourse
15.	Bosnia's president, Alija Izetbegovic, seems to fear that honest elections could dilute his Muslim nationalist party's monopoly of power in government controlled areas.	Negative Bosnian	Election discourse Balkanization discourse
16.	His government has blocked the operation of the independent broadcasting network designed by international authorities to allow independent	Negative	Election discourse

	candidates to be heard.		Balkanization discourse
17.	It will take until mid-October to create the minimal conditions for an internationally credible election to proceed.	Negative	Election discourse
18.	Mr. Frowick's civilian election supervisors and NATO troops should use this time to rerun the voter registration process under much tighter international control.	Neutral Western	Election discourse Western discourse
19.	They should guarantee physical protection to opposition rallies, using armed NATO troops if necessary.	Positive Western vs. Bosnia	Election discourse Bosnia discourse
20.	NATO should also provide physical protection for the establishment and operation of an independent broadcasting network under international control.	Positive Western vs. Bosnia	Election discourse Media discourse
21.	If Bosnia's voters freely return ethnic fanatics to office, that is their choice.	Negative Bosnian	Election discourse Balkanization discourse
22.	But citizens should be able to choose from a wide spectrum of candidates in a climate free of intimidation and coercion.	Negative Bosnian	Election discourse Balkanization discourse
23.	The United States and the international community, for their part, should not have to defend the credibility of an election that Bosnians can see for themselves has been shamelessly manipulated.	Negative Western vs. Bosnia	Election discourse Western discourse Balkanization discourse
24.	The Dayton agreement provides for the use of NATO forces to produce secure conditions for, among other things, the conduct of free and fair elections.	Neutral Western vs. Bosnia	Election discourse Western discourse Dayton discourse
25	NATO's main job – disengagement of the warring armies – has been accomplished.	Positive Western	Peace discourse
26.	It would not unduly add to the burden or risk of the troops to ask them now to provide security for candidates and voters.	Positive Western vs. Bosnia	Election discourse Western discourse Bosnian discourse

27.	There is unlikely to be long-term peace in Bosnia without credible elections.	Positive Bosnian	Election discourse Bosnian discourse
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Table 7: Article 6 – breakdown of text sentence by sentence

Summary:

The author of this editorial article claims that “...*campaign intimidations and fraudulent voter registration in Bosnia have reached the point where minimally acceptable conditions for national elections on Sept. 14 no longer exist.*” The author wants the elections postponed at least 30 days and more, and active steps should be taken to remedy the worst abuses.. Municipal elections have already been postponed, due to misconduct, but the same problem applies to national, regional and presidential elections.

An optimism which was there for a while concerning the election process, is no longer sustainable. The Serbian, Croatian and Muslim nationalist parties have themselves compromised any credibility in a vote in mid-September. Media is spreading ethnic hatred, thugs break up political meetings and threaten opposition candidates, nationalist Serbs who were active during the war are dominating the electoral process.

Bosnian Serb leaders like Radovan Karadzic, though ostensibly sidelined, see the elections as a way to ratify their wartime conquests and are eager for them to go forward quickly. On the other hand has Bosnia’s president, Alija Izetbegovic, has blocked the internationally funded independent broadcasting network to allow independent candidates to be heard. The author of the editorial suggests mid-October as a possible new date for minimal conditions to be created to allow the elections to take place, and suggests that this time should be spent rerunning the voter registration, guarantee physical protection to opposition rallies using NATO troops, protect the establishment of an independent broadcasting network etc. if the Bosnian voters freely return ethnic fanatics to office, that is their free choice. But the U.S. and the International community should not have to defend the credibility of elections that have been ‘*shamelessly manipulated.*’

Analysis:**Perspective:**

The main perspective of this article is definitely also a U.S. perspective, at the same time as it is balanced and not as narrow-mindedly focused on purely U.S. interests as some of the other articles analysed here. The main focus of the editorial is the election in Bosnia, not the U.S. election coming up. A Bosnian perspective is present in this article.

Main representation:

Although the framework represented in this article is mainly International Community/ U.S. interests, Bosnian interests are also represented to a large degree, in the sense that the editorial is worried about the situation for the Bosnian voters, shows truly concern for the democratic process in Bosnia. The U.S. is of course one of the actors contributing to this process, but unlike several of the other articles, the main focus of the editorial are the elections and the end result of the electoral process for the Bosnians.

Election discourse:

The Bosnian perspective is also represented as the most important issue related to the elections discourse, the up-coming U.S. elections are not mentioned at all.

Bosnian politics, with all its *“campaign intimidation and fraudulent voter registration”* is the central theme of the editorial. All important aspects of the issues that are hampering the election process are mentioned, including the difficult media situation, with *“party-controlled newspapers and radio and television stations “...that are “fanning ethnic hatreds and spreading slanders against rival groups”*. And the blame is distributed even-handedly, all groups are mentioned as having *“fatally compromised the credibility of a mid-September vote.* “The article mentions that *“in some of the Serb areas some of the same individuals and groups that directed the war seem to be dominating the electoral process.”* Karadzic and Milosevic get the obligatory criticism, this time for coercing *“...Bosnian Serb refugees to cast their votes in formerly Muslim towns, hoping to overwhelm the votes likely to be cast by Muslims evicted from these same localities.”* But Alija Izetbegovic is also criticised for having *“...blocked the operation of the independent broadcasting network designed by international authorities to allow independent candidates to be heard.”*

The author is at the end worried about the U.S. and the international community having to “...defend the credibility of an election that Bosnians can see for themselves has been shamelessly manipulated.”

But not to defend U.S. interests as such, but for the benefit of the Bosnian voters , who deserve “*free and fair elections*” .

Thus the author is not against holding elections at all, the conclusion of the article is:”...*there is unlikely to be long-term peace in Bosnia without credible elections.*”

It is the timing which is wrong, and the suggestion is that the elections be postponed, if only by 30 days.

Were conditions met?

The whole argument of this article rests on the proposition that hardly any o the conditions for holding elections on September 14 were met. The nationalists are controlling all political parties, there is no freedom of press, no freedom of movemnt or association, the conditions for holding free and fair elections as they were established in the Dayton Peace Agreement are not present, and the author is therefore suggesting that the elections are postponed.

Responsibility frame

If I should frame this article, I think it belongs in the *Responsibility frame*. It involves a clear request and suggestion to the responsible authorities (the Clinton Administration) to postpone the elections.

Negotiated position

The article is clearly opposing the current political trend, but is at the same time accepting the “rules of the game”, meaning that the U.S. and NATO have to control the situation in Bosnia. At the same time the article manages to keep a Bosnian perspective, and I therefore suggest it to be categorised as an article taking the negotiated position, decoding the hegemonic position while at the same time seeing the position of the less powerful in this case the Bosnians.

Addressee

Being an editorial originally printed in The New York Times, we may imagine the addressee being the liberal, reflecting urban intellectual that the New York Times presumably is trying to reach. Thus a critical editorial of an important foreign affairs issue as the Bosnian Elections were at the time, would not be surprising. Since the editorial is very balanced and to the point, it becomes even more convincing to the expected addressee. In former articles opposition to holding the elections was ascribed to Republicans trying to hamper Clinton's re-election. This cannot be ascribed to this editorial, and again making it more convincing and credible. Publishing in the International Herald Tribune may be a way of showing the world that unbiased opposition also exists in the United States.

CONCLUSIONS

The press coverage of the preparations for the first elections in Bosnia after the Dayton Peace Agreement is the main focus of the thesis. The analysis covers articles from the U.S. press during the period May to end of September 1996. The main bulk of articles is from June through September, and was printed in the newspaper *International Herald Tribune*. The articles are mainly news articles, and were for analytical purposes coded in three categories: *positive, negative or neutral*. These codes reflect the main attitude and position conveyed in the articles, whether they were positive, negative or neutral to holding the elections on the prescribed date 14 September according to the Dayton Peace Accords. The coding also relates to the position conveyed in the articles towards the process leading up to the elections.

The analysis of the total number of articles (N=80) from different U.S. newspapers, shows that the majority (73%) of the articles about the elections in Bosnia in the period June to September 1996 conveyed a negative attitude.

One assumption about the media coverage of the elections was that it would be based on a concept that the press has an active role to play in the political landscape - mainly as a communicator of information about political decisions. It is not unusual that the media is even thought of as a vehicle for foreign policy makers, in the sense that important messages are conveyed through the press. To a certain degree this assumption is confirmed in the analysis, even though the U.S. administration may not have been too pleased all the time with the way the U.S. press conveyed their decisions. The main bulk of articles were very critical towards the handling of the pre-election process.

Another general assumption about U.S. foreign news reporting is that it would stay loyal to the policies of its government. According to Davis, U.S. media normally “follows the flag”, they report on foreign affairs in accordance with the priorities of the U.S. government(Davis 1992:213). But both the result of the analysis of the total number of articles in the material and the closer analysis of the selected articles show that this assumption about foreign news reporting is not necessarily true. On the contrary, the results indicate that U.S. foreign news reporting may show journalistic independence and be critical

to the politics performed by the U.S. administration in a given situation. This way it lives up to the cherished ideal of independence of the press.

The discourse analysis of selected articles from the *International Herald Tribune* underlines the conclusion above. Although the selection of articles for analysis is not merely within the defined *negative* code, the over all message conveyed is critical to the way the pre-election process was handled, both by the U.S. government, the OSCE and other representatives of the international community involved.

One of the main indicators for the analysis was how the press coverage reflected the question:

- *Were conditions met for holding the elections? And*
- *How did the expressed position to this question reflect whether the press showed support for or had an independent/critical stand towards the policies of the U. S. administration?*

The majority of the articles conclude that all conditions were not met, even though they may have been positive or neutral to holding elections. In those cases the pragmatic position of keeping the deadline was considered more important than meeting the conditions. The majority of the articles, as mentioned above, showed an independent, critical position to the policies of the Clinton administration.

Almost all the articles are defined within an Election Discourse. At the same time most of the analysed articles represented a very clear U.S. perspective, although the subject matter dealt with the war shattered country of Bosnia. Related to this is also the fact that national U.S. politics seemed to matter more than foreign political concerns. Keeping the deadline and preparing for the elections in Bosnia was in most of the articles considered an important part of the preparations for the U.S. elections scheduled for November the same year, where president Clinton was the candidate for the Democratic Party. The mixing of national U.S. politics and international politics is a general feature reflected in almost all of the analysed press material.

Within the election discourse several other basic discourses are represented. One important such basic discourse is the so called Balkanization discourse which reflects the

Western position as democratic, well meaning, helpful towards Bosnia, the Western 'Self' as opposed to the Balkan 'Other'. This 'Other' represents everything that is counteracting modern economic and democratic development: violent, tribal, barbaric, uncivilised and backward.

Although the press was critical to the way the Bosnian policies of the U.S. administration was conducted at the time, the position of the U.S. as the dominant actor within the New World Order was never challenged. This reflects a presupposition that the U.S. is the leading power in the world, and has an implicit and defined power to act in international politics accordingly. This reflects one of the definitions of 'hegemony' in the thesis. Another definition is related to Fairclough and Gramsci, where hegemony is defined as 'leadership as much as domination across economic, political, cultural and ideological domains of society.' A third definition is the one used by Hall in the categorisation of positions of the press, where a dominant- hegemonic position is in acceptance of the social order as it is, considering it a legitimate order.

In the analysis I have tried to categorize the articles according to the positions proposed by Stuart Hall: dominant - hegemonic position, negotiated position, oppositional position. Regardless of the attitude towards the elections conveyed by the articles, most of them fall within the dominant-hegemonic position according to these categories. That means that the articles reflect an acceptance of the power structure that they describe – their representations may agree or disagree with the main actors (Bill Clinton, Dole, the head of the OSCE mission etc) but they convey a general acceptance of the structures as they are represented in U.S. and world politics.

Although the IHT appears to be an objective and balanced newspaper, a general critical position to the U.S. administration's way of handling the elections issue in Bosnia comes clearly through even in the news articles. This is shown through the negative angling of the article, the direct and indirect voice representation, and how the general tone and message of the article is conveyed.

The overall conclusion of the analysis in the thesis is that the type of foreign news reporting represented by the International Herald Tribune, to a large degree is independent and shows a critical position to the U.S. administration. The examples of the reporting concerning the first elections in Bosnia after the Dayton Peace Accords in 1996 underlines the conclusion that the press represented here has shown independence to its government's positions on the issue of the elections. Thus the ideals of an independent press contributing actively to the system of checks and balances of the U.S. structures is confirmed through the study of the press coverage of the elections in Bosnia in 1996.

Abbreviations

ABiH – Armija Bosne I Hercegovine – Army of Bosnia-Hercegovina

CDA – Critical Discourse Analysis

FRY – Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

HDZ – The Croat Nationalist Party

HVO - Hrvatsko Vijeće Obrane – the Croat Defence Council

IDP – Internally Displaced Persons

IHT – International Herald Tribune

JNA – Jugoslav Narodne Armije – Yugoslav People's Army

MSA – Mutual Security Administration (subscription paid by U.S. State Department)

NYT – The New York Times

OHR – Office of the High Representative

OSCE- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PEC – Provisional Election Commission

RS – Republika Srpska – the Bosnian Serb Republic

SFRY – Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

SDA – Stranke Demokratske Akcije – Party for Democratic Action

SDP – Social Democratic Party

SDS – Stranke Demokratske Srpskije – Bosnian Serb Party

NIOD – Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie –

Nederland's Institute for War Documentation

UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees

WP – The Washington Post

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Annexes

Annex 1

Dayton Peace Agreement

Annex 2

Figure 1: Norman Fairclough: A framework for critical discourse analysis of a communicative event

Annex 3

Tables:

June 1996 U.S. Press Coverage

July 1996 U.S. Press Coverage

August 1996 U.S. Press Coverage

September 1996 U.S. Press Coverage



Office of the High Representative

**Dayton Peace
Agreement**

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1995

The General Framework Agreement

The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the "Parties"),

Recognizing the need for a comprehensive settlement to bring an end to the tragic conflict in the region,

Desiring to contribute toward that end and to promote an enduring peace and stability,

Affirming their commitment to the Agreed Basic Principles issued on September 8, 1995, the Further Agreed Basic Principles issued on September 26, 1995, and the cease-fire agreements of September 14 and October 5, 1995,

Noting the agreement of August 29, 1995, which authorized the delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to sign, on behalf of the Republika Srpska, the parts of the peace plan concerning it, with the obligation to implement the agreement that is reached strictly and consequently,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Parties shall conduct their relations in accordance with the principles set forth in the United Nations Charter, as well as the Helsinki Final Act and other documents of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In particular, the Parties shall fully respect the sovereign equality of one another, shall settle disputes by peaceful means, and shall refrain from any action, by threat or use of force or otherwise, against the territorial integrity or political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina or any other State.

Article II

The Parties welcome and endorse the arrangements that have been made concerning the military aspects of the peace settlement and aspects of regional stabilization, as set forth in the Agreements at Annex 1-A and Annex 1-B. The Parties shall fully respect and promote fulfillment of the commitments made in Annex 1-A, and shall comply fully with their commitments as set forth in Annex 1-B.

Article III

The Parties welcome and endorse the arrangements that have been made concerning the boundary demarcation between the two Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, as set forth in the Agreement at Annex 2. The Parties shall fully respect and promote fulfillment of the commitments made therein.

Article IV

The Parties welcome and endorse the elections program for Bosnia and Herzegovina as set forth in Annex 3. The Parties shall fully respect and promote fulfillment of that program.

Article V

The Parties welcome and endorse the arrangements that have been made concerning the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as set forth in Annex 4. The Parties shall fully respect and promote fulfillment of the commitments made therein.

Article VI

The Parties welcome and endorse the arrangements that have been made concerning the establishment of an arbitration tribunal, a Commission on Human Rights, a Commission on Refugees and Displaced Persons, a Commission to Preserve National Monuments, and Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations, as set forth in the Agreements at Annexes 5-9. The Parties shall fully respect and promote fulfillment of the commitments made therein.

Article VII

Recognizing that the observance of human rights and the protection of refugees and displaced persons are of vital importance in achieving a lasting peace, the Parties agree to and shall comply fully with the provisions concerning human rights set forth in Chapter One of the Agreement at Annex 6, as well as the provisions concerning refugees and displaced persons set forth in Chapter One of the Agreement at Annex 7.

Article VIII

The Parties welcome and endorse the arrangements that have been made concerning the implementation of this peace settlement, including in particular those pertaining to the civilian (non-military) implementation, as set forth in the Agreement at Annex 10, and the international police task force, as set forth in the Agreement at Annex 11. The Parties shall fully respect and promote fulfillment of the commitments made therein.

Article IX

The Parties shall cooperate fully with all entities involved in implementation of this peace settlement, as described in the Annexes to this Agreement, or which are otherwise authorized by the United Nations Security Council, pursuant to the obligation of all Parties to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law.

Article X

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina recognize each other as sovereign independent States within their international borders.

Further aspects of their mutual recognition will be subject to subsequent discussions.

Article XI

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

DONE at Paris, this 14 day of December, 1995, in the Bosnian, Croatian, English and Serbian languages, each text being equally authentic.

For the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

For the Republic of Croatia

For the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Witnessed by:

European Union Special Negotiator

For the French Republic

For the Federal Republic of Germany

For the Russian Federation

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

For the United States of America

Annexes

Annex 1-A: Agreement on Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement

Annex 1-B: Agreement on Regional Stabilization

Annex 2: Agreement on Inter-Entity Boundary Line and Related Issues

Annex 3: Agreement on Elections

Annex 4: Constitution

Annex 5: Agreement on Arbitration

Annex 6: Agreement on Human Rights

Annex 7: Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons

Annex 8: Agreement on the Commission to Preserve National Monuments

Annex 9: Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations

Annex 10: Agreement on Civilian Implementation

Annex 11: Agreement on International Police Task Force**Office of the High Representative**

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Office of the High Representative

Dayton Peace
Agreement

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1995

The General Framework Agreement: Annex 3

ANNEX 3

Agreement on Elections

In order to promote free, fair, and democratic elections and to lay the foundation for representative government and ensure the progressive achievement of democratic goals throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, in accordance with relevant documents of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska ("the Parties") have agreed as follows:

Article I: Conditions for Democratic Elections

1. The Parties shall ensure that conditions exist for the organization of free and fair elections, in particular a politically neutral environment; shall protect and enforce the right to vote in secret without fear or intimidation; shall ensure freedom of expression and of the press; shall allow and encourage freedom of association (including of political parties); and shall ensure freedom of movement.
2. The Parties request the OSCE to certify whether elections can be effective under current social conditions in both Entities and, if necessary, to provide assistance to the Parties in creating these conditions.
3. The Parties shall comply fully with paragraphs 7 and 8 of the OSCE Copenhagen Document, which are attached to this Agreement.

Article II: The OSCE Role

1. **OSCE.** The Parties request the OSCE to adopt and put in place an elections program for Bosnia and Herzegovina as set forth in this Agreement.
2. **Elections.** The Parties request the OSCE to supervise, in a manner to be determined by the OSCE and in cooperation with other international organizations the OSCE deems necessary, the preparation and conduct of elections for the House of Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina; for the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina; for the House of Representatives of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; for the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska; for the Presidency of the Republika Srpska; and, if feasible, for cantonal legislatures and municipal governing authorities.
3. **The Commission.** To this end, the Parties request the OSCE to establish a Provisional Election Commission ("the Commission").
4. **Timing.** Elections shall take place on a date ("Election Day") six months after entry into force of this Agreement or, if the OSCE determines a delay necessary, no later than nine months after entry into force.

Article III: The Provisional Election Commission

1. **Rules and Regulations.** The Commission shall adopt electoral rules and regulations regarding: the registration of political parties and independent candidates; the eligibility of candidates and voters; the role of domestic and international election observers; the ensuring of an open and fair electoral campaign; and the establishment, publication, and certification of definitive election results. The Parties shall comply fully with the electoral rules and regulations, any internal laws and regulations notwithstanding.
2. **Mandate of the Commission.** The responsibilities of the Commission, as provided in the electoral rules and regulations, shall include:
 - a. supervising all aspects of the electoral process to ensure that the structures and institutional framework for free and fair elections are in place;
 - b. determining voter registration provisions;
 - c. ensuring compliance with the electoral rules and regulations established pursuant to this Agreement;
 - d. ensuring that action is taken to remedy any violation of any provision of this Agreement or of the electoral rules and regulations established pursuant to this Agreement, including imposing penalties against any person or body that violates such provisions; and
 - e. accrediting observers, including personnel from international organizations and foreign and domestic non-governmental organizations, and ensuring that the Parties grant accredited observers unimpeded access and movement.
3. **Composition and Functioning of the Commission.** The Commission shall consist of the Head of the OSCE Mission, the High Representative or his or her designee, representatives of the Parties, and such other persons as the Head of the OSCE Mission, in consultation with the Parties, may decide. The Head of the OSCE Mission shall act as Chairman of the Commission. In the event of disputes within the Commission, the decision of the Chairman shall be final.
4. **Privileges and Immunities.** The Chairman and Commission shall enjoy the right to establish communications facilities and to engage local and administrative staff, and the status, privileges and immunities accorded to a diplomatic agent and mission under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

Article IV: Eligibility

1. **Voters.** Any citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina aged 18 or older whose name appears on the 1991 census for Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be eligible, in accordance with electoral rules and regulations, to vote. A citizen who no longer lives in the municipality in which he or she resided in 1991 shall, as a general rule, be expected to vote, in person or by absentee ballot, in that municipality, provided that the person is determined to have been registered in that municipality as confirmed by the local election commission and the Provisional Election Commission.

Such a citizen may, however, apply to the Commission to cast his or her ballot elsewhere. The exercise of a refugee's right to vote shall be interpreted as confirmation of his or her intention to return to Bosnia and Herzegovina. By Election Day, the return of refugees should already be underway, thus allowing many to participate in person in elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Commission may provide in the electoral rules and regulations for citizens not listed in the 1991 census to vote.

Article V: Permanent Election Commission

The Parties agree to create a permanent Election Commission with responsibilities to

conduct future elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Article VI: Entry into Force

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

For the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

For the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

For the Republika Srpska

Attachment to Annex 3 on Elections

Document of the Second Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Copenhagen, 1990.

Paragraphs 7 and 8:

(7) To ensure that the will of the people serves as the basis of the authority of government, the participating States will

(7.1) - hold free elections at reasonable intervals, as established by law;

(7.2) - permit all seats in at least one chamber of the national legislature to be freely contested in a popular vote;

(7.3) - guarantee universal and equal suffrage to adult citizens;

(7.4) - ensure that votes are cast by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure, and that they are counted and reported honestly with the official results made public;

(7.5) - respect the right of citizens to seek political or public office, individually or as representatives of political parties or organizations, without discrimination;

(7.6) - respect the right of individuals and groups to establish, in full freedom, their own political parties or other political organizations and provide such political parties and organizations with the necessary legal guarantees to enable them to compete with each other on a basis of equal treatment before the law and by the authorities;

(7.7) - ensure that law and public policy work to permit political campaigning to be conducted in a fair and free atmosphere in which neither administrative action, violence nor intimidation bars the parties and the candidates from freely presenting their views and qualifications, or prevents the voters from learning and discussing them or from casting their vote free of fear of retribution;

(7.8) - provide that no legal or administrative obstacle stands in the way of unimpeded access to the media on a non-discriminatory basis for all political groupings and individuals wishing to participate in the electoral process;

(7.9) - ensure that candidates who obtain the necessary number of votes required by

law are duly installed in office and are permitted to remain in office until their term expires or is otherwise brought to an end in a manner that is regulated by law in conformity with democratic parliamentary and constitutional procedures.

(8) - The participating States consider that the presence of observers, both foreign and domestic, can enhance the electoral process for States in which elections are taking place. They therefore invite observers from any other CSCE participating States and any appropriate private institutions and organizations who may wish to do so to observe the course of their national election proceedings, to the extent permitted by law. They will also endeavour to facilitate similar access for election proceedings held below the national level. Such observers will undertake not to interfere in the electoral proceedings.

Office of the High Representative

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Annex 2

Figure 1, Norman Fairclough: A framework for critical discourse analysis of a communicative event




Fig. 1: A framework for critical discourse analysis of a communicative event

Annex 3**Tables : June 1996 U.S. Press coverage****July 1996 U.S. Press coverage****August 1996 U.S. Press coverage****September 1996 U.S. Press coverage**

LIST OF ARTICLES U.S. PRESS JUNE 1996 – ON ELECTIONS

IHT = International Herald Tribune, NYT = New York Times, WP= Washington Post, LAT = Los Angeles Times
P = positive N= neutral Neg = negative

No.	Date	Author	Page	Title	Genre	P	N	Neg
1	2	Chris Hedges	NYT	Report on Bosnia questions ability to hold elections	News report			X
2	3		LAT	Bosnian vote to go ahead by mid Sept.	News report	X		
3	4	Strecko Latal (AP)	WP	Most Bosnians disagree with West on timetable for nation's elections	News report			X
4	4		WP	Bosnia Loophole	Editorial			X
5	4		NYT	Protect Bosnia's Election	Editorial	X		
6	4		LAT	Elections and War Criminals	Editorial	X		
7	4	Philip Shenon	NYT	From the U.S., Mixed Signals on Bosnia War Crime Issue	News Report			X
8	5	Chris Hedges	NYT	Bosnia observers told to focus on Positive Events	News Report			X
9	10	Chris Hedges	IHT/ NYT	Swiss Resist Pressure by U.S. for Bosnia Vote	News Report			X
10	13	Steven Erlanger	IHT/ NYT	Washington Steamrolls allies in Drive for Bosnia Election	News analysis			X
11	13	Thomas L. Friedman	IHT	Behind the U.S. Position: Idealism, Deceit, Desperation	Opinion			X
12	14	Reuters, AP	IHT	Conference on Bosnia Assesses Peace Progress	News report		X	
13	14	Jonathan C. Randal	IHT	Free Press Sacrificed For Election	News report			X
14	15-	Warren Christopher	IHT/ NYT	Without Elections, There Will Be No Unified Bosnian State	Opinion	X		
15	15-	Anthony Lewis	IHT	But War Criminals Still Call the Shots	News report			X
16	17	AFP	IHT	Ex-Bosnia Prime Minister Hurt	News Report		X	
17	17	Flora Lewis	IHT	Western Make-Believe in Bosnia Can't Have a Happy Ending	Opinion			X
18	17	Daniel Williams	IHT/ WP	Alarm Over Karadzic Clouds Peace Process	News Report		X	

19	19	Joseph Fitchett	IHT	Europeans Second U.S. On Bosnian Elections	News report	X		
20	20	John Pomfret	IHT/ WP	The Bosnian Riddle: Who's in Charge Here?	News analysis			X
21	24	Reuters	IHT	Karadzic Said to Plan to Quit but Keep Power	News item		X	
22	29- 30	Reuters AP	IHT	Karadzic is Told to Quit by Monday	News item		X	
				Total		5	5	12

No.	Date	Author	Paper	Headline	Genre	Pos.	Neu.	Neg.
1	01	John Pomfret	IHT/WP	Karadzic Steps Aside as Bosnian Serb Chief	News report		x	
2	02	Chris Hedges	IHT/NYT	West's About-Face on Karadzic: Familiar and Sad	News analysis			x
3	03	Reuters	IHT	No Deal, Serbs' New Leader Says	News report			x
4	03	IHT	IHT	Karadzic's Taunt	Editorial		x	
5	04	IHT/AFP/AP	IHT	Is Karadzic in or Is He Out?	News Report			x
6	06-07	IHT/Reuters/	IHT	Karadzic Seeks a Trial, on His Terms				x
7	08	Raymond Bonner	IHT/NYT	A Bosnian Dilemma: Karadzic and Mladic	News Report			x
8	11	William Pfaff	IHT/LAT	International Troublemakers Could Do Some Good in Bosnia	Opinion			x
9	15	Elaine Sciolino	IHT/NYT	U.S. Sending Holbrooke to Prod Serbia on Karadzic	News Report		x	
10	15	Mike O'Connor	IHT/NYT	Attacks on Foreigners Raise Bosnian Tension	News Report			x
11	16	IHT/Reuters/AFP	IHT	Vote Overseer Says Karadzic Must Back Off	News Report			x
12	22	IHT/NYT	IHT/NYT	Diplomatic Verve	Editorial	x		
13	23	Michael Dobbs	IHT/WP	2 Lone Rangers in Diplomacy: Holbrooke and Germany's '008'	News Report	x		
14	23	Georgie Anne Geyer	IHT	How a Potemkin Force Cowed the Mighty West	Opinion			x
15	24	IHT/AP	IHT	Next U.S. Move: Evict Karadzic	News Report			x
16	24	Samantha Power	IHT/NYT	Croatia, Too, Flouts Dayton Pact	Opinion			x
17	24	Christine Spolar	WP	Serbs Linozbe Banned Leader	News Report			x
18	25	Raymond Bonner	IHT/NYT	Moderates, Such as They are, Sprout in Bosnia	News Report			x
19	26	William Pfaff	IHT/LAT	War Crimes Panel could Set a Crucial Precedent	Opinion			x
20	28	John Pomfret	WP	Karadzic's Party blocks Serbs	News Report			x
21	30	Reuters	WP	Official Harbors Limited Hope on Bosnian Elections	News Report			x
				Total		2	3	16

LIST OF ARTICLES U.S PRESS AUGUST 1996 – ON ELECTIONS

IHT = International Herald Tribune, NYT = New York Times, WP= Washington Post
Pos= positive, Neu = neutral, Neg = Negative

No	Date	Author	Paper	Headline	Genre	Pos	Neu	Neg
1	01	Mike O'Connor	IHT/NYT	In Serbian Bosnia, the Opposition Cringes	News Report			x
2	03	Mike O'Connor	NYT	Serb Fighter Now Fights Ruling Party in Bosnia	News Report	x		
3	06	Christine Spolar	WP	Watch on Media Blinks in Bosnia	News Report			x
4	10	Christine Spolar	WP	A Complex Route to Harmony: Bosnian Vote Fraught with Intricacies, Fears of further Division	News Report			x
5	10-11	AFP	IHT	U.S. Aide in Serbia	News Item		x	
6	12	Christine Spolar	IHT	The Muslim Candidate Amid Bosnian Serbs	News Report			x
7	14	Reuters	IHT	U.S. and NATO Press for Fair Polls in Bosnia	News Report	x		
8	16	David L. Bosen	IHT	Who will Stand Up for Free Elections in Bosnia	Opinion			x
9	16	Anna Husarska	IHT	Minimal Prerequisite Conditions Haven't Been Achieved	Opinion			x
10	17-18	AFP/Reuters/IHT	IHT	Security Aides In Bosnia Fear Plot on Troops Linked to Vote	News report			x
11	17-18	WP	IHT	Bosnia Isn't Ready	Editorial			x
12	22	John Pomfret	WP	Bosnian Refugees Look to Ballot Box	News Report			x
13	23	John Pomfret	IHT/WP	Bosnian Serb Switches From Purges to Politics				x
14	30	IHT/NYT	IHT/NYT	Bosnian Elections	Editorial			x
15	31	William Claiborne	IHT/WP	Dole Presses Clinton to Delay Vote by Bosnians	News Report			x
						2	1	12

LIST OF ARTICLES U.S. PRESS SEPTEMBER 1996 - ON ELECTIONS

IHT = International Herald Tribune, WP = Washington Post, NYT = New York Times
 Pos = Positive, Neu = Neutral, Neg = Negative

No	Date	Author	Paper	Headline	Genre	Pos	Neu	Neg
1	05	Mike O'Connor	IHT	(.....unreadable) weakens Elections in Bosnia				X
2	06	Christine Spolar	IHT/ WP	Karadzic on Display - Monitors Probe Serbs' Use of His Image	News Report			X
3	09	WP	IHT/ WP	A Bosnia Flasco?	Editorial			X
4	09	John Pomfret	IHT/ WP	Test for Fragile Bosnia - Sept. 14 Elections Face Daunting Hurdles	News Report			X
5	10	Anthony Lewis	IHT/ NYT	Next in bosnia, a fraud Approved by America	Opinion			X
6	12	John Pomfret	IHT/ WP	Cleaning Up on Ethnic Cleansing- Bosnian Serbs Unyielding on the Return of a Muslim Family	News Report			X
7	12	Anthony Lake	IHT	These Elections Are a Step In Bringing Democracy to Bosnia	Opinion	X		
8	13	Mike O'Connor	IHT/ NYT	Serb Warlord Shakes The Sword of Politics	News Report			X
9	14 - 15	Chris Hedges	IHT/ NYT	Exhausted, Bosnia Votes - Village Mirrors Broken Nation's Woes	News report			X
10	14- 15	Joseph Fitchett	IHT	Expecting the Worst; An Extremist Landslide	News Analysis			X
11	14- 15	John Kornblum	IHT/ WP	Is this the Right time for the Bosnians to Vote ? Finally, Giving the People Their Say	Opinion	X		
12	14- 15	Anthony Lewis	IHT/ NYT	Strengthening the War Criminal	Opinion			X
13	14- 15	John Pomfret	IHT/ WP	Bosnia/ For a Fragmented Nation, flawed Elections/ The Moderate Parties: Do they Stand a chance for a Toehold?	News Report			X

14	14-	Mike O'Connor	IHT/N YT	Daunting Day for Voters: Getting to the Polls Stumps Refugees	News Report			X
15	16	Chris Hedges	IHT/N YT	Balkan Rivals Set To Meet in Paris-U.S. Acts Fast to Generate Talks On Future of Bosnia After Vote	News Report		X	
16	17	Reuters	IHT	Izetbegovic Leads Rival In Bosnia But Serb Might Take 3-Man presidency	News Report		X	
17	17	IHT	NYT	Bosnia work Continues	Editorial			X
18	17	Jim Hoagland	IHT/ WP	If Bosnia's voting Exercise Were Habit-Forming	Opinion			X
19	17	Anthony Lewis	IHT/ NYT	But the Instigators of This Catastrophe Are Still at Work	Opinion			X
20	18	Chris Hedges	IHT/ NYT	Hard-Liners Srugc IN Bosnia's election For 3-Man Presidency	News Report			X
21	18	WP	IHT/ WP	After Bosnia's Elections	Editorial			X
22	19	IHT	IHT	Muslim Wins First Place in Bosnia Izetbegovic Edges Serb Hard -Liner to Lead Presidency	News Report	X		
23	20	Jim Hoagland	IHT/ WP	Why Indicted Bosnian War Criminals Go Free	Opinion			X
24	21-22	AP	IHT	Monitor Denounces Election in Bosnia	News Item			X
25	21-22	NYT	IHT/ NYT	Beyond Bosnia's Elections	Editorial			X
26	21	John Pomfret	WP	Counting Errors, Alleged Fraud Put Bosnian Results in Question	News Report			X
27	24	Michael Dobbs	IHT/ WP	Now It's the Bosnia Diplomats Warring 5 Nations in contact Group dispute When to Lift Sanctions on Serbia	News Report		X	
28	25	John Mearsheimer /Stephen Van Evera	IHT/ NYT	Partition Is the Inevitable Solution	Opinion			X
Total number of articles - September						3	3	22